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ABSTRACT
Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace is widely recognized 
as a foundational International Relations text. My 
research has uncovered a variety of competing 
interpretations of the work since its initial publication 
in the late eighteenth century. This thesis examines 
English-language commentary on the treatise from the mid­
nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century. It 
demonstrates the existence of two distinct patterns of 
interpretation.
According to my analysis, interpretations from the 
mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century assert that the 
text endorses peace proposals above the state level. This 
collection of interpretations constitutes Pattern One. 
Interpretations from the mid-twentieth century to its end, 
however, maintain that the text is in favor of peace 
proposals at the state level. This collection of
interpretations constitutes Pattern Two.
It is argued that the principal explanation for the 
existence of these patterns resides-in the rise and decline 
of hopes for peace through international organization. A 
subsidiary explanation is that the patterns reflect the 
steady increase in the number of liberal states in the 
western hemisphere over the past century and one-half. 
These patterns and their explanations provide a 
comprehensive historical background and analytical 
framework for understanding Perpetual Peace which enables 
academics and students of International Relations to better 
understand and appreciate its complex meaning and to think 
beyond the conventionally accepted interpretations of the 
day.
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INTRODUCTION
'THE PERPETUAL PEACE'
A Dutch innkeeper once put this satirical 
inscription on his signboard, along with the 
picture of a graveyard. We shall not trouble to 
ask whether it applies to men in general, or 
particularly to heads of state (who can never 
have enough of war) , or only to the philosophers 
who blissfully dream of perpetual peace. The 
author of the present essay does, however, make 
one reservation in advance. The practical
politician tends to look down with great 
complacency upon the political theorist as a mere 
academic. The theorist's abstract ideas, the 
practitioner believes, cannot endanger the state, 
since the state must be founded upon principles 
of experience; it thus seems safe to let him fire 
off his whole broadside, and the worldly-wise 
statesman need not turn a hair. It thus follows 
that if the practical politician is to be 
consistent, he must not claim, in the event of a 
dispute with the theorist, to scent any danger to 
the state in the opinions which the theorist has 
randomly uttered in public. By this saving 
clause, the author of this essay will consider 
himself expressly safeguarded, in correct and 
proper style, against all malicious
interpretation.1
The prelude to Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace, first 
published in Konigsberg in 1795, is a prophecy. Kant
1Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Political 
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 93
(emphasis added). Any text quoted from Kant's Perpetual 
Peace throughout the thesis derives from this translation. 
When commentators use alternative translations in their 
interpretation of the treatise, these are noted and any 
relevant distinctions in language are indicated.
7
predicted that suspicious political leaders would consider 
the essay a "malicious" tract. He had visions of practical 
politicians, then or at some later time, holding his new 
treatise responsible for endangering the state. By 
including these clever opening lines, he believed he was 
successfully guarding against this possibility.2 Little was 
his concern that the very theorists he was trying to 
protect might argue endlessly over what he proposed in 
Perpetual Peace through the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This, in fact, is exactly what they have done. 
Their commentary on Kant's text is the source of this 
thesis.
As a Master of Science student at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science researching Kant's 
contribution to international political theory, I became 
intrigued with the number of competing interpretations of 
Perpetual Peace I found over the years. Observing that 
similar interpretations of the work were situated in 
relatively well-defined periods of history, it occurred to 
me that further research might reveal distinct patterns of
Apparently, Kant's Prelude was not clever enough. The 
publication of Perpetual Peace immediately "won him the 
reproach of being a Jacobin (1795)." A.C.F. Beales, The 
History of Peace: A Short Account of the Organized
Movements for International Peace (New York: The Dial
Press, 1931), p. 36.
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interpretation of Kant's celebrated treatise. This thesis 
sets out to explore this possibility. Additionally, once 
the existence of the patterns is successfully established, 
the thesis asks: why have they formed? It puts forward two 
historical explanations, one principal, one subsidiary, for 
pattern formation, and in the process, reflects on the 
relationship between the historico-political context of the 
interpreter and his or her interpretation of a classic text 
of International Relations. More broadly, this thesis 
provides for the first time a thorough account of the way 
Perpetual Peace has been interpreted in the English 
language. It is hoped that an interpretive history of this 
treatise will be a meaningful and valuable contribution to 
an academic discipline in which it is viewed as a 
foundational text.
Outlining the Arguments
I argue that two clear patterns of interpretation of 
Perpetual Peace have arisen. These patterns emerge from 
interpretations of the text completed in the English 
language between the years 1845 and 2000. Chapter One 
offers an introduction to the text of Perpetual Peace. It 
discusses which portions of the text are of most
9
consequence to interpretations that ultimately reveal each 
pattern. This chapter provides the reader with a general 
grasp of the diverse ideas and proposals within the full 
text of Perpetual Peace. In addition, highlighting the 
broad range of its subject matter facilitates understanding 
of the more detailed discussions of interpretations that 
must occur when arguments for the existence of patterns are 
made in the chapters to follow.
According to my analysis in Chapters Two and Three, 
interpretations from the mid-nineteenth to the mid­
twentieth century maintain that the text of Perpetual Peace 
endorses peace proposals above the state level. This 
collection of interpretations constitutes Pattern One, the 
development of which occurred in two phases. Pattern One, 
Phase One emerges from interpretations completed between 
the mid-nineteenth century and the end of World War I. 
These interpretations are discussed in Chapter Two. 
Interpretations during this period assert that the text 
calls for a significant restraint on state sovereignty 
through establishment of a centralized authority, in the 
form of an international state or strong federation, above 
the collectivity of states. Pattern One, Phase Two arises 
from interpretations completed between the end of World War 
I and the mid-twentieth century. These interpretations are
10
considered in Chapter Three. Interpretations during this 
period suggest the text requires the sovereignty of each 
state to be curbed through establishment of a less
formidable federation --  one that still exists, however,
as an institutionalized authority above the level of 
states.
According to my analysis in Chapters Four through 
Seven, interpretations from the mid-twentieth century to 
its end maintain that the text supports peace proposals at 
the state level. This collection of interpretations 
constitutes Pattern Two, and as with Pattern One, two 
phases of development can be identified. Pattern Two, 
Phase One emerges from interpretations completed between 
the 1950s and the early 1980s. These interpretations are 
examined in Chapter Four. After a century of understanding 
Perpetual Peace as requiring the limitation of state 
sovereignty, interpreters during this period defend a 
state-centric reading of Kant's work which sees the 
prevention of war occurring through peace proposals at the 
state level. Pattern Two, Phase Two arises from
interpretations completed from the early 1980s through the 
post-Cold War era. These interpretations are explored in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. According to my analysis, 
interpretations during this period similarly view the
11
sovereign state as paramount in Kant's text and see it as 
the primary vehicle to peace. Yet these interpretations 
are better understood as a second phase of Pattern Two 
because of the special emphasis they give to the First 
Definitive Article, which proclaims that the civil 
constitution of every state shall be republican.3
Finally, this thesis puts forward broad historical 
explanations for the various patterns and phases of 
interpretation of Kant's treatise. Chapter Eight sets 
forth the principal explanation, which argues that pattern 
formation is a function of the rise and fall of hopes for 
peace through international organization. A subsidiary 
explanation developed in Chapter Nine reflects on the 
steady increase in the number of liberal states in the 
western hemisphere over the past one hundred fifty-five 
years and the affect of this evolving historico-political 
phenomenon on the minds of interpreters commenting on 
Perpetual Peace during this time period and living 
generally within this geographical space.
3Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbett, p. 99.
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The Sociology of Knowledge
These final two chapters move the thesis in the 
direction of the 'sociology of knowledge.' The 'sociology 
of knowledge' is associated with the thought of Karl 
Mannheim, specifically, his book Ideology and Utopia. 
Broadly stated, the 'sociology of knowledge' considers "the 
significance of the non-theoretical conditioning factors in 
knowledge" and makes the following key observation: "mental
structures are inevitably differently formed in different 
social and historical settings."4 According to Mannheim, 
"the older method of intellectual history, which was 
oriented towards the a priori conception that changes in 
ideas were to be understood on the level of ideas (immanent 
intellectual history), blocked recognition of the 
penetration of the social process into the intellectual 
sphere."5 Another way he states this is that "the emergence 
and crystallization of actual thought" does not "develop 
historically in accordance with immanent laws" or "follow
4Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to 
the Sociology of Knowledge, translated by Louis Wirth and 
Edward Shils (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1954;
first published in England, 1936), p. 237 and p.238, 
respectively.
5Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 240.
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from the 'nature of things'" or "from 'pure logical 
possibilities.'"6 Neither is it "driven by an 'inner 
dialectic.'"7 Instead, it "is influenced in many decisive 
points by extra-theoretical factors of the most diverse 
sort."8 Mannheim's central concern is with the
"perspective" of the thinking subject or, as he describes 
the term, "the subject's whole mode of conceiving things as 
determined by his historical and social setting."9
Similarly, this thesis, specifically the final two 
chapters, focuses on the "perspective" of the interpreter 
as he or she encounters Perpetual Peace. The interpreter's
consciousness ---  "his whole mode of conceiving things" as
Mannheim says  when he or she examines a text on the
subject of international political theory is in many ways 
shaped by the historical, social and political currents of 
a given age. The thesis asserts that this Mannheimian 
"perspective" conditions and influences his or her
interpretation of the text.10 Additionally, the larger
6Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 240.
7Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 240.
8Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 240.
9Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 239.
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patterns that I argue have emerged reflect the 
"perspective" of a number of interpreters at work during 
well-defined historical stages. The thesis submits that 
this is a plausible way to account for the variety of 
competing interpretations that have arisen over the past 
century and one-half, especially when it is understood that 
all interpreters were reading similarly translated texts of 
Perpetual Peace through the entire period in question. 
Though the language of the text remains the same through 
time, the meaning of the text changes shape with time.
10In a short essay discussing Mannheim's thought, E.H.
Carr once wrote the following:
The proposition that thought is influenced and 
conditioned by the situation of the thinker in time 
and place had been repeated so often as to become 
trite and boring. Yet in practice the history of 
philosophical or political or economic ideas could 
still be discussed and taught as a self-sufficient
entity in which one 'school' succeeded another without
regard to the social background whose changing 
character determined the changing patterns of thought. 
Mannheim laboured to show that the history of ideas, 
like other kinds of history, could not be studied in 
isolation from the society in which the ideas were
born and flourished. E.H. Carr, From Napoleon to
Stalin and Other Essays (London: MacMillan Press,
Ltd., 1980) , pp. 179-80 .
Perpetual Peace: Textual Interpretations under
Consideration
In completing a broad interpretive history of this 
kind, it is important to set out which interpretations are 
under consideration in development of the thesis. 
Generally speaking, this thesis examines English-language 
interpretations of Kant's Perpetual Peace completed from 
1845 to the year 2000. The majority of these
interpretations were written by Anglo-American scholars and 
commentators who consider the treatise in a variety of 
books, academic articles, book reviews and even prefaces 
and introductions to translations of the text. It is 
necessary at this stage to say a few words about those 
interpretations that are not considered in this thesis and 
the reasons for their exclusion.
First, as stated above, Kant's Perpetual Peace was 
published in the year 1795. We are told that it initially 
sold fifteen hundred copies,11 was readied for a second 
edition in 1796, and translated into the English and French
11Edwin Mead, "Immanuel Kant's Internationalism," 
Contemporary Review, CVII (February 1915), p. 228.
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shortly thereafter.12 While given greater attention by 
scholars since the publication of F. H. Hinsley's enduring 
analysis of it in Power and the Pursuit of Peace (1963), it 
had been discussed by historians, international lawyers, 
and peace advocates, as well as those writing within the 
relatively new field of academic International Relations 
and the somewhat older field of Political Science, long 
before Hinsley's well-known work reached the bookshelves.
Importantly, there have been translations of the 
treatise into a number of languages over the years and my 
research has discovered commentary on the piece, however 
more prevalent since the end of the Cold War, in tongues as 
varied as French, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, and even 
Croatian, as well as the original German. While it is 
assumed that the latter offer discerning textual analyses 
in their own right, in order to delimit the research 
project and to avoid the morass of linguistic difficulties 
that might easily follow from an expansive interpretive, 
history of this kind, I have deliberately chosen to focus 
the lion's share of my research efforts on scholarly 
commentary about Perpetual Peace written in the English 
language. Such a preference, however befitting to a thesis
12W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 9.
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written within a discipline whose origins are predominantly 
Anglo-American, is in no way intended to slight well- 
developed interpretation of Kant's popular treatise in 
these additional languages.13 Indeed, there are several 
instances throughout the following chapters where such 
interpretations are discussed as points of comparison or as 
examples of interpretive consistency (or inconsistency) 
across linguistic and geographic boundaries.
Second, Kant's writings on international relations are 
relatively few in number, written mainly during the later 
part of his life, and have sometimes been criticized by 
scholars for their supposed lack of seriousness stemming 
from rather suspicious remarks Kant made about them. For 
example, Hannah Arendt remarks that Kant "called some of 
[his political writings] a mere 'play with ideas' or a 
'mere pleasure trip.'"14 And in reference to the "ironical 
tone of Perpetual Peace" which Arendt deems "by far the
13Chris Brown notes, "the discipline of International 
Relations remains to this day largely a product of the 
English-speaking world, although, happily, this may not be 
the case for much longer." Chris Brown, Understanding 
International Relations (MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1997), p. 
22.
14Hannah Arendt & Ronald Beiner, eds., Lectures on 
Kant's Political Philosophy - Delivered at the New School 
for Social Research, Fall 1970 (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1982), p . 7.
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most important of them," she says not to take "too 
seriously" the treatise he once called in a letter to 
Kiesewetter (October 15, 1795) little more than
"'reveries.'"15 Still, well-respected authors note their 
"lasting influence" on the discipline of International 
Relations.16 Because of Kant's important later writings on 
international relations, Howard Williams and Ken Booth 
recently stated that the German known most for his critical 
and moral philosophy "has a justifiable claim to be the 
first comprehensive theorist of world politics."17 They 
give much of the credit for contemporary academic interest 
in Kant's writings on international relations to Martin 
Wight and his influential work International Theory: The
Three Traditions. According to Williams and Booth, Wight 
"was the first modern theorist of international relations
15Arendt and Beiner, eds., Lectures on Kant's Political 
Philosophy, p. 7.
16Andrew Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in 
International Relations," Review of International Studies, 
16 (1990), p. 183.
17Howard Williams & Ken Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond
Limits" in Ian Clark & Iver B. Neuman, eds., Classical 
Theories of International Relations (Houndsmills, 
Basingstroke & London: MacMillan Press, 1996), p. 71.
While both authors applaud Wight for encouraging scholarly 
interest in Kant's writings on international relations, 
they note that Wight "did not serve Kant well" by anointing 
him "intellectual figurehead of the 'Revolutionist'
19
to take Kant's work seriously."18 Specifically, Perpetual 
Peace, of all of Kant's works on politics and international 
relations, has received the most attention from 
contemporary scholars for its visionary proposals and the 
relevance it is held to have for present-day international 
politics. Indeed, Wight remarks, "Kant's essay on
Perpetual Peace was perhaps the ripest fruit of his 
philosophy" and "the most illustrious example" of writings 
by "some of the greatest political philosophers 
fascinated by the problems of international relations."19
While there is ample evidence of Kant's unpublished 
reflections on the subject of international relations from 
1764-1768 and from 1773-1789,20 the most influential 
published writings occur even later in his life from 1784 
to 1797. The following are four essays written by Kant
tradition." Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond
Limits," p. 71.
18Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
72 .
t
19Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three
Traditions, edited by Gabriele Wright and Brian Porter with 
an introductory essay by Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester
University Press for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1991), p. 4.
20Georg Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations: Free
Federation or World Republic?" Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 32 (July 1994), pp. 462-63.
20
during this later period: Idea for a Universal History with 
a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) ; On the Common Saying: This
May be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice 
(1793) ; Perpetual Peace (1795) ; and The Metaphysics of 
Morals (1797) . All wrestle with the same issues Kant 
confronts in Perpetual Peace.
Some of the scholarly commentary and interpretation 
discussed in the thesis attempts to discern the meaning of 
Kant's international theory through a comparative analysis 
of all the works mentioned above. In its treatments of 
these accounts, however, this thesis carefully isolates 
commentary on Perpetual Peace from the discussion of Kant's 
other writings on international relations. Only 
occasionally are the latter considered. This is because 
the thesis is not an exposition on the history of Kant's 
general international theory based on an analysis of 
interpretations of all his works on the subject. The
principal focus is on Perpetual Peace --  a treatise Chris
Brown recently called "the first genuine masterpiece of 
international political theory."21
21Brown, Understanding International Relations, p. 236.
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PART ONE
KANT'S PERPETUAL PEACE:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXT, INTERPRETATIONS, AND PATTERNS
22
CHAPTER ONE
THE TEXTUAL HOOKS OF INTERPRETATIONS
Introduction
The object of Chapter One is to introduce the reader 
to the text of Perpetual Peace. More specifically, this 
chapter explores which parts of the text are of greater (or 
lesser) consequence to interpreters in their attempts to 
decipher what this complex and intricate treatise proposes. 
The more pivotal parts of the text are introduced in 
connection with a general summary of the interpretations 
that refer to them. This presentation of the original 
Kantian text coupled with a summary of representative 
interpretations from each of the four historical periods 
under consideration permits easier entry into the detailed 
analysis of individual interpretations which follows in 
arguments for the existence of patterns in Parts Two and 
Three of this thesis. Table One summarizes each of the 
Articles of Kant's treatise and is provided below for the 
convenience of the reader.
23
TABLE ONE
Perpetual Peace: The Articles of Kant's Treatise
The Preliminary Articles of a 
Perpetual Peace between States
First Preliminary Article
No conclusion of peace shall be 
considered valid as such if it was 
made with a secret reservation of 
the material for a future war.
Second Preliminary Article
No independently existing state, 
whether large or small, may be 
acquired by another state by 
inheritance, exchange, purchase or 
gift.
Third Preliminary Article
Standing armies will gradually be 
abolished altogether.
Fourth Preliminary Article
No national debt shall be 
contracted in connection with the 
external affairs of the state.
Fifth Preliminary Article
No state shall forcibly interfere 
in the constitution and government 
of another state.
Sixth Preliminary Article
No state at war with another shall 
permit such acts of hostility as 
would make mutual confidence 
impossible during a future time of' 
peace.
The Definitive Articles of a 
Perpetual Peace between States
First Definitive Article
The Civil Constitution of Every 
State shall be Republican
Second Definitive Article
The Right of Nations shall be based 
on a Federation of Free States
Third Definitive Article
Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited 
to Conditions of Universal 
Hospitality
First Supplement: On the Guarantee 
of a Perpetual Peace
Perpetual Peace is guaranteed by no 
less an authority than the great 
artist Nature herself.
Second Supplement: Secret Article 
of a Perpetual Peace
The maxims of the philosophers on 
the conditions under which public 
peace is possible shall be 
considered by states, which are 
armed for war.
24
Interpretations from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the End 
of World War I
Chapter Two argues that interpretations written from 
the mid-nineteenth century to the end of World War I assert 
that Perpetual Peace calls for a significant restraint on 
state sovereignty through establishment of a centralized 
authority above the level of states. A number of these 
interpretations focus almost exclusively on one portion of 
the text of Perpetual Peace in coming to this conclusion. 
Though references are made to different Articles in the 
text and some interpretation carried out on text within 
those Articles, what Perpetual Peace ultimately does for 
these interpreters is based substantially on a small 
section towards the end of the Second Definitive Article.
Accordingly, the most quoted and frequently referred 
to passage by interpreters that discuss the text of 
Perpetual Peace during this historical period is the 
following:
There is only one rational way in which states 
coexisting with other states can emerge from the 
lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like 
individual men, they must renounce their savage and 
lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive 
laws, and thus form an international state (civitas
25
gentium), which would necessarily continue to grow 
until it embraced all the peoples of the earth.1
1Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Political 
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 105.
Because of the initial popularity of the first edition of 
1 Perpetual Peace, Kant decided to publish a second in 1796. 
To the second edition were attached two appendices: "On the 
Disagreement Between Morals and Politics in Relation to 
Perpetual Peace" and "On the Agreement Between Politics and 
Morality According to the Transcendental Concept of Public 
Right." Rarely, if ever, are these referred to by 
interpreters of Perpetual Peace. There are, however, two 
passages from the appendices that consider issues similar 
to those discussed in the selection from the Second 
Definitive Article quoted above that are worthy of note. 
In the first appendix, Kant asserts the following:
The proverbial saying fiat iustitia, pereat 
mundus (i.e. let justice reign, even if all the rogues 
in the world must perish) may sound somewhat inflated, 
but it is nonetheless true. It is a sound principle 
of right, which blocks up all the devious paths 
followed by cunning or violence. But it must not be 
misunderstood, or taken, for example, as a permit to 
apply one's own rights with the utmost rigour (which 
would conflict with ethical duty), but should be seen 
as an obligation of those in power not to deny or 
detract from the rights of anyone out of disfavour or 
sympathy for others. And this requires above all that 
the state should have an internal constitution 
organized in accordance with pure principles of right, 
and also that it unite with other neighbouring nations 
or even distant states to arrive at a lawful 
settlement of their differences by forming something 
analogous to a universal state. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 
ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, p. 123.
He makes the following point in the second appendix:
Now we have already seen above that a federative 
association of states whose sole intention is to 
eliminate war is the only lawful arrangement which can 
be reconciled with their freedom. Thus politics and 
morality can only be in agreement within a federal 
union, which is therefore necessary and given a priori
26
This passage is recognized by a number of interpreters from 
this period as definitive proof that Perpetual Peace 
requires the sovereignty of each state to be relinquished. 
To these interpreters, the applicable solution to the 
problem of war between separate states is understood to be 
the formation of a centralized authority capable of 
enforcing laws above the level of states.
It is important to note that interpreters working 
during this historical period use different terms when 
referencing the portion of the text quoted above. As used 
in Nisbet's translation, the terms 'international state' 
and 'civitas gentium' are seen in interpretations during 
this time. Additionally, terms like 'universal state,' 
'state of nations' and 'republic universal' are encountered 
as well. The potential shades of difference between these 
terms are not of significant concern to advancement of the 
thesis. Put in context of the interpretations under study,
through the principles of right. And the rightful 
basis of all political prudence is the founding of 
such a union in the most comprehensive form possible; 
for without this aim, all its reasonings are unwisdom 
and veiled injustice. Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans 
Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, p. 129 (emphasis in 
original).
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each term can be generally described as a centralized 
authority existing above the state level. While there is 
little discussion of the political, judicial, and/or 
military components of this authority (indeed most 
interpreters neglect this detail not out of inattention to 
the entirety of the treatise but simply out of respect for 
the text which avoids it as well) , there is general 
agreement on the coercive character of its laws assisted by 
the institutionalization necessary to their enforcement. 
Most certainly, such an authority restricts state
sovereignty. Of the few interpreters during this period 
who describe Kant's proposal as a 'federal union,'
'universal federation' or 'federation of the world,' the 
key point to recognize is that they continue to view the 
text as one in favor of a peace proposal above the state 
level.
Of related significance, there is interpretive
uniformity on the subject of Kant's alternative to the 
conception of the international state by interpreters 
writing during this period. Directly after the oft-quoted 
passage mentioned above, Kant asserts the following:
But since this (the international state or 
civitas gentium) is not the will of the nations, 
according to their present conception of international 
right (so that they reject in hypothesi what is true 
in thesi) , the positive idea of a world republic
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cannot be realized. If all is not to be lost, this 
can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of 
an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely 
to prevent war. The latter may check the current of 
man's inclination to defy the law and antagonize his 
fellows, although there will always be a risk of it 
bursting forth anew.2
While contrasting language within the Second Definitive 
Article exists, it is most strikingly evident in Kant's 
discussion of the nature of the organization necessary to 
establish peace. The two apparently conflicting passages 
quoted so far provide the interpreter with much to consider 
and debate. However, Chapter Two argues that in a majority 
of interpretations during this period, there is very little 
inquiry into the characteristic features of Kant's
"negative substitute" ----  the "gradually expanding
federation." Indeed, most do not even mention the proposed 
alternative (or offer any textual analysis of it), even 
though many passages within Perpetual Peace refer to this 
pared-down surrogate for instituting peace. The
interpreters working during this period are more persuaded 
by the first passage, which discusses the international 
state.
2Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 105 (emphasis in original).
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Undeniably, for such a short treatise, Perpetual Peace 
has much to say: six specific Preliminary Articles with
generous commentary coupled with three Definitive Articles 
considering everything from the appropriate constitution 
for each state, to theories of international organization, 
even to the right of strangers to be treated with 
hospitality upon their arrival to a foreign territory. 
This would seem to offer ample material for an eager 
interpreter. Instead of analyzing in detail the
conflicting passages within the Second Definitive Article, 
much less the relationships between all three of the 
Articles, most interpretations from this period are 
satisfied with a focus on one passage. Furthermore, there 
is very little mention within these interpretations of the 
subsequent two supplements to the treatise wherein Kant 
discusses the complex role that nature plays in the 
establishment of peace and the need for a secret 
'Philosopher's7 Article.
As such, in comparison to the more involved textual 
analysis by interpretations written during the alternative 
three historical periods under consideration, this summary 
of the first collection of interpretations may seem 
rudimentary. Unfortunately, there is not much more to be 
said at this point. Simply stated, interpretations during
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this period (which I argue in Chapter Two reveal the first 
phase of Pattern One) read little else into Perpetual Peace 
than the following avowal: Kant's text specifically
endorses a peace proposal above the state level wherein the 
sovereignty of each state is reined in by a centralized 
authority with the 'teeth' to enforce its own laws.
Interpretations from the End of World War I to the Mid- 
Twentieth Century
According to Chapter Three, what emerges from those 
interpretations completed from the end of World War I to 
the mid-twentieth century is an understanding that the text 
of Perpetual Peace requires the surrender of some 
sovereignty by each independent state to a wider 
federation. For almost all interpreters writing during 
this period, a federation, not an international state, 
becomes the ideal towards which nations should work to 
achieve. Finally, as will be seen from an examination of 
the full range of interpretations completed during this 
period in Chapter Three, there is a clear tendency by these 
interpreters to liken this federation to the League of 
Nations founded immediately after World War I.
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The broader argument to keep in mind as detailed 
issues of the text are addressed in Chapters Two and Three 
is that interpretations from both of these periods under 
study read the text as favoring peace proposals above the 
state level. Importantly though, each set of 
interpretations presents a somewhat different idea of how 
much sovereignty is to be transferred to this authority.
The principal passage of interest to interpretations 
completed during this period has already been stated above. 
Though rarely ever mentioned within interpretations from 
the earlier era, Kant's concept of "an enduring and 
gradually expanding federation" as a "negative substitute" 
for the "positive idea of a world republic" becomes the 
primary textual anchor of this collection of 
interpretations.3 Within these interpretations, there is a 
noticeable lack of focus on the "one rational way" Kant has 
offered to prevent future war between states.4 These 
interpretations more clearly commit themselves to passages 
like the one above that bolster support for the alternative 
suggestion mentioned above. This alternative suggestion is
3Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 105.
4Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 105.
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that Kant's ideal in the Second Definitive Article is a
federation, not an all-powerful international state. These 
interpreters appear more cognizant of and ultimately 
persuaded by statements within the Second Definitive 
Article that focus on the term 'federation' and offer
logical reasons for embracing it instead of an 
international state in their efforts to decipher Kant's 
real solution to the problem of war.
For example, Kant begins the Second Definitive Article 
with the "initial assumption" that if the Second Definitive 
Article is concerned entirely with the right of nations, 
the concept of it "only makes sense if there are 
independent nations."5 The second explanation related to 
this is more involved than this simple "assumption" and
worth quotation here. Kant remarks:
People who have grouped themselves into nation
states may be judged in the same way as individual men 
living in a state of nature, independent of external 
laws; for they are a standing offense to one another 
by the very fact that they are neighbours. Each
nation, for the sake of its own security, can and 
ought to demand of the others that they should enter 
along with it into a constitution, similar to the 
civil one, within which the rights of each could be 
secured. This would mean establishing a federation of 
peoples. But a federation of this sort would not be
5Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 102 and Georg Cavallar, "Kant's Society of 
Nations: Free Federation or World Republic?" Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 32 (July 1994), p. 467, respectively.
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the same thing as an international state. For the
idea of an international state is contradictory, since 
every state involves a relationship between a superior 
(the legislator) and an inferior (the people obeying 
the laws), whereas a number of nations forming one 
state would constitute a single nation. And this 
contradicts our initial assumption, as we are here 
considering the right of nations in relation to one
another in so far as they are a group of separate 
states which are not to be welded together as a unit.6
These are intuitive reasons for initially rejecting the 
international state in the context of his Second Definitive 
Article.
He later follows these with a more cogent argument 
regarding the relationship between the internal 
constitutions of states and a potential world constitution 
to be imposed on them from the outside. He states, "while 
natural right allows us to say of men living in a lawless
condition that they ought to abandon it, the right of
nations does not allow us to say the same of states."7 This 
is because "they already have a lawful internal 
constitution, and have thus outgrown the coercive right of 
others to subject them to a wider legal constitution in
6Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 102 (emphasis in original).
7Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 104.
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accordance with their conception of right."8 Kant suggests 
here that it is illogical for a state, which already 
possesses an internal constitution, to be subject to an 
external one as well.
Finally, Kant's rather critical remarks about the kind 
of constitution necessary to the founding of an 
international state end with a positive averment that 
suggests again his commitment to federation. He explains 
that "peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without 
a general agreement between the nations; thus a particular 
kind of league, which we might call a pacific federation 
(foedus pacificum), is required."9 Different than the goal 
of a "peace treaty (pactum pads) which is to terminate one 
war, (the pacific federation) would seek to end all wars 
for good."10 While the primary aim of said federation may 
be to create the conditions of a permanent peace, Kant
reluctantly closes the Second Definitive Article with this 
admonition: "(the federation) may check the current of
man's inclination to defy the law and antagonise his
8Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 104.
9Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 104 (emphasis in original).
10Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 104 (emphasis in original).
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fellows, although there will always be a risk of it 
bursting forth anew."11
The above paragraph's accent on quotation may seem
excessive (and, as will be shown in Chapter Three, such 
passages are rarely referred to directly in interpretations 
during this period). Still, it is helpful to identify in 
toto the selections of the original text from which the 
interpreters may generally draw in coming to their
conclusion that a less formidable federation, not an all- 
powerful international state, is what the text requires. 
These passages, more specifically, their focus on
federation coupled with reluctance to embrace the argument 
for an international state, give shape to the principal 
passage most frequently alluded to by interpreters working 
during this period. From this, these interpreters read 
into Perpetual Peace a desire to curb state sovereignty
through establishment of a federation with certain positive 
powers, albeit one where less sovereign authority is ceded 
to it than a world state would require.
Finally, and given much greater attention within the 
contextual arguments of Chapter Three, one of the 
characteristics shared by nearly all interpretations
1:LKant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 105.
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completed during this period is the tendency to view the 
League of Nations as the institutional manifestation of 
Kant's model federation they understand to be proposed in 
the Second Definitive Article. One interpretation, in 
particular, explains that "at least six of the famous 
Fourteen Points are anticipated" by Perpetual Peace.12 More 
precisely, the term 'league,' considered separate from its 
"League of Nations" label above, is not employed as an 
interpretive term of art clarifying the proposed Kantian 
federation until interpretations begin to surface after 
World War I.13 However preliminary the thought, both of 
these potential examples of language used in elucidation of 
the text are arguably interrelated and reflect, once again,
12Jessie Wallace Hughan, A Study of International 
Government (London: George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1924),
p. 156.
13Though the term 'league' is found once in the Second 
Definitive Article of the 1970 Nisbet translation used 
here, no English translation that would have been available 
to this second set of interpreters during the historical 
period in which they considered Kant's Perpetual Peace 
included the term in the text. For example, Nisbet refers 
to "the general agreement between the nations" as a 
"particular kind of league." Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. 
Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, p. 104. M. Campbell Smith, 
who translated and interpreted Perpetual Peace in the early 
twentieth century, calls this "compact between nations . .
an alliance of a particular kind." Immanuel Kant, 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, introduction and
translation by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta (Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1903), p. 134.
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this series of interpretations shift away from 
understanding Perpetual Peace as advocating something like 
an international state and towards the view that the 
Kantian ideal in the text is something analogous to a 
federation where sovereign power is distributed more evenly 
between its central organizational feature and the 
assembled political parts. Their interpretations on this 
issue, as will be shown in Chapter Three, are entirely 
consistent.
Interpretations from the 1950s to the Early 1980s
The collection of interpretations written from the 
1950s to the early 1980s makes the fullest use of the text 
available in Perpetual Peace. Thus far in this
introduction to text and interpretation, little has been 
written about the Preliminary Articles, the First 
Definitive Article requiring the civil constitution of 
every state to be republican, the Third Definitive Article 
concerning the limitation of cosmopolitan right to 
conditions of universal hospitality, or the First 
Supplement and its discussion of what, in fact, guarantees 
perpetual peace. While the First and Third Definitive
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Articles14 are important to this set of interpreters, the 
Preliminary Articles and the First Supplement (together 
with the Second Definitive Article) are crucial to their 
account of what the text recommends.
The argument presented in Chapter Four is that
interpretations completed between the 1950s and the early
1980s understand Perpetual Peace as a text that views the
sovereign state as the fundamental unit through which peace 
will be achieved. These interpretations offer a reading of 
the text, which advocates peace proposals at the state
level. Concerning specific textual hooks, it is not 
uncommon to see the principal passage of interest to 
interpretations completed between the end of World War I 
and the mid-twentieth century in interpretations written 
during this new period. Still, there is one final excerpt 
from the text of the Second Definitive Article, which 
receives a significant amount of attention from 
interpreters during this period and is generally not
140f the three Definitive Articles, the text of the 
Third Definitive Article receives the least attention by 
interpreters from all four periods under consideration. 
Still, as will be developed in Chapter Four, F.H. Hinsley's 
influential interpretation sees it (together with his 
understanding of the Preliminary and Second Definitive 
Articles) as convincing proof of the treatise's commitment 
to the separation of states. F.H. Hinsley, Power and the 
Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963), pp. 62-80.
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discussed by interpreters during either of the earlier 
periods. As a provision of textual support for the 
collection of interpretations completed between the 1950s 
and the early 1980s, it is as influential as any.
Upon affirming that "peace can neither be inaugurated 
nor secured without a general agreement between the nations 
[in the form of] a particular kind of league . . . call [ed]
a pacific federation (foedus pacificum)," Kant attempts 
once more to describe, however general, the nature of the 
pacific federation in question.15 He states, "This 
federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a 
state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of 
each state in itself."16 Though certainly in different 
degrees, both sets of interpretations already introduced 
above understand peace to be a consequence of an 
institutional restraint introduced above the state level.
The collection of interpretations from this period, 
however, places special emphasis on Kant's claim in this 
passage that peace must be established through the 
continued freedom of the sovereign state, not on its
15Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 104 (emphasis in original).
16Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 104 (emphasis in original).
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limitation. Kant closes this excerpt with further remarks 
that seem to encourage this new interpretation. He writes:
It can be shown that this idea of federalism, 
extending gradually to encompass all states and thus 
leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has 
objective reality. For if by good fortune one 
powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic 
(which is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual 
peace), this will provide a focal point for federal 
association among other states. These will join up 
with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each 
state in accordance with the idea of international 
right, and the whole will gradually spread further and 
further by a series of alliances of this kind.17
At last, "If the concept of international right is to
retain any meaning at all, reason must necessarily couple
it with a federation of this kind," what Kant has called,
immediately before this sentence, "a free federation."18
Focusing on language like "association of states,"
"alliance (of states)," "securing the freedom of each
state," and "free federation" from the excerpts above,
interpretations from this period sense a genuine commitment
to the preservation of state sovereignty in the Second
Definitive Article. Such language conveys the notion of an
ultimate separateness of states. An "association" or an
"alliance," even a "free federation," directs this group of
17Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 104 (emphasis in original).
18Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, pp. 104-05.
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interpretations away from the institutional character of 
the proposed international authority prevalent in the first 
two groups of interpretations and towards a loosely bound 
and dissoluble collection of independent states where peace 
is insured by the workings of nature upon them and their 
eventual adoption of republican government.
For the first time, the term "voluntary," never 
mentioned in the Second Definitive Article of Kant's 
translated tract, is used throughout interpretations of the 
text to indicate the unforced process through which 
separate states freely choose to band together. Rarely if 
ever is the phrase "coercive laws" used in interpretations 
from this period.
Finally, for these interpreters, any limited 
organizational structure that might develop would not 
possess the powers over states interpretations completed 
during the first and second periods suggest. Though to 
different degrees, there are 'teeth' in the international 
authorities accepted by both phases of Pattern One. This 
is clearly not the case with the first (or second) phase of 
Pattern Two. The general reading of the text offered by 
this new group of interpreters suggests the locus of 
authority and law within the international system remains 
with and between the independent state(s).
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In addition to text within the Second Definitive
Article, it is not uncommon for interpreters during this 
period to consider the six Preliminary Articles as further 
evidence for their claims.19 The titular headings of the 
articles are presented here as follows:
1. No conclusion of peace shall be considered 
valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation 
of the material for a future war. 2. No independently 
existing state, whether it be large or small, may be 
acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, 
purchase or gift. 3. Standing armies (miles
perpetuus) will gradually be abolished altogether. 4. 
No national debt shall be contracted in connection 
with the external affairs of the state. 5. No state 
shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and 
government of another state. 6. No state at war with 
another shall permit such acts of hostility as would 
make mutual confidence during a future time of peace.20
Several of these interpreters note that the Second, Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Preliminary Articles all appear to
"assume" the continued existence of the independent state.
Furthermore, there is selected commentary below each
Article, which suggests, with ever greater discernment, the
19More so than any single interpretation, the influence 
of F.H. Hinsley's interpretation in Power and the Pursuit
of Peace (1963) on others during this period is pervasive. 
As one of the more well-known and helpful representative 
interpretations from this period, I have chosen in this 
part of the summary to roughly follow the passages he uses 
in his discussion of the Preliminary Articles.
20Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, pp. 93-96.
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logic associated with the preservation of the sovereign 
integrity of the state.
Most applicable, Kant explains in the commentary to 
the Second Preliminary Article that "a state, unlike the 
ground on which it is based, is not a possession 
(patrimonium) . It is a society of men, which no-one other
than itself can command or dispose of. Like a tree, it has
its own roots, and to graft it on to another state as if it 
were a shoot is to terminate its existence as a moral 
personality."21 He further states in the commentary to the 
Fifth Preliminary Article that "the interference of 
external powers [in the constitution and government of 
another state] would be a violation of the rights of an 
independent people . . . Such interference would be an
active offense and would make the autonomy of all other 
states insecure."22 Finally, in the closing section of the 
Preliminary Articles, Kant distinguishes between those 
Preliminary Articles that ought to be introduced at once 
(Articles One, Five, and Six) and those which permit some
delay in their execution (Articles Two, Three, and Four).
21Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 94.
22Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 96.
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He explains, "The latter need not necessarily be executed 
at once, so long as their ultimate purpose (e.g. the 
restoration of freedom to certain states in accordance with 
the second article) is not lost sight of."23
Essentially, interpretations from this period find in 
the headings and commentary of the Preliminary Articles a 
clear link to its interpretive position on the Second 
Definitive Article. This position reveals the sovereign 
state as the fundamental operational unit through which 
international peace will be achieved. With no coercive 
legal mechanism above the separate states to guarantee 
peace, this new collection of interpretations relies on 
Kant's central idea based in the First Supplement to 
achieve the same goal. Exhibiting a grand faith in "the 
great artist Nature herself (natura daedala rerum)," 
interpretations from this period extract from this textual 
anchor of the First Supplement the route through which 
peace can be attained within and between independent 
states.24 Yet, as Kant quickly asks, "how does nature 
guarantee that what man ought to do by the laws of his
23Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 97 (emphasis in original).
24Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, pp. 108-14 (emphasis in original).
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freedom will in fact be done through nature's compulsion, 
without prejudice to the free agency of man? The question
arises, moreover, in all three areas of public right in
political, international and cosmopolitan right.1,25
Like most social contract theorists of his era, Kant 
is initially concerned with the formation of a civil 
constitution or political right. Through what he calls the 
"mechanism of human inclinations," nature wakes reason from 
its own slumber so that the latter might overcome the 
former.26 Neighboring peoples, indeed their multiplicity of 
rational human wills "so admirable in [themselves] but so 
impotent in practice," are driven by internal dissent and 
external conflict created from their conflicting and self- 
seeking inclinations bestowed by nature to collectively 
form separate protective states under law.27 Thus, 
political right, in the ultimate form of a republican 
constitution, is achieved by the phenomenal pulse of nature 
arousing dormant human reason.
25Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 112 (emphasis in original).
26Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 114.
27Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 112.
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Nature does not stop, however, at the domestic level. 
As to international right, which "presupposes the separate 
existence of many independent adjoining states," it also 
prevents the inclination of each newly formed and 
presumably not yet republican state among these from 
attempting to dominate the rest through universal 
despotism.28 Via the barriers of linguistic and religious 
difference which nature imposes, intermingling between 
states is thwarted. This nature-induced separateness of 
states and the consequent avoidance of one state's will to 
"universal despotism which saps all man's energies and ends 
in the graveyard of freedom" creates a peace that is 
"guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous 
rivalry. "29
In cases of both political and international right, 
the natural mechanism of phenomenal conflict inherent in
relations between men and the separate states constructed 
from them necessarily achieves peace. Yet just as nature 
separates to foster peace, so to does it unite to fulfill 
the same objective under cosmopolitan right. By the same
28Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 113.
29Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 114.
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motivation of mutual self-interest supplied by nature, "the 
spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every 
people, and it cannot exist side by side with war."30 Here, 
peace results again from the natural condition, not the 
moral potential, of humanity privately functioning within 
independent states united for common economic purposes.
The First Supplement is a most influential part of the 
text for interpreters writing during this period. While 
the Preliminary Articles may solidify the independent state 
as the primary actor under interpretations from this 
period, the First Supplement guarantees peaceful relations 
between such states in the long run. Essentially, and 
certainly allied with the Preliminary Articles, these two 
provisions yield further textual support to the view 
advanced by these interpreters that the Second Definitive 
Article embraces the sovereign state as the way to peace. 
Placed within the contextual framework of Chapter Four, the 
defense of state sovereignty becomes the defining feature 
of interpretations completed between the 1950s and early 
1980s.
30Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 114 (emphasis in original).
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Interpretations from the Early 1980s to the End of the
Twentieth Century
In Chapters Five through Seven, I argue that 
interpretations written from the early 1980s through the
end of the twentieth century explain that Perpetual Peace 
views the sovereign republican state as the channel to 
peace. Like those interpretations written between the
1950s and the early 1980s, these also read the text as
favoring peace proposals at the state level. To avoid
repeating passages and meanings already clarified in 
Pattern Two, Phase One above, it is sufficient to submit in 
this summary that Pattern Two, Phase Two's understanding of 
the Second Definitive Article rests on excerpts within it 
that, through analysis and interpretation, reveal positions 
centered on the sovereign republican state as the channel 
to peace. The distinction between these two sets of 
interpretation that makes them worthy of division concerns 
the special weight and specific textual analysis this final 
group of interpreters give to the First Definitive Article. 
For them, what Kant spells out in a particular section of 
the First Definitive Article becomes the crucial ingredient 
in the grand peace proposal offered by Perpetual Peace.
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Firstly, for this final group of interpreters, Kant's 
"negative substitute," or from other passages, his 
"alliance," "league" or "free federation," is properly 
understood as a collection of independent states with 
republican constitutions committed to the rule of law, the 
separation of legislative and executive powers, and full 
representation of the body politic. On the surface, this 
conception is not so different from interpretations that 
reveal Pattern Two, Phase One. Yet there is a subtle 
change that occurs. Related to the formal thrust or a 
priori claims of his moral theory, Kant states within the 
First Definitive Article that "The republican constitution 
is . . . pure in its origin (since it springs from the pure
concept of right)."31 With their focus on the First 
Supplement (and the role that nature plays in the practical 
establishment of peace), this reading of the First 
Definitive Article is normally sufficient for Pattern Two, 
Phase One interpreters.
For Pattern Two, Phase Two interpreters, however, the 
passage immediately following the above provides the 
practical reason, for them not any less important than the 
formal, for states to adopt a republican constitution. Not
31Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 100.
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only is the establishment of the republican constitution 
right in theory, but similar to the role that nature plays, 
"it offers a prospect of attaining the desired result, i.e.
a perpetual peace" as well.32 Kant lengthily responds with
the following reason why:
If, as is inevitably the case under this 
constitution, the consent of the citizens is required 
to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is 
very natural that they will have great hesitation in 
embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this
would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries 
of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, 
supplying the costs of the war from their own 
resources, painfully making good the ensuing 
devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take 
upon themselves a burden of debt which will embitter 
peace itself and which can never be paid off on 
account of the constant threat of new wars. But under 
a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and 
which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest 
thing in the world to go to war. For the head of 
state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the 
state, and a war will not force him to make the 
slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, 
pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned.
He can thus decide on war, without any significant 
reason, as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly 
leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are always ready 
for such purposes) to justify the war for the sake of 
property.33
Pattern Two, Phase Two interpreters are far more likely to 
accept the above passage (and the practical reason offered
32Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 100.
33Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 100.
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within for adopting the republican constitution) as the 
text's primary solution to the problem of war.
Finally, for Pattern Two, Phase Two interpreters, 
implicit in the quoted excerpt is the relationship between 
states with republican, representative government and their 
peaceful propensities toward each other. This, as well, 
becomes a pivotal theme of Pattern Two, Phase Two 
interpretation. Again, it does not go unrecognized in both 
phases of Pattern One or Pattern Two, Phase One. The
important point is that this theme, and its logical
complement that states without representative governments 
are more likely to be war-like with each other, receive far 
less interpretive emphasis than is evident in Pattern Two, 
Phase Two. Essentially, and really for the first time, 
Perpetual Peace is understood to be a treatise with full 
textual support for the idea that domestic politics 
determines international politics. As Pattern Two, Phase 
Two interpreters sense the 'statist' orientation of the 
Second Definitive Article, they see the potentially
belligerent relationship between separate states overcome 
by Kant's practical argument in the First Definitive
Article. The overall thrust of Pattern Two, Phase Two 
interpretation recognizes, to a much greater extent, the
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primary importance of the First Definitive Article, 
specifically the practical reason for its adoption.
Conclusion
To conclude, however less frustrating Perpetual Peace 
may be to read and understand than Kant's other works, this 
chapter should have made clear that his popular text is 
still involved and complex. Upon a first reading, the text 
may seem to contain contradiction after contradiction. 
Here Kant says an international state is needed, there a 
federation, or there simply an association of sovereign 
states. As has been briefly shown here, interpreters 
emphasize different portions of the text as more or less 
consequential in coming to their conclusions as to what 
peace proposal(s) the text ultimately endorses. This 
chapter has sought to introduce this notion and has 
hopefully provided a sound basis from which to explore, 
with greater specificity, the full range of interpretations 
over past years necessary to the formulation of my argument 
that two distinct patterns of interpretation have arisen.
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PART TWO
THE ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE s 
PEACE PROPOSALS ABOVE THE STATE LEVEL
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CHAPTER TWO
PATTERN ONE, PHASE ONE: REINING IN STATE SOVEREIGNTY.
INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY 
TO THE END OF WORLD WAR I
Introduction
It is the primary purpose of this chapter to advance 
the argument that close analysis of individual 
interpretations written during this historical period 
reveals the first phase of an interpretive pattern of 
Kant's Perpetual Peace. Study into each textual
interpretation is critical to a full and fair explication 
of the thesis. This approach seems best suited for 
exposing general similarities between interpretations to 
effectively advance the argument of pattern formation. It 
is important to remember that not all interpretations that 
reveal a particular phase of a pattern exactly mirror each 
other. If they did, then this whole exercise would be too 
immaculate. The idea behind the argument for patterns is 
simply that a majority of interpretations over a specific 
historical stretch tend towards similar analysis of the 
text in question. I argue that it is possible to tease 
from these similar particulars a pattern of interpretation.
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As introduced in Chapter One, the common thread 
running through these interpretations is the view that 
Perpetual Peace calls for the restriction of state 
sovereignty through the formation of a centralized 
authority above the state level as an effective solution to 
the problem of war. Based on a singular focus on one 
particular passage from the text of Perpetual Peace, a 
number of interpreters refer to Kant's authority as an 
'international state,' 'civitas gentium,' or 'state of 
nations.' Others consider it a 'universal state' or 
'republic universal.' Still others label it a 'universal 
federation' or 'federal union.' Finally, there are those 
who note the war-like ways of independent, sovereign states 
and suggest Kant's text as a remedy to this ever-present 
problem because it is, in their view, clearly in favor of 
the significant limitation of sovereignty. Importantly, a 
central feature of the first phase of Pattern One is the 
''reining in of state sovereignty. '
Henry Wheaton: An Early British Interpretation
The first English-language interpretation of Kant's 
Perpetual Peace that I consider is from Henry Wheaton's 
veil-known book, History of the Law of Nations in Europe
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and America, published in 1845.1 After repeating what Kant 
says in the First Definitive Article, Wheaton begins his 
commentary by lamenting the fact that "In the existing 
system of international relations, the state of nature, 
which has ceased as between individuals, whilst it still 
subsists as between nations, is not a state of peace, but 
of war, if not flagrant at least always ready to break 
out."2 According to him, this is because the "code 
expounded by public jurists to nations has never had the 
obligatory force of law, properly so called, for want of an 
adequate coercive sanction."3 To remedy this (and with a 
passage that mirrors a portion of the text from Perpetual 
Peace), Wheaton suggests Kant's conclusion that "Nations 
must renounce, as individuals have renounced, the 
anarchical freedom of savages, and submit themselves to 
coercive laws, thus forming a community of nations, civitas 
gentium, which may ultimately be extended so as to include 
all the people of the earth."4 Without "the guarantee of a
xHenry Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations in Europe 
and America (New York: Gould, Banks & Co., 1845), pp. 750- 
53 .
2Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, pp. 751-52.
3Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, p. 752.
4Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, p. 752.
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special compact having for its object the perpetual 
abolition of war," Wheaton contends that the Kantian "state 
of peace must . . . ever remain insecure."5
Recalling the introduction to text and interpretations 
written during this period in Chapter One, it is important 
to note that no where after these remarks does Wheaton 
question whether Kant believes the submission by numerous 
states to coercive laws under a larger civitas gentium is 
unrealizable. Indeed, he even quotes Kant in saying that 
such an "idea . . .  is not an impracticable or visionary" 
one.6
Furthermore, the alternative to state submission to 
public laws enforced by an authority existing above the 
state level is what Kant refers to as the "negative 
substitute" of "an enduring and gradually expanding 
federation."7 This section of the text, which states that 
federation is more likely to be accepted by the "will of 
nations" than the "civitas gentium," is not considered in
5Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, p. 752.
6Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, p. 752.
7Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Political 
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.105.
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Wheaton's discussion.8 Wheaton's conclusion is clear: 
Perpetual Peace is ultimately in favor of the establishment 
of an authority existing above the level of states whose 
laws are backed by, as he calls it, "an adequate coercive 
sanction."9 This will result in a clear restraint on state 
sovereignty.
8Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 105.
9As a point of comparison with English-language 
interpretations, it is interesting to briefly consider an 
1836 publication Professor Stapfer of Paris entitled Life 
of Immanuel Kant, translated by Professor Hodge, Library of 
Useful Tracts, Volume Three (Edinburgh: Thomas Clark,
183 6) . His comments on Perpetual Peace below are few and 
rather confusing, though there appears to be some 
similarities with other interpretations from this period. 
Speaking of Kant in Perpetual Peace, Professor Stapfer 
states:
Raising himself to a region, whence he embraces, 
in one view, the existing relations among nations and 
individuals, [Kant] discovers and points out the facts 
and necessities, which must lead men gradually to come 
out of their present barbarous and destructive state 
of inquietude; in the same manner as the 
establishment of social institutions resulted from the 
union of families, removing the state of nature to 
guarantee the mutual security of person and property, 
by creating a central authority, sustained by a force 
which could not be resisted. Stapfer, Life of 
Immanuel Kant, trans. Professor Hodge, p. 45.
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An Interpretation by James Lorimer: A "Stricter Bond of
Union" Required by the Text of Perpetual Peace
James Lorimer focuses his discussion on one passage 
from Perpetual Peace. In his Institute of the Law of 
Nations written in 1884, Lorimer quotes the text directly: 
"Nations must renounce, as individuals have renounced, the 
anarchical freedom of savages, and submit themselves to 
coercive laws; thus forming a civitas gentium, which may 
ultimately extend, so as to include all the people of the 
earth."10 Like Wheaton, Lorimer does not consider the 
passage directly following this one which questions the 
practicality or will of nations to form a civitas gentium 
and suggests instead a "negative substitute of an enduring 
and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war."11 
Though he does suggest thereafter that Kant struggled with 
the "difficulties attendant on this proposal," he makes 
this remark in the context of another work, namely Kant's
10James Lorimer, The Institute of the Law of Nations: A 
Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political 
Communities, Two Volumes (Edinburgh & London: William
Blackwood & Sons, 1884), Volume One, p. 225.
1;LKant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B.
Nisbet, p. 105.
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Metaphysics of Law.12 Lorimer quotes selected passages from 
this work13 then explains in these that "Kant [is] guarding 
himself, as if by anticipation, against the imputation of 
desiring to establish a Universal State."14 Making no 
reference to Perpetual Peace during this discussion, 
Lorimer clearly sees Perpetual Peace as the treatise by 
Kant most sympathetic to a universal state (and his 
Metaphysics of Morals as opting for something far less
12Lorimer, The Institute of the Law of Nations, pp.
225-26.
13Lorimer quotes the following from the Metaphysics of
Law:
The establishment of perpetual peace, which ought 
to be considered as the ultimate object of every 
system of public law, may perhaps be considered as 
impracticable, inasmuch as the too great extension of 
such a federal union might render impossible that 
supervision over its several members, and that 
protection to each member which is essential to its 
ends . . . What we mean to propose is a general
congress of nations, of which both the meeting and the 
duration are to depend entirely on the sovereign wills 
of the several members of the league, and not an 
indissoluble union like that which exists between the 
several States of North America, founded on a 
municipal constitution. Such a congress and such a 
league are the only means of realising the idea of a 
true public law, according to which the differences 
between nations would be determined by civil 
proceedings, as those between individuals are 
determined by civil judicature, instead of resorting
to war -- a means of redress worthy only of
barbarians. Lorimer, The Institute of the Law of 
Nations, p. 22 6.
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ambitious). This is probably why he concludes his analysis 
of Kant's two works with the explanation that, in Perpetual 
Peace, Kant was advocating a much "stricter bond of union" 
than in the Metaphysics of Law.15 Like Wheaton's, Lorimer's 
interpretations suggests a similar reduction in state 
sovereignty.
Independence of the State Questioned in Interpretations by 
D.6. Ritchie, R. Latta and Benjamin Trueblood
There follows a stream of late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century interpretation, which continues to 
rein in state sovereignty in interpretations of Kant's 
Perpetual Peace. For example, David Ritchie, in his 1902 
book Studies in Political and Social Ethics, offers an 
interpretation that strongly endorses the notion that 
Perpetual Peace calls for a clear restraint on state 
sovereignty as the only path to peace. Though brief, his 
statements on this subject are emphatic. He writes "it is 
more than a hundred years since Kant wrote his essay on 
'Perpetual Peace.' Kant saw quite clearly that there is
14Lorimer, The Institute of the Law of Nations, pp.
226-27.
15Lorimer, The Institute of the Law of Nations, p. 227.
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only one way which war between independent nations can be 
prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be 
independent."16 He echoes this statement when he writes the 
following a few lines later: "The absorption of smaller
nations into larger political bodies means the prevention 
of war within great areas."17
As with Ritchie above, Professor R. Latta points out 
quite clearly the danger Kant sees in nations maintaining 
their sovereign independence. He first explains that, for 
Kant, "perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely a 
speculative Utopian idea, but a moral principle which ought 
to be, and therefore can be, realised."18 Yet "realisation 
of this ideal" will never occur without "honestly facing 
political facts and getting a firm grasp of the 
indispensable conditions of a lasting peace."19
16David George Ritchie, Studies in Political and Social 
Ethics (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1902), p.
169.
17Ritchie, Studies in Political and Social Ethics, p.
170.
18Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay,
introduction and translation by M. Campbell Smith, preface 
by Professor R. Latta (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.,
Limited, 1903), p. VI.
19Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta, pp. VI-VII.
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The political facts of Latta7s age are exactly those
of Kant's the sovereignty of each nation in the world
is inviolable and unquestioned and to "strive after the 
ideal [of perpetual peace] in contempt or in ignorance of 
this condition is a labour that must inevitably be either 
fruitless or destructive of its own ends."20 As such, 
according to Latta, "Kant thus demonstrates the 
hopelessness of any attempt to secure perpetual peace 
between independent nations. Such nations may make 
treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is 
not to the interest of either party to denounce them. To 
enforce them is impossible while the nations remain 
independent."21 Thereafter, he directly quotes Ritchie's 
phrase already excerpted above: "There is only one way in
which war between independent nations can be prevented; and 
that is by the nations ceasing to be independent."22 He too
20Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta, p. VII.
21Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta, p. VII.
22Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta, p. VII.
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sees Perpetual Peace as a text advocating the restriction 
of nations' sovereign independence.
Also writing during this time period, Benjamin 
Trueblood explains that "The last years of the eighteenth 
century gave us Kant's great tractate on 'Perpetual Peace,' 
in which was uttered for the first time the idea of the 
federation of the world in an international state built 
upon republican principles."23 In another article, he
states that "A great international state, coextensive with 
the surface of the globe, with some sort of government 
directing the general interests of the race and compatible 
with local self-government, is the necessary and inevitable 
outgrowth of the nature of man and of society."24 Though he 
mentions in a footnote below this remark that Kant "does 
not seem, however, to have believed such an [international] 
state possible," he still maintains in the same footnote
that, nevertheless, "Kant was the first to give us the idea 
of a great international state in Perpetual Peace."25
23Benjamin F. Trueblood, "The Historical Development of
the Peace Idea," Paper presented at the Summer School of
Religious History, Haverford, Pennsylvania, June 1900, p. 
21.
24Benjamin F. Trueblood, The Federation of the World 
(Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1899), p. 3.
25Trueblood, The Federation of the World, p. 3.
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Comparison with Interpretation by the German Biographer 
Friedrich Paulsen
The German biographer Friedrich Paulsen, writing 
around the time of Latta, Ritchie, and Trueblood, published 
his book Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine in 1898.
While interpretations of Perpetual Peace written in German 
are not the subject of this thesis, it is useful to compare 
Paulsen's discussion with those English-language 
interpretations during this period. In his section on
Kant's "Theory of Law and the State," Paulsen states that 
"Everlasting peace was the favorite idea of Kant when he 
was growing old. The condition of its possibility lies in 
a universal union of states under just laws."26 According 
to Paulsen, Kant believed that "to promote the universal 
union of states under just laws is a duty, just as it was 
declared to be a duty to promote the formation of the
national constitution."27
26Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and
Doctrine, translated from the revised German edition by 
J.E. Creighton and Albert Lefevre (New York: Charles
Scribner & Sons, 1902), p. 355.
27Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, p.
355. Interestingly, Smith in the Introduction to her 
translation says nearly the same thing: "It is the duty of
statesmen to form a federative union as it was formerly the 
duty of individuals to enter the state." Kant, Perpetual
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After these initial remarks, Paulsen seems intent on
linking Kantian "Reason" to his interpretation of Perpetual 
Peace. Paulsen's explanation, though lengthy, is worth 
inclusion. He explains:
Nor would the aged Kant lend a willing ear to the 
laudation of clever and unscrupulous politicians. His 
impressions of the politicians have great similarity 
with the views expressed by Plato. He describes them 
as persons who make possible everything impossible, 
except the dominance of right upon the earth, which 
they rather regard as something absolutely impossible. 
He regards them as empiricists lacking in ideas, who 
see no further than the advantage of the day, but are 
not able to estimate things in their large relations. 
In distinction from this, it will remain the permanent 
task of philosophy to view things from the standpoint 
of ideas, or as Spinoza would say, sub quadam 
objection of unpracticality. This reproach is often 
raised against Plato's Republic: but ideas are not
refuted by vulgar appeal to alleged contradictory 
experience. Rather experience has to be measured by 
ideas formed after their pattern. The philosopher 
should set up an archetype and the task of the 
politician should be 'to bring, in accordance with 
this, the existing constitutions ever nearer to the 
highest possible degree of perfection.'28
To this, Paulsen adds the most relevant paragraph for our
purposes:
Like the idea of a perfect system of laws in a 
state, the idea of an international union of states 
united by law, and the consequent substitution of a 
legal process for violence and war, is a necessary 
idea of reason, and as such perfectly legitimate. It
Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, and trans. M. Campbell 
Smith, preface by Professor R. Latta, p. 60.
28Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, pp.
356-57.
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is the duty of the politician to work for its 
realization; the saying 'thou canst for thou oughtst7 
holds not merely in private morality, but also in 
public matters concerning the laws.29
While far from an in-depth interpretation of the 
Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace, Paulsen 
arrives at the conclusion that Kant in Perpetual Peace 
suggests a union of states under law because it is a 
necessary "idea" of reason and, as such, is something 
towards which politicians should always work. Yet he 
further explains Kant7s belief that the realization of this 
idea may come about even without "the good will of the 
politician.7/30 Kant discusses in Perpetual Peace the ever- 
increasing number of evils associated with war, e,g., "the 
evils of present war, the intolerable burdens of preparing 
for future war, and the paying of debts of past wars."31 
According to Paulsen7s reading of Kant, "The increase of 
these evils will continue to strengthen the impulse to get 
rid of them. As they have been strong enough to induce
savages to submit to the rule of a political constitution,
29Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, p.
357.
30Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, p.
357.
31Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, p.
357.
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they will also be effective in compelling the states to 
give up their savage freedom."32
In these cases, Paulsen understands the underlying 
argument of Perpetual Peace to be one favoring the 
sacrifice of the freedom of the state. This, as hopefully 
is becoming clear, is a similar thread running throughout 
interpretations during this period. It is interesting to 
note this developing theme's similarity with both an 
uncovered German interpretation here and the French 
interpretation footnoted above.33
Commentary from Translations of Kant's Perpetual Peaces 
Interpretations by J.D. Morell, W. Hastie and Mary Campbell 
Smith
As was stated in the Introduction, some of the 
interpretation or commentary on Perpetual Peace over the
32Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, pp.
357-58.
33The French interpretation referenced is in Footnote 9 
above. As stated earlier, interpretations of Perpetual 
Peace written in German and French are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Still, the kinship between the two
interpretations briefly discussed and English-language 
interpretations during this period would seem to provide 
interesting avenues for future research into this 
particular area of the history of international ideas.
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past century and one-half comes from remarks made, whether 
in introduction or preface, to translations of the text 
from the original German. The first English translation 
(since the original translation of Perpetual Peace from
German into English in 1796) appeared in the year 1884.
J.D. Morell was its author.34 Though little depth of 
textual analysis is offered prior to the translation, 
Morell does see the treatise, as one in favor of a "method 
of creating a federal union between neighbouring nations .
[through] which the end of durable peace can be 
gradually attained."35 Recalling Kant's statement from 
Appendix II that "politics and morality can only be in 
agreement within a federal union . . . and that the
rightful basis of all political prudence is the founding of
such a union in the most comprehensive form possible,"
34Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, translated by J.D. 
Morell (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1884). Morell remarks 
in the preface that the "1796 translation is no longer to 
be procured," meaning he believed he was, effectively, 
bringing the treatise to the English-speaking public for 
the first time in many years. Like Morell, I have been 
unable to locate the 1796 original translation into English 
or any other English translations between this date and the 
time of Morell's translation in 1884. This might be one 
reason why there appears to be fewer English-language 
interpretations or commentary relating to Perpetual Peace, 
specifically in the Anglo-American context, during the 
nineteenth century.
35Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, trans. J.D. Morell, p.
vi.
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Morell's former statement (and its similarity to Kant's 
"comprehensive federal union") certainly suggests a 
commitment to the creation of a federal union wherein the 
sovereignty of each state existing within it is necessarily 
contained.36
In what is likely a stronger endorsement of such a 
"comprehensive" union, W. Hastie explains in the 
Introduction to his 1891 translation that, according to 
Kant, "war . . . can only be brought to an end by a better
political organization."37 From this, Kant "expounds and 
applies . . . the idea of a Universal Federation of the
Human Race, in the most original and fertile way."38
The textual analysis in Mary Campbell Smith's 
introduction to her translation of Perpetual Peace is much 
more thorough than Morell's or Hastie's. Though Smith does 
discuss the other Articles in her Translator's 
Introduction, she (as with other interpretations during 
this time) views the Second Definitive Article as the
36Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 129.
37Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Principle of 
Politics, edited and translated by W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T 
Sc T Clark, 1891), p. XXXVI.
38Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. and trans. W. Hastie, p. 
XXXVI.
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"central idea of the treatise."39 Distinctively, she is one 
of the few interpreters during the period that makes 
reference to Kant's "negative substitute" or federation as 
a possible alternative to a state of nations. In analysis 
of the Second Definitive Article, she explains that "the 
only footing on which a thorough-going, indubitable system 
of international law is in practice possible is that of the 
society of nations: not the world republic the Greeks
dreamt of, but a federation of states."40
Yet even with this remark, Smith notes with an 
asterisk by the term "world republic" that Kantian "Reason 
[still] requires a State of Nations."41 Smith uses the 
terms world republic and state of nations interchangeably. 
According to Smith, a State of Nations "is the ideal" in 
Perpetual Peace and "Kant's proposal of a federation of 
states is a practical substitute from which we may work to
39Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
Essay, intro, and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by 
Professor R. Latta, p. 68.
40Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta, pp. 68-69.
41Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor 
R.Latta, p. 69.
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higher things."42 Within her translation, Smith refers the 
reader to a particular part of the text of Perpetual Peace 
explaining that "Kant seems to speak of a State of nations 
as the ideal" as opposed to a "federation of nations."43 
This passage has already been singled out by Wheaton's and 
Lorimer's interpretations. Smith's translation of that 
passage reads as follows: "For states, in their relation to 
one another, there can be, according to reason, no other 
way of advancing from that lawless condition which 
unceasing war implies, than by giving up their savage 
lawless freedom, just as individual men have done, and 
yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus they can 
form a State of nations (civitas gentium) , one, too, which 
will be ever increasing and would finally embrace all the 
peoples of the earth."44 Smith is less convinced that the 
only entity Kant favors in Perpetual Peace is a state of
nations. As stated above, she acknowledges that a
42Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R.
Latta, p. 69.
43Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R.
Latta, p. 129.
44Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R.
Latta, p. 136.
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federation, rather than a state of nations, is the more 
practical option for Kant. Still, she admits that in
Perpetual Peace the state of nations remains the ideal and, 
as important, reason requires it as "the surest way to 
attain peace."45
Leonard Woolf and Edwin Doak Mead: Final Interpretations
from this Period
The final interpretations of Perpetual Peace from this 
period come to us from Leonard Woolf and Edwin Doak Mead. 
Woolf's discussion of Perpetual Peace is fairly brief but 
complimentary of the work's ambitious proposals. Speaking 
initially of the great number of proposals for peace that 
have arisen over the past several centuries, he notes that 
"A stream of calf-bound, cloth-bound, paper-bound volumes 
has for the last 300 years issued from the world's presses 
containing schemes for the establishment of perpetual 
peace."46 Writing this around the beginning of the First 
World War, Woolf states, "The Great War has for the moment
45Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta, p. 68.
46Leonard Woolf, "Review of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace,'" 
New Statesman (July 31, 1915), p. 398.
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caused this stream to run a little fuller."47 Regarding 
Perpetual Peace, he adds "Of all these projects and schemes 
and dreams none is more curious and original than Kant's 
Zum Ewigen Frieden,"48 According to Woolf, not only is it 
"full of political wisdom," it is by "far the most 
'practical' work ever written on the subject."49 After 
listing the Preliminary and Definitive Articles, he refers 
to them as the "pillars of the Temple of Perpetual Peace" 
and notes, "not one is chimerical or utopian."50 Through 
them, "Kant has succeeded in laying down the conditions of 
international relationship and government which would have 
to exist in order to make perpetual peace possible."51
While Woolf acknowledges that Perpetual Peace is in 
favor of "international government," Mead is thoroughly 
convinced that the text supports the establishment of a 
world government in his interpretation. In reference to 
Perpetual Peace, he begins quite grandly by stating "It was 
a remarkable insight of Kant's that universal peace could
47Woolf, "Review of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace,'" P- 398 .
48Woolf, "Review of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace,'" P- 398.
49Woolf, "Review of Kant' s 'Perpetual Peace,'" P- 399.
50Woolf, "Review of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace,'" P- 399.
51Woolf, "Review of Kant' s 'Perpetual Peace,'" P- 399.
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come only with the republic universal."52 Without initial 
explanation as to the structure of this "republic 
universal," it does not seem a stretch to say that such a 
"republic universal" would involve the loss of state 
sovereignty in order to form a single world entity. Based 
on this single statement, it cannot be determined whether 
or not he continues to see states in Kant's "republic 
universal" as existing after its formation (which may more 
likely be said for other terms from this group of
interpretations like "state of nations"). Still, it is 
difficult to think of a more definitive term than "republic 
universal" for describing a world-wide governmental
authority that will exist above the state level and operate 
as a clear restraint on state sovereignty.
After a short discussion of the Preliminary articles 
(where he essentially quotes directly from the text and 
offers little analysis), Mead begins to offer more evidence 
in support of the above statement concerning the "republic 
universal." First, like other interpreters during this 
period, he sees the second section of Perpetual Peace
within which exists the three definitive articles as most 
important to the body of the treatise. He states that the
52Edwin Doak Mead, "Immanuel Kant's Internationalism,"
Contemporary Review CVII (February 1915), p. 226.
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"three great constructive principles are stated in the 
definitive articles" of the treatise.53 He then explains
Kant's understanding of Nature's role in improving men, the 
state, and international relationships. Agreeing with 
Smith and Paulsen above, Mead asserts that Kant "surveys
again the course of evolution, with all its struggles and
antagonisms, to show that just as individual men, with all
their conflicting interests and inclinations, are forced 
out of a condition of aloofness and lawlessness into the 
condition of a State, so individual nations are being 
gradually forced towards arbitration and federation by the 
sheer dangers and evils of the present disorder, self- 
interest pointing the same way which morality commands."54 
He also expounds on Kantian "Reason" and "Morality" and the 
requirements it places on politicians to work towards the 
ideal of a "republic universal," echoing again earlier 
words by Smith. He states:
To the objection of the practical politician, 
that great reforms theoretically admirable cannot be 
realised because men are what they are, Kant wisely 
answers that many have large knowledge of men without 
yet truly knowing the nature of man. The process of 
creation cannot be justified if we assume that it 
never will or can be better with the human race. 
Kant's cardinal position is that the pure
53Mead, "Immanuel Kant's Internationalism," p. 231.
54Mead, "Immanuel Kant's Internationalism," p. 231.
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principles of right and justice have objective reality 
and can be realised in fact, that it is precisely our 
vocation to proceed about their realisation as fast as 
we apprehend them, and that failure to do this is 
really opposed to nature and is dangerous politics.55
Mead concludes his discussion of Perpetual Peace by
doing what a number of interpreters from this period do.
He quotes directly from the text those several lines that
often appear in interpretation from the mid-nineteenth
century to the end of World War I: "For States viewed in
relation to each other, there can be only one way,
according to reason, of emerging from that lawless
condition which contains nothing but occasions of war.
Just as in the case of individual men, reason would drive
them to give up their savage, lawless freedom, to
accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and thus to
form an ever-growing State of Nations, such as would at
last embrace all the nations of the earth."56
Mead could have as easily quoted, then discussed the
following two sentences after this to demonstrate what
seems like confusion in the Second Definitive Article over
what the text is proposing:
55Mead, "Immanuel Kant's Internationalism," p. 231 
(emphasis in original).
56Mead, "Immanuel Kant's Internationalism," p. 232.
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But since this is not the will of the nations, 
according to their present conception of international 
right (so that they reject in hypothesi what is true 
in thesi) , the positive idea of a world republic 
cannot be realised. If all is not to be lost, this 
can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of 
an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely 
to prevent war. " 57
Instead, he understands the genuine position of the Second
Definitive Article to be found in the former selection. He
never quotes or even refers to the latter excerpt.
Conclusion
To briefly conclude, this chapter has primarily 
discussed English-language interpretations of Kant's 
Perpetual Peace completed from the mid-nineteenth century 
to the end of World War I. It argues that these 
interpretations reveal the first phase of an emerging 
pattern, which understands the text of Perpetual Peace to 
be in favor of a significant restraint on state sovereignty 
through formation of a centralized authority above the 
level of states. Terms like 'international state,'
'civitas g e n t i u m 'universal state,' 'world republic' and 
'republic universal' are often used to describe this
57Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 105 (emphasis in original).
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authority. Other commentators refer to it as a 'universal 
federation' or 'federal union.7 Importantly, neither Kant 
nor the interpreters that consider Perpetual Peace go into 
any details about this centralized authority, its political 
and military components, etc. The most that can definitely 
be said about it is that it will exist above the level of 
states, diminishing the sovereignty of each through public 
laws above them that it can enforce.
Finally, several interpretations which significantly 
contribute to the emergence of this first phase of Pattern 
One focus almost exclusively on one passage within the 
Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace and rarely 
consider the First, Third, or even the remainder of the 
Second Definitive Article in their textual analysis. It is 
difficult to determine whether these interpreters were 
simply ignoring the rest of the text or were so certain 
that the proposal for an 'international state' or 'state of 
nations' in that passage was of such central importance 
that discussion of competing claims or secondary aspects of 
the text was unnecessary. Either way, their frequent focus 
on this proposal to the exclusion of other alternatives 
presented elsewhere in the text suggests how pivotal this 
passage was to their determination of what Perpetual Peace 
ultimately recommends as a solution to the problem of war
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between states. As for those commentators from this period 
whose brief interpretations do not quote directly from the 
text, their interpretations still acknowledge that the 
prevention of war will occur through peace proposals above 
the state level.
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CHAPTER THREE
PATTERN ONE, PHASE TWO: SOVEREIGNTY CURBED.
INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE END OF WORLD WAR I 
TO THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
Introduction
This chapter discusses English-language
interpretations of Kant's Perpetual Peace written between 
the end of World War I and the mid-twentieth century. The 
common thread running through these interpretations is the 
view that Perpetual Peace requires the surrender of some 
sovereignty on the part of states to a wider federation. 
In the sense that both Phase One and Phase Two of Pattern 
One read the' text as requiring a peace proposal above the 
state level, the latter is not so different from the 
former. Still, there is a detectable shift in
interpretation that occurs from Phase One to Phase Two, 
which includes the following distinctive components. 
First, Perpetual Peace suggests to almost all interpreters 
working within this period that the ideal towards which 
nations should work to achieve peace is a federation, not 
an international state. Second, it is shown that
interpretations written during this period rarely if ever 
consider the passage often referred to throughout
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interpretations that reveal the first phase of Pattern One.1 
Instead, meanings taken from the text of Perpetual Peace by 
these interpreters rely on a variety of passages, though 
more precisely on the following passage offered already in 
Chapter One but important enough to quote again here:
Since this [the international state] is not the 
will of the nations, according to their present 
conception of international right, the positive idea 
of a world republic cannot be realised. If all is not 
to be lost, this can at best find a negative 
substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually 
expanding federation likely to prevent war.2
Most importantly, there is a tendency among many
interpreters writing during this period to liken this
"enduring and gradually expanding federation" to the first
permanent international organization, the League of Nations
founded immediately after the end of World War I .
xTo restate, Kant explains towards the end of the 
Second Definitive Article, "There is only one rational way 
in which states coexisting with other states can emerge 
from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like 
individual men, they must renounce their savage and lawless 
freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus 
form an international state (civitas gentium), which would 
necessarily continue to grow until it embraced all the 
peoples of the earth." Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in 
Kant's Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated 
by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970), p. 105.
2Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 105.
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The Ideal Changes: Dwight D. Morrow's Interpretation
According to my research, Dwight W. Morrow completed 
one of the first post-World War I English-language 
interpretations of Kant's Perpetual Peace in his book, The 
Society of States, in 1919.3 Morrow focuses primarily on 
Kant's discussion in the Second Definitive Article. His 
conclusion is that the text of the Article suggests a 
federation of states, not a universal state, as the
3D.P. Heatley's Diplomacy and the Study of 
International Relations, discussed below, was also 
completed in 1919 and includes a brief review of the Second 
Definitive Article of Kant's treatise. I also discovered a 
book by the German Mathias Erzberger, The League of 
Nations: The Way to the World's Peace, which was written, 
then translated into the English in 1919. His reference to 
Kant, interestingly enough, is brief though worth noting 
for its similarity to the English-language interpretations 
of this time. Here, Erzberger is certain that the Second 
Definitive Article did not endorse a world state:
Kant, one of the greatest German philosophers, 
forms, as we see, on a basis of intellectual 
perception, the same estimate of war, and suggests the
same arrangements for its prevention --  for example,
the greatest possible limitation of war --  as did
the Popes, the protectors and the embodiment of the 
Christian moral law. But other prominent Germans, 
towards the end of the eighteenth century, were 
concerned with the ideal of peace. Schlegel even 
suggested an international state, which Kant, in his 
commentary upon the Second Definitive Article of his 
Perpetual Peace, rejected. M. Erzberger, The League 
of Nations: The Way to the World's Peace, translated
by Bernard Miall (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919),
p. 118.
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solution to the problem of war between sovereign states. 
This solution is the ideal towards which all states should 
work.
For example, in his reading of the Second Definitive 
Article, Morrow explains that for Kant, "It is to this end
(the federation of states) that mankind is advancing. To
make many nations into one single State is not only 
impracticable, but undesirable. It might well lead to 
despotism and it would ignore the necessity of developing 
the several national traits."4 Morrow remarks in another 
section that "As civilization increases, as men become more
and more alike in principles and get more and more of an
understanding of one another and of their differences, the 
final Federation of States will be developed."5 To this he 
adds that Kant "describes this ideal at present [to be] 
unattainable, but still an ideal toward which all men 
guided by reason must constantly strive."6 Based on his use 
of the words "end," "advancing," and "final" in the above 
quotations from his work, it is clear to him that the ideal
4Dwight W. Morrow, The Society of Free States (New York 
& London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1919), p. 147.
sMorrow, The Society of Free States, p. 145.
6Morrow, The Society of Free States, pp. 145-46.
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expressed in the Second Definitive Article is in fact a 
federation, not an all-encompassing world state.
The League of Nations' Parallel: Interpretations by Jessie
Wallace Hughan, D.P. Heatley, Nicholas Murray Butler, Mehan 
Stawall, Carl Joachim Friedrich and R.B. Mowat
As one might expect, there was a stream of scholarly 
literature that emerged in relation to Wilson's Fourteen 
Points in 1918 and the subsequent founding of the League of 
Nations in 1920. Though not particularly comprehensive in 
their analysis of the full text of Kant's Perpetual Peace, 
these writers did view Perpetual Peace, and the idea of an 
international authority suggested in the Second Definitive 
Article, as one of the intellectual foundations for the 
League of Nations. Like Morrow above, these interpreters 
understand Perpetual Peace to favor a federation as the 
guarantor of a future peace.
Jessie Wallace Hughan, writing in 1923, explains that 
the Second Definitive Article suggests "a federation of 
free states shall be founded rather than a super-state."7 
Hughan also asserts that, throughout Perpetual Peace, "At
7Jessie Wallace Hughan, A Study of International 
Government (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1923), p. 155.
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least six of the Fourteen Points are anticipated, and 
propositions laid down as to absolutism, armament, war 
loans, secret diplomacy, self-determination, intervention, 
methods of warfare, and the League of Nations, which, if 
followed, would have rendered the events of 1914 an 
impossibility.7/8
Like many other interpreters, D.P. Heatley, in his 
1919 book, Diplomacy and the Study of International 
Relations, hopes to arrive at a Kantian view of 
international relations through a general study of all his 
works. As stated earlier, this is the type of analysis 
with which this thesis is very careful. Still, he does 
offer some commentary on Perpetual Peace alone. While 
noting the fact that too much "emphasis has been unduly 
laid on conclusions by those who cite him [Kant] in their 
advocacy of a League of Nations," Heatley still understands 
Perpetual Peace to be a text encouraging the formation of a 
federation of states.9 In fact, in including a selection 
from a translation (and unfortunately one he does not 
reference) where he sets forth what Perpetual Peace 
envisions, he chooses the following quotation: "Every
8Hughan, A Study of International Government, p. 156.
9D.P. Heatley, Diplomacy and the Study of International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919), p. 200.
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people, for the sake of its own security, may and ought to 
demand from any other people that it shall join in entering 
into a constitution, similar to the civil constitution, in 
which the right of each shall be secured. Thus would arise 
a League of Nations."10 Nowhere in Heatley's commentary 
does he consider the frequently quoted passage from 
interpretations that reveal Pattern One, Phase One. His 
final allusion to the text is the simple remark that, for 
Kant, "international right shall be founded on a federation 
of free states."11
Nicholas Murray Butler also sees the conceptual 
similarity between Kant's federation and the League of 
Nations. In his Path to Peace: Essays and Addresses on
Peace and its Making, he writes that the "thought of Kant 
is not restricted to national policy alone."12 In quoting 
directly from the text, Butler states, "The public right 
ought to be founded upon a federation of free states."13 He 
then exclaims "There, in a single sentence, is the prophecy
10Heatley, Diplomacy and the Study of International 
Relations, pp. 203-04.
1:LHeatley, Diplomacy and the Study of International 
Relations, p. 204.
12Nicholas Murray Butler, The Path to Peace: Essays and 
Addresses on Peace and its Making (New York, London: 
Charles Scribner's & Sons, 1930), p. 200.
13Butler, The Path to Peace, p. 200.
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of the League of Nations and the function of international 
law."14
Unlike Butler who looks only to the Second Definitive 
Article, Mehan Stawall sees the resemblance between the 
ideas of all three definitive articles and the principles 
of a League of Nations. Stawall refers to Perpetual Peace 
as a treaty and writes, "The 'constitutive' Articles of the 
Treaty deal more directly with the League of Nations that 
was then [in Kant's time] only a dream."15 According to 
Stawall, "Kant's first requirement for such a League is 
that every member of it should have a republican form of 
government . . . and only on the basis of such a League can
there be a satisfactory system of international law."16
Even as late as 1948, the well-known Harvard scholar, 
Carl Joachim Friedrich likens Kant's treatise to the League 
of Nations. Yet he comments not only on its similarity to 
the League, but to the United Nations as well. Friedrich 
even states, "it is obvious that this [the Second 
Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace] is the keynote of
14Butler, The Path to Peace, p. 200.
15Mehan F. Stawall, The Growth of International Thought 
(London: Thornton Butterworth Limited, 1929), pp. 204-05.
16Stawall, The Growth of International Thought, pp. 
204-05.
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both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations Charter."17 Further discussing the world's second 
permanent international organization, Friedrich asserts 
that "There can be little question that the Charter of the 
United Nations in many respects fulfills those conditions 
which Immanuel Kant had formulated as essential to the 
establishment of a world-wide organization."18 Friedrich 
also acknowledges, "Nor would [Kant] be as disturbed as
some among us that the organization turned out to be a
league rather than a Union."19 Appropriate to this comment, 
Friedrich acknowledges towards the end of his analysis that 
Kant thought it "wiser to stick to federalism" since a
"united government for the world" would most likely "raise 
the specter of a world-wide despotism."20 Distinguished 
from an all-powerful world government, Friedrich recognizes 
the similarities between the more limited proposals of 
Perpetual Peace and the more limited powers of both the
League of Nations and the United Nations.
17Carl Joachim Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 45.
18Friedrich, Inevitable Peace, p. 33.
19Friedrich, Inevitable Peace, p. 33#
20Friedrich, Inevitable Peace, p. 46.
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Finally, in a comprehensive study of the European 
states system written in 1923, R.B. Mowat remarks in a 
section devoted primarily to the world's first permanent 
international organization that "the League had many
precursors in the world of thought  [one of which was]
Kant's treatise on Perpetual Peace."21 He further states, 
"the League of Nations offers a reasonable compromise 
between the sacrifice of independence on the part of the 
constituent States, on the one hand, and the wielding of 
universal despotic dominion, on the other."22 Mowat 
obviously views the League of Nations (and most probably 
its intellectual forebear discussed in the Second 
Definitive Article) as an international institution, which 
requires the surrender of some independence on the part of 
member states. As will be shown, this idea (along with the 
accompanying tendency to liken Kant's federation to the 
League of Nations demonstrated above) occurs frequently in 
this collection of interpretations.
I use the terms 'accompanying tendency' in the sense 
that when these interpreters use the term "League of
21R.B. Mowat, The European States System, A Study of 
International Relations, 2nd edition (London: Oxford
University Press, 1929; first published in 1923), p. 94.
22Mowat, The European States System, p. 94.
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Nations" (and "United Nations" in Friedrich's case), they 
are not referring to a super-state, international state, or 
state of nations where state sovereignty is more seriously 
limited, but to an international authority in which the 
independent sovereignty of each member is curbed. For 
example, Thomas Barclay succinctly explains this idea in a 
1935 article in the Contemporary Review. He writes, "That 
the League of Nations is not a super-state has been claimed 
for it, but I cannot regard the acceptance of the 
dispositions of the Covenant as otherwise than the 
curtailment of the autonomy of the adherent states."23 The 
primary point is that this group of interpreters understand 
Kant's envisioned federation and the actual League of 
Nations as international authorities in which members must 
relinquish some of .the their sovereignty. This principal 
element of interpretations written during this period is 
far more evident, however, in several of the following 
interpretations of Perpetual Peace, completed primarily in 
the thirties and early forties.
23Thomas Barclay, "Perpetual Peace, Official Schemes 
and Projects," Contemporary Review 147 (January/June,
1935), p. 679.
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Sovereignty Curbed: Interpretations by A.C.F. Beales,
Waldemar Gurian and John Bourke
First, A.C.F. Beales, in his historical account of the 
organized movements for international peace, makes space 
for brief analyses of several eighteenth-century 
philosophers whose theories may have contributed to 
developing peace movements in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Immanuel Kant and his theories 
espoused in Perpetual Peace are given primary attention. 
Beales offers a concise review of the treatise, starting 
with the point that Kant, "as the last of the eighteenth- 
century philosophers, accepted the new theory of the nation 
State but rejected the headstrong logic that would enlarge 
the nation into a Cosmopolis.7/24 Unlike many interpreters, 
Beales sees Perpetual Peace as a practical text. He 
explains that "Kant firmly believed eternal peace to be an 
unrealizable ideal; therefore his suggestions were more 
properly concerned with seeking the right road and 
following it as far as was humanly possible."25 He further
24A.C.F. Beales, The History of Peace: A Short Account 
of the Organized Movements for International Peace (New 
York: The Dial Press, 1931), p. 36.
25Beales, The History of Peace, p. 36.
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notes, "Kant's Perpetual Peace (Zum Ewigen Frieden) won him 
the reproach of being a Jacobin (1795).7/26 He sees "the
book", as he calls it, as "falling into two p a r t s  an
examination of certain reforms to be undertaken while war 
still existed, in order to create a public opinion 
favorable to the abolition of war, and a body of 
suggestions for the final organization of perpetual 
peace."27 With these comments, Beales wishes to present 
Kant and Perpetual Peace as author and text interested not 
so much in theoretical principle, but practical reform.
Before discussing the Second Definitive Article, he 
offers background into Kant's domestic political theory:
Kant agreed with Hobbes that man was by nature 
selfish and base, but he drew from history the lesson 
that mankind had risen to a high state of civilisation 
through the competition and 'mutual antagonism' of 
individuals 'in society,' which not only had produced 
social chaos but also had brought out all man's latent 
powers, until the chaos had been resolved by the 
formation of the State.28
Beales uses Kant's political theory as a way into his 
international proposal. He states, "This argument Kant 
employed similarly to foreshadow an analogous development
26Beales, The History of Peace, p. 36.
27Beales, The History of Peace, p. 36.
28Beales, The History of Peace, p. 36.
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among States themselves, culminating in a 'federation of 
free republics.7"29 After explaining that "By republic, 
Kant meant any form of government which embodied the 
liberty and equality of its subjects," he points out that 
Kant "favoured federation in preference to a World State."30 
Yet if it is clear that Kant did not support one highly 
centralized super-state as Beales writes, then what does 
this federation consist of? Many interpreters have 
struggled with this question over the years, with certainly 
no help from the text itself. One thing is certain. No 
matter what interpretation is given in any of the four 
periods under consideration, it is more likely than not to 
be just as general as the text itself in the discussion of 
the concrete attributes of this federation. Yet this is 
honest interpretation. One thing all interpreters do agree 
on is that Kant, in the Second Definitive Article, offers 
little insight into the substance and content of his 
proposal, be it an international state, a federation, or 
simply an association of like-minded states. As such, 
other than interpreting it in one or other of these ways,
29Beales, The History of Peace, p. 36.
30Beales, The History of Peace, p. 36.
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they are all very careful not to give too many details of 
its structure.
This is probably why John Bourke is correct in saying 
that, compared to earlier peace proposals by other thinkers 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries like the Abbe
de St. Pierre, "Kant's scheme [in Perpetual Peace] is the
first fully to break away from the political conditions of 
any given time and be based upon universal facts of human 
nature which do not pass away with the ages."31 He
continues by saying that "for two reasons we must not 
expect to find in it a programme fulfilling all detailed 
demands that could be made upon it. It is general in
character, an outline, a framework, and does not aim at
being more."32
Yet even with the admittedly general nature of the
proposals offered in the Second Definitive Article in 
Perpetual Peace, there are still relatively clear
differences that arise in interpretations over the years. 
As stated above, an international state or highly
centralized federation as important components of Pattern
31John Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'"
Philosophy 17 (1942), p. 331.
32Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
331.
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One, Phase One, a less formidable federation as a primary- 
component of Pattern One, Phase Two, or the preservation of 
state sovereignty as a primary component of both phases of 
Pattern Two, are all different conclusions of many 
interpretations written since the mid-nineteenth century.
What is important to note in this context (and in 
relation to Beales' article) is a central factor that 
distinguishes the first and second phase of Pattern One. 
Pointedly, Beales believes that Kant's "Federation would 
involve 'the surrender of a portion of power in return for 
participation in a wider, richer, and more secure life.'"33 
This is a very general remark about the nature of Kant's 
federation yet it comes up time and again, both explicitly 
and implicitly, in several other interpretations completed 
in the time period from the end of World War I to the mid­
twentieth century. Ultimately, it is why this Chapter and 
the particular phase of Pattern One that is revealed within 
it is referred to as 'Sovereignty Curbed.' Accordingly, 
Beales understands Kant's proposal to involve the 
"surrender" of some power by the sovereign state to a wider 
federation. This is somewhat different from most
interpretations that reveal Pattern One, Phase One, which
33Beales, The History of Peace, p. 36.
97
envision a more serious restraint on state sovereignty. It 
is also unlike interpretations completed during the last 
half of the twentieth century, which suggest that the 
proposals in Perpetual Peace stand for the preservation of 
sovereignty, not its restraint.
Waldemar Gurian, in his critique of Mortimer J. 
Adler's book, How to Think About War and Peace, briefly
echoes Beales' remarks.34 In speaking of Perpetual Peace, 
Gurian notes, "Kant believed that a curtailment of national 
sovereignty by a perpetual pact excluding war would make 
lasting peace possible."35 He further states, "Hegel
rejected this belief, emphasizing that sovereignty of 
states cannot be bound or limited."36
John Bourke's article, already mentioned above, speaks 
as well of Kant's " (VoIkerbund) or federation of nations .
as one where there must be some surrender of
sovereignty on the part of each member state."37 Though
34Waldemar Gurian, "Perpetual Peace? Critical Remarks 
on Mortimer J. Adler's Book," Review of Politics, 6 (1944),
pp. 228-38.
35Gurian, "Perpetual Peace? Critical Remarks on 
Mortimer J. Adler's Book," p. 22 9.
36Gurian, "Perpetual Peace? Critical Remarks on
Mortimer J. Adler's Book," p. 22 9.
37Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,"' p.
330.
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obviously in agreement with the above two interpreters on 
this important issue, Bourke goes into much more detail 
than these about the rest of the treatise. While he 
praises Kant for bringing the issue of the prevention of 
war to the forefront of his philosophical writings towards 
the end of his life and briefly mentions four works that 
deal with the subject, he still chooses to concentrate his 
interpretive efforts on Perpetual Peace. This treatise, he 
says, "contains the fullest, most independent, and most 
systematic presentation of Kant's views; and it is upon 
this that we shall concentrate in considering them."38 
Bourke views Kant in Perpetual Peace as "eminently sober 
and practical, not a visionary or day-dreaming utopian."39 
Still, similar to almost all other interpreters, he is 
careful to note the general nature of the treatise. He 
states, "Kant makes no claim to offer a programme, cut-and- 
dried and complete, for the abolition of war at once, in a 
lifetime, or in a century."40
38Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
325.
39Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
325.
40Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
325.
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Unlike interpretations written between the 1950s and 
early 1980s, many of which view the content of Kant's 
Preliminary Articles as an argument for the preservation of 
state sovereignty, Bourke discusses them simply as 
"preliminary conditions which must first be satisfied 
before the ideal federation of free republican states can 
be brought to pass."41 Bourke senses that Kant, in 
including these Preliminary Articles, wants to make certain 
that "each time a war is fought, the period following it 
shall be less and less a merely negative period, a mere 
cessation of hostilities, an interval between one war and 
another, and more and more a positive period in which 
constructive attempts are made to establish peace on a 
firmer and more lasting basis."42 With respect to the 
Preliminary Articles, Bourke says nothing here about their 
supposed "assumption" of the sovereign state as the sole 
operational unit through which peace might be established. 
This, as will be shown below, is what commentators writing 
between the 1950s and early 1980s take from the Preliminary 
Articles. Instead, Bourke responds, "peace is something
41Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
330.
42Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p. 
330 (emphasis in original).
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which has to be prepared for and established with effort, 
no mere passive state of relief hovering uneasily between a 
past on which we look back with horror and a future which 
we view with dazed indifference."43
It is apparent to Bourke that the establishment of 
peace requires the existence of an authority above a 
collection of separate states. This is why he immediately 
turns to a discussion of the Second Definitive Article and 
an organized federation for an answer. As we have seen, 
Bourke, like Morrow above, has already referred to this 
federation of free republican states as an ideal.44 This is 
characteristic of interpretations written during this time 
(as the next three interpretations analyzed after this one 
will demonstrate). Yet Bourke is interested in the 
concrete attributes of this federation too. He follows the 
discussion of the Preliminary Articles with the comment 
that "It remains now to inquire what kind of federation it
43Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" pp. 
330-31 (emphasis in original).
44While it seems fairly clear that Bourke understands 
this ideal to be a federation, he is not completely clear 
on this point. While he states that Kant "rejects the 
notion of a world state," he sees fit to mention that it is 
"entertained" as an idea in another passage. Bourke, 
"Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p. 332. Still, his 
discussion and analysis is devoted primarily to the idea of 
federation, and he suggests more than once that it is 
Kant's vision or ideal.
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is which Kant here envisages" in the Second Definitive 
Article.45 While Bourke believes we may somehow "feel 
disappointed" with the lack of detail Kant goes into in 
describing his federation, as has been noted above, "we 
[still] must not expect to find in it a programme 
fulfilling all detailed demands that could be made upon it. 
It is general in character, an outline, a framework, and 
does not aim at being more."46 In fact, the most that can 
be said about it according to Bourke's interpretation is 
that "there must be some surrender of sovereignty on the 
part of each member state" within the federation.47 Though 
Bourke notes that "we might expect to have found some 
account in Kant's scheme of the form that this [federation] 
would take, of precisely what aspects of sovereignty or 
powers the separate states would agree to forgo to the 
central authority," he believes it is nowhere to be found.48 
Once again, the most these three interpreters are willing 
to say about Kant's proposal is that it will involve some
45Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
331.
46Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
331.
47Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
332.
48Bourke, "Kant's Doctrine of 'Perpetual Peace,'" p.
332 .
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limitation of sovereignty through the creation of a 
federation.
The Ideal Is a Federation, not a World State: 
Interpretations by Jessie H. Buckland and J.F. Crawford
In the Introduction to a 1927 translation of Perpetual 
Peace, Jessie H. Buckland is as clear as Morrow and Bourke 
in the belief that the ideal in Kant's treatise is a 
federation. Buckland spends considerable time discussing 
Kant's moral and political philosophy, which need not be 
analyzed here. Buckland's understanding of the Preliminary 
Articles is much like that of Bourke in that he views them 
simply as "practical" suggestions for the improvement of 
relations between states after war, not a designation of 
them as encouraging the entrenchment of the sovereign 
state.49 His views on the Second Definitive Article are 
relatively sparse though quite telling. In his textual 
analysis, he states that in terms of Kant's treatise, 
"Since each state is a sovereign state, no common authority 
over all states can be set up, and there can be no
49Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, translated by Helen 
O'Brien, introduction by Jessie Buckland, Grotius Society 
Publications: Texts for Students of International
Relations, No. 7 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1927), p. 10.
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compulsion, as in the case of the individual, to leave the 
state of nature and to become part of a world state."50 He 
further notes, "If we can't aim at the establishment of a 
common authority to which all states must submit, the only 
ideal consistent with freedom is that of a federation of 
free States."51
Like Buckland, J.F. Crawford has written an earlier 
1925 article that also marks the end, or goal, or ideal of 
Kant's proposal as a federation of states. Though he 
primarily discusses Kant's Idea of a Universal History with 
a Cosmopolitan Purpose in his analysis, he does offer 
several comments on Perpetual Peace. Crawford first refers 
to the Preliminary Articles as "concrete proposals" which, 
if implemented, would help humanity achieve the "goal" of 
federation.52 Nowhere does he remark that they are simply 
proposals to sustain peace through, and only through, the 
continued existence of the sovereign state, as will be seen 
in interpretations written between the 1950s and early 
1980s.
50Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. Helen O'Brien, intro. 
Jessie Buckland, p. 9.
51Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. Helen O'Brien, intro.
Jessie Buckland, p. 9
52J.F. Crawford, "Kant's Doctrines Concerning Perpetual
Peace," Monist 35 (1925), p. 312.
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Crawford then moves to the Second Definitive Article 
where he quotes directly from the treatise stating, "The 
law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free 
states."53 His comment exactly after this quotation is that 
"This is not so much a condition of the goal [meaning 
perpetual peace] as the goal itself."54 He also asks 
earlier in the treatise, in a more general discussion, 
"Does Kant regard the goal of world federation as actually 
attainable?"55 When coupling these comments with his 
further remark that "Kant is so sensitive to the deadening 
effects of too widely centralized a government that he 
rejects a world state in favor of a federation," it is 
clear that Crawford understands the Kantian ideal to be a 
federation, not a world state.56 Yet this federation is not 
just an ideal for Kant according to Crawford. Crawford 
explains that in the realm of "methods and practical
53Crawford, "Kant's Doctrines Concerning Perpetual
Peace," p. 313.
54Crawford, "Kant's Doctrines Concerning Perpetual
Peace," p. 313.
55Crawford, "Kant's Doctrines Concerning Perpetual
Peace," p. 310.
56Crawford, "Kant's Doctrines Concerning Perpetual
Peace," p. 310.
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details . . .  a federation of states is all [Kant] is
willing to endorse."57
A Concluding Interpretation by A.C. Armstrong
The final interpretation from this period to be
reviewed is by A.C. Armstrong. Published in 1931, 
Armstrong's article is devoted entirely to Kantian 
philosophy on peace and war. While he offers a very in- 
depth analysis of Kant's views on international relations, 
he does so through an examination of all his texts, not 
just Perpetual Peace. Still, it is fairly easy to
distinguish Armstrong's comments that specifically relate 
to Perpetual Peace. Furthermore, they generally resemble 
all of the above interpretations and thus further the 
argument for the existence of a second phase of Pattern 
One. In fact, Armstrong's interpretation has aspects of
most of the key elements of interpretations from this 
period.
Armstrong begins his look at Kant's thought with the 
comment that there have been those over the years who view 
Kant as "proposing the destruction of independent
57Crawford, "Kant's Doctrines Concerning Perpetual
Peace," p. 310.
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nationality . . .  in favor of a world state [or 
Voelkerstaat] .//58 Armstrong then clearly states that this 
"argument is of course a misinterpretation."59 This is why
he later explains that "Much more frequently, therefore --
and this may be called its standard designation by Kant --
it is described as a Voelkerbund" or a "federation of free 
states."60 He concludes that this "federation" is a 
"federal organization of the several states, or a group of 
neighbor states, in substitution for the world-state, which 
has been found impracticable."61 Yet Armstrong still takes 
from the text the notion that the original position of 
states is a "lawless condition."62 And though a
substitution of a world state is not the answer as claimed 
above, there should occur a "substitution of the federal
58A.C. Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," 
The Journal of Philosophy, Volume XXVIII, No. 8 (April 9, 
1931), p. 198.
59Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
198.
60Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
202.
61Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
202 .
“Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
203 .
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relationship of nations in place of their original lawless 
condition."63
Armstrong also notes this "federal organization" as 
part of the "Kantian programme, then, distinctly includes 
the elements of an international league."64 Yet according 
to Armstrong, this organization "transcends the provisions 
of the Kellogg Pact and parallels the plan of the League of 
Nations more nearly than that of any other of the later 
movements for the furtherance of peace."65 While Armstrong 
does believe that the "present League is more closely knit 
together in its organization, as, it should probably be 
added, it is more complexly framed, than the Bund which 
Kant had in mind," he does see "the federal idea [as] 
central in his thought."66
“Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
203 .
“Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
203 .
“Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
203 .
“Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," p.
203 .
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter argues that textual 
interpretations of Kant's Perpetual peace found in the 
period between the end of World War I and the mid-twentieth 
century have similar themes running through them that 
reveal a particular phase of Pattern One unique to this 
specific historical period. The second phase of Pattern 
One that emerges recognizes Kant's text as one that 
proposes the formation of a federation in which the 
sovereignty of each member state is curbed. This
federation is an ideal towards which all states should work 
to achieve. Conceptually speaking, it is also understood 
as similar to the idea and certain concrete components of 
the League of Nations founded in 192 0 and, in one example 
offered, the United Nations founded in 1945. Finally, the 
textual anchor of the term 'federation' is found in a 
variety of passages throughout the Second Definitive 
Article, though discussion of it in the one principal 
passage already stated is what interpreters from this 
period refer to primarily. All of these elements 
demonstrate a relative shift in the overall understanding 
of Kant's Perpetual Peace that occurs in the movement from
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Phase One to Phase Two. Still, both phases recognize that 
the text suggests peace proposals above the state level.
110
PART THREE
THE ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE: 
PEACE PROPOSALS AT THE STATE LEVEL
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CHAPTER FOUR
PATTERN TWO, PHASE ONE: IN DEFENSE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY.
INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE 1950s TO THE EARLY 1980s
Introduction
In this chapter, the argument is made that the first 
phase of a new pattern emerges from interpretations 
completed between the 1950s to the early 1980s. These 
interpretations view Kant's Perpetual Peace as a text, 
which endorses the sovereign state as the essential unit 
through which lasting peace will be achieved. The
continued freedom and independence of the state, not its 
restriction, is what this collection of interpretations 
suggests.
Frequently, interpretations during this period 
acknowledge that Kant may have favored a confederation, 
free federation, association, or alliance of states in 
Perpetual Peace. Still, the interpreters that use these 
terms always describe such entities as voluntary, loosely 
bound, and ultimately dissoluble. This is because their 
reading of the text demonstrates that the sovereignty of 
the state is not to be compromised, regardless of what kind 
of international entity may potentially develop.
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Finally, this series of interpretations tends to be 
grounded in more than just the text of the Second 
Definitive Article. One encounters examination and review 
of the Preliminary Articles, the First Supplement, and 
even, to some extent, the Third Definitive Article much 
more frequently in interpretations written during this 
period. In support of the claim that the text of the 
Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace champions the 
preservation of state sovereignty, interpreters from this 
period look to all of these selections in asserting their 
position.
Besides the focus on broader portions of the text, 
interpretations during this period offer considerably more 
substance and analysis of Perpetual Peace than most of the 
interpretations discussed in Chapters Two and Three. This 
is certainly evident in what I would argue is the defining 
interpretation of this period, written by F.H. Hinsley in 
his 1963 book Power and the Pursuit of Peace. While I 
generally analyze interpretations of the text in 
chronological order, I think it is more instructive to 
consider Hinsley's 1963 work first. Clearly, it is most 
representative of interpretations written during this time, 
discussing all the core elements of interpretations that I 
argue reveal Pattern Two, Phase One. As such, an
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introductory review of it will provide an easier entry into 
further discussion of the other textual analyses.
F.H. Hinsley's Influential Interpretations
Hinsley initially states in his chapter on Immanuel 
Kant that the philosopher "took over Rousseau's conception 
of the international state of nature [as] 'a state of war'" 
and that therefore posited that "'the state of peace must 
be founded.'"1 Upon delving into the text of the Second 
Definitive Article, Hinsley is not ready to say that Kant's 
solution to this problem of the state of war between 
nations is the same as Rousseau's or the Abbe de St. 
Pierre's. He states that Kant's "detailed exposition . . .
in Perpetual Peace constitutes a complete departure from 
their organisational proposals."2
More importantly, Hinsley then begins his key analysis 
of what he believes Kant is proposing in Perpetual Peace. 
Thoughts on this theme essentially occupy the entire 
chapter. He calls Kant's and Rousseau's idea of an 
international state of nature and the resulting state of
■^F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace 
(Cambridge: Power and the Pursuit of Peace), p. 62.
2Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 67.
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war between states a "predicament."3 But according to 
Hinsley, in Perpetual Peace, Kant "did not suppose the way 
out of the predicament [to be] a merger of the separate 
states."4 Hinsley obviously sees Kant as favoring the 
coming together of individuals in a state to avoid the 
state of war between them and thus to further their most 
basic interests in survival. Yet he also believes that the 
international state of nature poses a different problem for 
Kant. Interpreting the text, Hinsley asserts that though 
"individuals must combine to survive, states, by their very 
nature, could not. It was no more logical to hope to solve 
the international problem by the supersession of the states 
than it would have been logical to try to end the civil 
state of nature by the abolition of individuals."5 He ends 
this discussion by exclaiming that the above is the 
"dominant theme in Perpetual Peace."6
In reaching this first conclusion, Hinsley relies 
primarily on Kant's statements in the Second Definitive 
Article. There Kant likens states to individual men which 
"live in a state of nature . . . [and therefore] for the
3Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 62.
4Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 62.
5Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 62.
6Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 62.
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sake of security can and ought demand of the others that 
they should enter . . . into a constitution, similar to the
civil one, within which the rights of each could be 
secured."7 Yet as we have already discussed in Chapter One, 
the next step towards a single state of nations that would 
seem the logical response to the international state of 
nature is both a "contradiction" since "nations already 
have a lawful internal constitution, thus outgrowing the 
coercive right of others to subject them to a wider legal 
constitution" and impracticable because it is not the "will 
of the nations according to their present conception of 
international right."8
From this, Hinsley concludes the first section with 
the comment that Kant "accepted the continuing independence 
of states . . .  as morally right."9 He explains that "Just 
as [Kant] derived the right to freedom of the individual 
from the dictates of the moral law, so he derived the right 
to freedom of the s t a t e  the route to and the guarantee
7Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Political 
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 102.
8Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 102, p. 104, and p. 105, respectively.
9Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 63.
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of the freedom of the individual --  from the same moral
law."10
Hinsley then turns to the Preliminary Articles for 
analysis and support of his claim that Perpetual Peace 
stands for the preservation of state sovereignty. 
Interpretations that reveal both phases of Pattern One 
discuss the Preliminary Articles on occasion, but mostly in 
passing, and never in support of their separate positions 
on the text. Hinsley quickly points out even before his 
discussion of their impact that "These articles not only
assumed the autonomy of the state but sought to strengthen 
it."11 Furthermore, Hinsley disagrees with the majority of 
those who understand the Preliminary Articles to be little 
more than preliminary conditions that must be 'fulfilled7 
before the Definitive Articles can be offered with the goal 
of 'establishing7 peace. He states that "'the preliminary 
articles of perpetual peace between states7 [are] a
statement of the law of nations as it ought to b e  and
thus of Kant7 s solution -- and not, as has often been
assumed, as a statement of the preliminary progress that
must be made before the work of establishing peace could be
10Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 63.
1:lHinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 64.
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begun."12 He clearly sees the Preliminary Articles as part 
of Kant's prescription and therefore integral to what he is 
advocating. As such, his statement that these articles not 
only assume, but also seek to strengthen, the sovereign 
state makes more sense.
His emphasis is on the Second, Third, and Fifth 
Preliminary Articles. After generally summarizing all the 
articles, wherein he emphasizes Kant's constant use of the 
word "state" and the consistent connotation it receives 
from him as an independent and sovereign entity,13 he turns 
to Kant's commentary directly below each of the above three 
articles in support of his interpretive claim. First, he 
notes Kant's statement in the Second Preliminary Article 
that "A state is not a possession like the soil . . . It is
a society of men which no one but themselves is called on
12Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 69.
131. No treaty of peace shall be held to be such, 
which is made with the secret reservation of the material 
for a future war. 2. No state having an independent
existence, whether it be small or great, may be acquired by 
another state, through inheritance, exchange, purchase or 
gift. 3. Standing armies shall gradually disappear. 4. 
No debts shall be contracted in connection with the foreign 
affairs of the state. 5. No state shall interfere by 
force in the constitution and government of another state. 
6. No state at war with another shall permit such acts of 
warfare as must make mutual confidence impossible in time 
of future peace: such as the employment of assassins . . .
the instigation of treason . . . etc. Hinsley, Power and
the Pursuit of Peace, p. 69 (emphasis in original).
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to command or dispose of. Since, like a tree, such a state 
has its own roots, to incorporate it as a graft into
another state is to take away its existence as a moral 
person and to make of it a thing."14 Second, he notes that 
the Third Preliminary Article "demanded the abolition of 
standing armies because they 'threaten other states with
war7 and were 'the causes of wars of aggression, 7 but 
argued that 'the case is entirely different where the 
citizens of a state voluntarily drill themselves and their 
fatherland against attacks from without.7"15 Finally, Kant 
refers to the Fifth Preliminary Article where he says, "No 
state shall interfere by force in the constitution and 
government of another state" as such interference would 
constitute a "trespass on the rights of an independent 
people and an actual offence which . . . would tend to
render the autonomy of all states insecure."16
While Hinsley offers little analysis of each section 
presented, he implies in all of these that Kant is 
demonstrating his commitment to the independent state. 
This is especially true in regard to the Second and Fifth 
Preliminary Articles. First, Kant describes the state as a
14Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 69.
15Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 69.
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moral person and essentially says it is contradictory to 
"incorporate it as a graft into another state or take away 
its existence."17 The creation of an international state 
like that discussed in several interpretations that give
rise to Pattern One, Phase One would certainly undermine 
Kant's notion of the state as a moral person whose
independent existence would obviously be compromised by a 
larger state "incorporating it as a graft into it." 
Second, the very basic non-interventionist position Kant 
takes in the Fifth Preliminary Article may come under 
attack even in a Pattern One, Phase Two-like federation. 
Finally, Hinsley maintains, "in a concluding paragraph to 
the preliminary articles, Kant even demanded that states 
which had lost their independence should have it 
restored."18 He turns once again to the Second Preliminary 
Article but this time to a different section. Here,
Hinsley notes Kant's acknowledgment that, in comparison to 
the First, Fifth, and Sixth Preliminary Articles which
"should be introduced at once, the "execution" of the 
Second Preliminary Article may be "delayed."19 Yet Hinsley
16Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 69.
17Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 69.
18Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 69.
19Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, pp. 64-65.
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then quotes Kant as saying this delay does not mean that 
"The restitution . . .  to certain states of the freedom of 
which they have been deprived . . . must be indefinitely
put off."20 Once again, Hinsley's examination of the text
reveals to him, however general, Kant's commitment to the
independence of the state.
While Hinsley clearly reads into the Preliminary 
Articles Kant's support of the inviolable sovereignty of 
the state, he is just as convinced that this position 
reveals itself in the Third Definitive Article. In 
comparing it to the Preliminary Articles, Hinsley states, 
"Even more remarkable for its emphasis on the independence
of the state was another of the definitive articles --  the
third --  in which Kant introduced the notion of 'the
Cosmopolitan or World Law.'"21 Since the Third Definitive 
Article has barely been mentioned thus far, I will offer a 
quick summary of the text involved in this interpretation. 
The article pronounces in its titular heading that 
"Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of 
Universal Hospitality."22 According to Kant, "Hospitality
20Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 65.
21Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 65.
22Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 105.
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means the right of a stranger not to be treated with 
hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory."23 
Kant goes on to say, "He can indeed be turned away, if this 
can be done without causing his death, but he must not be 
treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a 
peaceable manner in the place he happens to be in."24
Hinsley's reading of the above goes as follows. 
First, in commenting on the title, Hinsley says, "It is not 
for nothing that generations of commentators have been 
puzzled by [it]."25 He further states, "They have had 
difficulty in reconciling it with their assumption that he 
advocated the merger of states."26 The main point, 
according to Hinsley, is that "It asserted the right of all 
men to seek their freedom in as many separate states as
natural conditions required --  and especially in those
backward areas where the state had not yet developed."27 
Hinsley understands Kant to be saying that separate states
23Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 105.
24Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, pp. 105-06.
25Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 65.
26Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 65.
27Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 65.
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exist and will continue to exist. As such, cosmopolitan 
right will always be limited according to this reality.
While Hinsley seems to creatively read into the 
Preliminary Articles and the Third Definitive Article 
Kant's support of the independent state, his interpretive 
position is that much more persuasive in his analysis of 
the Second Definitive Article. Beyond what has already 
been explained above in reference to it, Hinsley attempts 
to uncover what Kant actually means by all the different 
phrases he uses to describe his proposal for peace in the 
Second Definitive Article. Hinsley asserts, "we must now 
establish what was Kant's conception of the 'federalism of 
free states.'"28 He recognizes that Kant uses this term to 
describe his proposal in the Second Definitive Article and, 
like all interpreters, he tries to pin down what Kant is 
suggesting. As was explained in earlier chapters, this has 
never been an easy task for interpreters as Kant was very 
general in his formulations. Still, Hinsley is otherwise 
convinced and confident that Kant did not favor an 
international state or federation that restricted state 
sovereignty in any way.
28Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 66
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In Hinsley's analysis to follow, it is very easy to 
notice the interpretive shift from the broader components 
of Pattern One discussed in Chapters Two and Three to the 
ideas and meanings presented in this instructive 
interpretation. While this shift is detected through 
Hinsley's novel focus on the Preliminary Articles and Third 
Definitive Article, it is even more evident in his 
discussion of the Second Definitive Article that 
interpreters from the earlier two periods focus on 
exclusively.
Though it is not clear if he researched them, Hinsley 
would seem to have little confidence in interpretations 
that reveal the first phase of Pattern One. He initially 
states, "Everybody knows that [Kant] did not advocate world 
government or the complete but less universal merger of 
states: he explicitly rejects this solution.7/29 In a later 
book, he says to those earlier interpreters that explained
Kant's text in this way that they simply "misunderstood
• 0 Kant's entire argument."
Showing little sympathy with this Pattern One, Phase 
One component, Hinsley seems just as skeptical about
29Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 66.
30F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: C.A. Watts and Co. 
Ltd., 1966), p. 216.
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interpretations that reveal Pattern One, Phase Two. He 
states that "because of his use of such phrases 
[federation, federalism, etc.] most people firmly believe 
that he advocated international federation in our modern 
sense of the term as the only alternative."31 He 
emphatically states, "This is not the case."32 According to 
Hinsley, *[Kant] derived these phrases from the word foedus 
and used that to mean 'treaty,' which is what it still 
means [and therefore] he was envisaging the replacement of 
the existing imperfect, customary international law by a 
structure of international society based on a treaty 
between independent states."33
Hinsley clearly believes that Kant in Perpetual Peace 
is as likely to dismiss a federation that exists as an 
institutionalized authority above the level of states as a 
world state. His reasons for this interpretive position 
are as follows:
[Kant] was as much opposed to it [federation] as 
to world government because of his insistence that the 
state, like the individual, could not part with its 
freedom. The individual must impose the state on 
himself in order to remain free. In the same way
31Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 66.
32Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 66.
33Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 66.
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'free federation' for Kant was what the state must
impose on itself while remaining free.3*
Though Hinsley does admit that a "league or international 
organization" may arise incidentally from Kant's very 
limited proposal, he asserts that "voluntary acceptance as 
continuing independent nations of a rule of law" will not 
be "backed up by international organisation or physical 
force."35 This is because, in the final analysis, "Kant
insisted that some other solution must exist --  that
international peace must be based on and obtained through
the freedom of the s t a t e  because he took the doctrine
of state sovereignty and autonomy to its logical 
conclusion." 36
Importantly, Hinsley does not budge from this
interpretive position in books he writes in later years. 
In his 1966 book, Sovereignty, he remarks, "We shall
acquire, indeed, a renewed respect for the percipience of 
Immanuel Kant who, in the 1780s and 1790s, spelled out
clearly the message that peace could now be founded only on 
self-imposed improvement in the conduct of the independent
34Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 66 
(emphasis in original).
35Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 66.
36Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, pp. 66-67.
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sovereign state."37 Ten years after his first textual 
analysis of Kant's treatise in Power and the Pursuit of 
Peace, Hinsley published his 1973 book Nationalism and the 
International System. Here, he notes that "Kant 
rejected the programme for improving the international 
system by amalgamating states, or by imposing international 
political organisation upon them."38 Instead, Hinsley 
continues to suggest, "For Kant, even more decisively than 
for Bentham, a treaty agreement between sovereign states 
was the only means by which the international system might 
be improved."39
Yet this bare-minimum solution, which Hinsley is 
convinced Kant endorsed, presents obvious problems. The 
notion of a rule of law in the form of a treaty between 
independent states is a nebulous one. If states remain 
independent with only a relatively abstract and 
unenforceable rule of law between them, then that order 
presumably created by a federation or world state that may 
be in a position to enforce the rule of law would seem to
37F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (C.A. Watts & Co. Ltd., 
1966), p. 212.
38F.H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the International 
System, Twentieth Century Studies, edited by Donald Tyerman 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), p. 75.
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be reduced to anarchy in a context of separate, autonomous 
states pursuing their own external affairs without any 
checks on their actions.
Even Hinsley admits this problem. He first states, 
"Kant's dilemma here was the same as that which had faced 
Rousseau."40 He goes on to say that if "There could be no 
lawful international order without an international public 
law," then "it was not easy to see how there could be an 
international public law without an international political 
system."41 Still, Hinsley firmly believes that Kant was 
pressing for the development of an international public law 
that, in effect, "would do the work of an international 
political system."42 Clearly, Kant was differentiating 
"international law as it was from the rule of law as it 
should be."43 What he was ultimately "propounding," 
according to Hinsley's 1973 book, "was not a federation in 
our sense of the term, but collaboration between states
39Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System, p.
75.
40Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 68.
41Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 68.
42Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 68.
43Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 68.
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under an improved law of nations."44 While hope for an 
improved rule of law between separate states may sound too 
idealistic to place the goal of the prevention of war in, 
it should be clear by now that Hinsley does not believe 
Kant favored anything more than this prescription in the 
Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace.
Hinsley is not convinced that the proposal Kant offers 
in the Second Definitive Article is the only thing that 
will "guarantee" perpetual peace. Importantly, in one of 
the first examples of this, an interpreter of the text 
looks to material beyond the Preliminary and Definitive 
Articles in attempting to come to terms with what Kant 
believed would bring about peace. According to Hinsley, 
" [Kant] analyzed what he thought would produce peace in 
'the first addition' to the articles of Perpetual Peace, 
entitled 'On the guarantee of perpetual peace.'"45 Hinsley 
(and, as will be argued, other interpreters from this era) 
considers the "First Supplement: On the Guarantee of a
Perpetual Peace" as a "supplemental" avenue.46 At least in 
the way Hinsley understands it, the Kantian notion of an
44Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System, p.
76.
45Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, pp. 71-72.
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improved law of nations and the role it plays in producing
peace is in fact "supplemented" by this section of the
text.
In the First Supplement, Hinsley views Kant as placing 
his hopes for peace in "'the great artist nature . . .  as 
[her] mechanical course evidently reveals a teleology: to
produce harmony from the very disharmony of men even 
against there will.'"47 This rather complicated idea has
already been spelled out elaborately in Chapter One. In
Hinsley's case, he does little more than summarize the text 
of the Supplement (as I have done before) . Still, a brief 
look at his review of the text is helpful. In the first 
instance, "'nature creates the disharmony [between men] and 
the dispersal [of men] in order to force men to use their 
better qualities [e.g. reason] for overcoming its 
dangers.'"48 This "process," as Hinsley calls it, involves 
the following three areas: "'constitutional law,
international law and cosmopolitan or world law.'"49
46Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, pp. 108-14.
47Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 76.
48Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 76.
49Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 76.
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First, in constitutional law, nature leads humankind 
towards the formation of a civil constitution by instilling 
selfish propensities in individuals which, when opposing 
each other, "'impel them to submit themselves to compulsory 
laws and thus bring about the state of peace in which such 
laws are enforced.'"50
Second, in international law, Hinsley comments, 
"Nature's purpose in the international field is rather to 
preserve the separate states and to utilise their conflict 
[as it does in its relation to and influence on human 
beings]."51 Nature utilizes the means of language and 
religion to differentiate peoples and prevent them from 
coming together. Such differences, coupled with the 
already evident selfish inclinations of individuals, 
"'occasion the inclination towards mutual hatred and the 
excuse for war.'"52 This separating mechanism also brings 
people and states closer together through the "'the 
balancing of these forces in a lively competition (which 
would not occur under an amalgamation of states in a 
despotism which leads to the graveyard of freedom).'"53
50Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 77.
51Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 78.
52Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 78.
53Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 78.
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Just as men and states remain independent and free, so they 
will grow closer together and towards mutual agreement on 
the principles for a lasting peace because of their 
separateness from each other brought about by nature. It 
is thus not the transcendence of the collection of 
sovereign states through establishment of an all-powerful 
international state, but the competitive tendencies between 
states that will, paradoxically, bring about peace.
Finally, according to Hinsley, this "balanced 
competition would thus find its ultimate expression in the 
cosmopolitan or world law."54 Under this broad topic, Kant 
insinuates that the ever-present commercial instinct of 
humankind does much to prevent war because it cannot exist 
with it. Though nature does separate states through 
differences in language and religion, it also unites them 
under cosmopolitan law through the "'spirit of commerce 
which cannot exist with war, and which sooner or later 
takes hold of every nation [so that] States find themselves 
impelled (though hardly by moral compulsion) to promote the 
noble peace.'"55 In the above three ways, nature, through
54Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 78.
55Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 78.
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the mechanism of human self-interest, guarantees peace 
between separate states.
Hinsley is intent on giving the First Supplement its 
due. He sees it as an integral part of Kant's treatise, 
too long left out of discussion and interpretation of the 
text, and certainly important in understanding how Kant 
expected perpetual peace to result from the continued 
existence of the sovereign state with no higher political 
authority above it to restrict its freedom.
F.H. Hinsley's interpretations of Kant's Perpetual 
Peace, especially his chapter on Kant in Power and the 
Pursuit of Peace, are arguably the most well-known and 
thorough analyses of the entire text. Two later
interpreters referred to it as the "the first close textual 
analysis of Kant in the Anglo-American strongholds of 
academic international relations" since Perpetual Peace was 
first written in 1795.56 Full coverage of its review and 
analysis, as undertaken above, is crucial to the argument 
for the existence of a new pattern. Though other
interpreters from this period may leave out certain aspects
56Howard Williams & Ken Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond
Limits" in Ian Clark & Iver B. Neumann, eds. , Classical 
Theories of International Relations (Houndmills, 
Basingstroke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 
p. 72 .
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of his analysis of the text in their interpretations, it is 
certain that he covers nearly all thoughts on 
interpretation included in their considerations of the 
text.
Interpretations through the 1950s and 1960s: Frederick L.
Schuman, Kenneth Waltz and Wolfgang Schwarz
In this historical period under consideration, there 
exists commentary and discussion of the text that pre-dates 
Hinsley's 1963 book. For example, Frederick L. Schuman in 
his 1954 book The Commonwealth of Man briefly asserts, 
"Kant's 'articles of Perpetual Peace' postulated the
independence of all states, nonintervention, and 
disarmament."57 Schuman also suggests that the text 
advocates "more vaguely" some form of collective defense 
mechanism that operates to protect those independent states 
existing together in a "loose union, devoted to commerce 
and to republican constitutionalism."58 He does not
indicate that Kant proposed anything more than the
57Frederick L. Schuman, The Commonwealth of Man: An
Inquiry into Power Politics and World Government (London: 
Robert Hale Limited, 1954), p. 349.
58Schuman, The Commonwealth of Man, pp. 349-50.
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continuing existence of a collection of independent states 
bound together by similar political institutions and 
commercial activity.
In a far more significant interpretation of Kant's 
treatise, Kenneth Waltz writes in his 1962 article "Kant, 
Liberalism, and War" of Kant's commitment to the sovereign 
state. He believes it is important to offer this 
interpretation of the text because there exists so "many 
misinterpretations of his political philosophy" in the 
past.59 Throughout the first two sections of the article, 
Waltz gives the impression that Kant sees little difference 
between the state of nature at the civil level and the
state of nature at the international level.60 He explains, 
for Kant, "The civil state is necessary for two reasons, 
because men are imperfect and because even good men may
fall into dispute and require a legally established 
mediator. The universal law-state would seem to be
necessary for a similar pair of reasons.''61 According to
59Kenneth N. Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," 
American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), p. 331.
60Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," pp. 331-37.
61Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," pp. 336-37. 
Waltz makes the above comment in direct reference to the
following quote from Perpetual Peace: "Every people, for
the sake of its own security, thus may and ought to demand 
from any other that it shall enter along with it into a
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Waltz, "in spite of a number of statements such as the one 
just quoted, Kant will not accept the 'legal state of 
Society' on a grand scale, the world constitution 'similar 
to the civil constitution, ' as a solution to the problem."62 
Waltz continues with the comment that "Every time he uses 
such phrases he quickly adds qualifications that materially 
change their meaning."63
So, Waltz asks, "Why does Kant, after having
constructed an argument internally consistent, turn to the 
conclusion that not [world] government but a voluntary 
organization is the solution to the problem of war?" Here 
Waltz answers the question in an almost identical way as 
Hinsley. He sees two reasons why Kant does not carry the 
domestic analogy to its logical conclusion.
First, according to Waltz's reading, "States already
have a legal constitution; it would be illogical to place 
them under another. Individuals in a condition of nature 
have a right to compel others to join with them to form a
constitution, similar to the civil constitution, in which 
the right of each shall be secured." Immanuel Kant,
Eternal Peace and Other International Essays, translated by 
W. Hastie (Boston, 1914), p. 81 in Waltz, "Kant,
Liberalism, and War," p. 336.
62Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
63Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
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state. The right of a state to demand that other states 
submit to the rule of law is not comparably strong."64 As 
such, Waltz refers to Kant as "a non-interventionist 
liberal, in contrast to Mazzini and Woodrow Wilson," 
because "As a matter of right, no state can interfere with 
the internal arrangement of another."65
The second reason Waltz believes Kant "sh[ies] away 
from a world state [is that] he fears that such a state, 
once achieved, would be a greater evil than the war it is 
designed to eliminate."66 This is because it potentially 
"could become a terrible despotism, stifle liberty, kill 
initiative, and in the end lapse into anarchy."67
Following from his argument that a world state is not 
Kant's answer, Waltz then must offer an alternative, 
knowing full well that Kant was indeed interested in 
offering some kind of a solution to prevent future wars in 
Perpetual Peace, not simply a descriptive analysis of war 
and peace. According to Waltz, Kant "hopes states may 
improve enough and learn enough from the suffering and 
devastation of war to make possible a rule of law among
64Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
65Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
66Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
67Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
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them that is not backed by power but is voluntarily 
observed."68 Similar to Hinsley7s analysis above, Waltz 
views Kant7s proposal as suggesting the "internal
improvement of states and [improvement in] the external 
rule of law" between them.69 Yet it is the external rule of 
law that is entirely "voluntary" and "dependent on the 
perfection" with which the internal improvement of states 
"is realized."70 From this, it is easy to conclude that, 
like Hinsley, Waltz understands the text to place its faith 
entirely in the sovereign state as the avenue to peace. 
Nowhere in his article does he mention that the ■ text
suggests states should part with some of their sovereignty 
as has been argued when discussing interpretations that 
reveal both phases of Pattern One. Hinsley7s and Waltz7s 
arguments lay the foundation for the interpretive shift 
that begins to occur in the 1950s and 1960s.
Detailed interpretations of Perpetual Peace by Hinsley 
and Waltz, well known throughout the International 
Relations community, do provide the core material in the 
argument for a new pattern during this historical period. 
Still, it is important to note that throughout the 1960s
68Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
69Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
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and 1970s, other writers considering the text of Perpetual 
Peace offer interpretations very consistent with those of 
Hinsley and Waltz. Their analysis of the text offer even 
more support to the argument that a clear interpretive 
shift occurs during this time period.
Wolfgang Schwarz published an article in 1962 called 
"Kant's Philosophy of Law and International Peace."71 In 
discussing this topic, he is equally as interested in 
Kant's Metaphysics of Morals as he is in Perpetual Peace. 
Still, he does offer some commentary on the latter. While 
Schwarz outlines the Preliminary Articles in summary form 
like Hinsley, he does not mention that their very existence 
"assumes" the autonomy of the state.
Where he seems to agree more with Hinsley is in his 
brief discussion of the Second Definitive Article and the 
First Supplement. He refers first to the three Definitive 
Articles as "the positive conditions of international 
peace."72 His focus then turns to the Second Definitive 
Article. Because of "difference of language, of
70Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," p. 337.
71Wolfgang Schwarz, "Kant's Philosophy of Law and 
International Peace," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 23 (1962), pp. 71-80.
72Schwarz, "Kant's Philosophy of Law and International 
Peace," p. 76.
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'religions, ' and the ineffectiveness of laws over great 
distances," he suggests Kant is not in favor of a "world 
state."73 Like Hinsley, he takes the above reasons for this 
position from the First Supplement. Instead of a world 
state, he looks to "'the surrogate of the covenant of civil 
society, namely, free federalism.'"74 Once again, the 
implication that Schwarz gives is that states will "freely" 
and "voluntarily" enter into agreement with each other on 
the principles of peace, though not sacrifice their 
independence in doing so. Finally, in such an atmosphere 
where states retain their sovereignty, it is not a world 
state or federation that guarantees "the lawful order of 
peace," but for Schwarz (as with Hinsley), "the great 
artist nature."75 It is only through nature that the "dint 
of discord among men" can bring "'concord even against 
their will."76 Schwarz's analysis appears to fall in line 
with certain general elements of interpretations from this 
period discussed thus far.
73Schwarz, "Kant's Philosophy of Law and International 
Peace," p. 76.
74Schwarz, "Kant's Philosophy of Law and International 
Peace," p. 76.
75Schwarz, "Kant's Philosophy of Law and International 
Peace," p. 80.
76Schwarz, "Kant's Philosophy of Law and International 
Peace," p. 80.
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Comparison with a German-language Interpretation Written by 
the Noted Author Karl Jaspers
As has been done in the prior chapters, it is helpful 
to compare translated interpretations from other languages 
(primarily German) with English-language interpretations 
written during the same period. Here, in his book
Philosophy and the World published in the same year (1963) 
as Hinsley's Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Karl Jaspers 
presents a thorough interpretation of Perpetual Peace 
strikingly similar to Hinsley's.
Jaspers lists only the First, Fifth, and Sixth 
Preliminary Articles as relevant and of "lasting
significance."77 Interestingly, these are the ones that
Kant explains must be "executed at once."78 Though he does 
not openly state that the Preliminary Articles support the 
inviolable nature of the sovereign state, his comments
under the Second Preliminary Article certainly imply the 
same. Immediately below his re-statement of the article 
whose title reads "No state shall interfere by force with
77Karl Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, translated by 
E.B. Ashton (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963), p. 88.
78Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 97.
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the constitution and government of another state," he
writes:
That is to say, when a state is rent by internal 
dissension, this is the struggle of an independent 
people with its inner disease. As long as this strife 
is not settled, outside intervention by force would 
violate the autonomy of this people and state, thus 
jeopardizing the autonomy of all states.79
With these remarks, it is clear that Jaspers understands 
Kant to respect the autonomy of each existing state, which 
includes the right of peoples living therein to determine 
their own political affairs. Any intervention from the 
outside would violate this autonomy and neutralize this 
right.
The above discussion of the Second Preliminary Article 
actually goes hand in hand with Jaspers' view that Kant 
relies entirely on the internal improvement of states to 
achieve peace between them. This is expounded most clearly 
for him in the First and Second Definitive Articles. In 
his commentary on the First Definitive Article, Jaspers 
notes, "Only states governed under law can live in 
perpetual peace with one another. They alone have 
developed so strong a sense of legality that the 
consciousness of right may ultimately come to be reliable,
79Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 89.
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even without powers of compulsion."80 The First Definitive 
Article calls for the civil constitution of every state to 
be republican. According to Jaspers, in reference to the 
word "republican," Kant "does not mean a form of government 
(as the democratic, aristocratic, monarchic ones), but a 
manner of government."61 It is stated that the "manner of 
government opposed to the republican is the despotic."82
Jaspers then asserts that, for Kant, the republican 
constitution is characterized by three important
ingredients: first, "the legally established freedom
guaranteeing the rights of man --  rights which do not
depend upon majorities"; second, "the separation of
powers"; and third, "the system of representative
government, tied to free elections."83 In its very essence,
"The basic idea of the first definitive article is that a
reliable rule of law and a reliably peaceful
codification of the law by the popular will --  can be
achieved only under a republican kind of government."84
80Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 90.
81 Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 91 (emphasis in
original).
82Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 91.
83Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 91.
84Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 91.
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Jaspers believes the text suggests that the achievement of 
the rule of law within states is the only way to achieve 
lasting peace between states. He explains, "Lasting peace, 
too, is possible only among states governed in the 
republican manner; for this alone creates the common 
premises of lawful community."85
Jaspers believes Kant's understanding of the 
achievement of the rule of law within a state in the First 
Definitive Article is integral to a clearer view of Kant's 
positions in the Second Definitive Article. This leads 
Jaspers to the remark that "The Second Definitive Article 
does not call for a world state, nor for a universal 
government."86 Furthermore, and contrary to elements of 
Pattern One, Phase Two, it does not even call for a "league 
of nations" with some "coercive power."87 First, the 
reasons he offers in favor of Kant's supposed rejection of 
the world state stem from a reading of the text similar to 
those of Hinsley, Waltz, and Schwarz. His primary focus is 
on the First Supplement. He asserts Kant's belief that 
"Every state has the lawless desire to achieve 'lasting
85Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, pp. 91-92.
86Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 92.
87Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 96.
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peace by ruling the whole world, if possible.'"88 Yet the 
separation of states that occurs because of differences in 
religion and language prevent this from happening. In 
fact, this historical situation, though first leading to 
war, ultimately produces harmony and a movement towards 
federalism. Such a voluntary federalism, through constant 
"balancing . . .  in the liveliest competition" that occurs 
from states remaining entirely independent within it, is 
preferable to a super-state where "despotism brings peace 
in a graveyard of freedom."89 Jaspers' primary point is as 
follows:
There is one ineradicable difference between
civil and international l a w   the peace among the
citizens of a state is kept by the laws of the state 
which has the power of compulsion; peace between 
different states can be established and kept legally 
but only without powers of compulsion.90
Jaspers believes that "lasting peace is possible only
within a state structure."91 His final comment is that
there are two choices for Kant: "either the peaceful calm
of a world state, in which freedom is bound to be stifled
by despotism, or a state of free development toward peace
88Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 92.
89Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 92.
90Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 92.
91Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 96.
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by means of law, at the continuing risk of war."92 For 
Jaspers, "Kant chose the second way."93
Through the 1970s: An Interpretation by F. Parkinson and
W.B. Gallie's Major Contribution
Like Hinsley, F. Parkinson in his 1977 book The 
Philosophy of International Relations is one of the first 
interpreters of Perpetual Peace to suggest Kant's primary 
position in the Second Definitive Article is to advocate 
not an international state or formidable federation, but 
simply a treaty between independent states, each under the 
rule of law. As Parkinson puts it, "what was required now 
[for Kant in Zum ewigen Frieden] was a foedus pacificum (a 
treaty for peace)."94 Further, Parkinson quotes Kant from 
the final paragraph of Perpetual Peace: "'It may well be
said that this treaty for universal and eternal peace 
constitutes not only a part, but the final objective in its
92Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, pp. 96-7.
93Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 97.
94F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International 
Relations, Volume 52, Sage Library of Social Research 
(London, Beverly Hills: Sage Publication LTD, 1977), p. 67.
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entirety of law within the confines of common sense.'"95 
Knowing now what Parkinson believes Kant advances in
Perpetual Peace, it is equally important to consider what 
he rejects.
First, according to Parkinson, "a world state was 
dismissed by [Kant] on practical grounds as compromising 
too large an area to cope effectively."96 He then 
skeptically refers to this reason for rejection as
"pretextual" and falls in line with other interpreters from 
this period by offering, as he says, Kant's "real basis for 
objection which consisted in a denial of a right of states 
to demand union with other states on the analogy of
individuals expecting other individuals to join them in a 
state for the common benefit of all."97 Furthermore, in the 
context of the Second Preliminary Article which Parkinson 
discusses briefly, the interpreter reads into the article 
the dangers Kant sees in merging existing states together 
based on the latter's conception of the "new type of
95Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations,
p. 68.
96Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations, 
p . 69.
97Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations, 
p. 69.
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state."98 Such a state, "making its first appearance in the 
French Revolution, possessed genuine organic qualities on 
the analogy of the human being."99 Different to the ways 
"lawyers attribute personality to a state by way of a legal 
fiction," Kantian states "were living organisms in a real 
biological and psychological sense."100 As such, Parkinson 
asserts that "it seemed unnatural, even monstrous to Kant 
to suggest that the tissues of one state were capable of 
being grafted on to the body of another state in the 
expectation that the two might grow together eventually" in 
the long-term interest of peace.101 This would obviously 
have to occur in the creation of a world state and is 
another reason, however implied, that Parkinson believes 
Kant in Perpetual Peace is against its formation.
Second, and even more radical than some of the above 
interpreters, Parkinson does not even understand Kant to 
favor "a confederation based on voluntary agreement .
98Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations, 
p . 65.
"Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations, 
p. 65.
100Parkinson, The Philosophy of International
Relations, p. 65.
101Parkinson, The Philosophy of International
Relations, p. 65.
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as a practical proposition in the short run."102 The 
"internal improvement of states" which will ultimately 
bring "the creation of a liberal-constitutional order 
within as many states as possible was to be the basis of 
all international welfare."103
Parkinson would clearly reject analyses of the text 
offered by interpretations that reveal both phases of 
Pattern One. His interpretation is very similar to other 
interpretations found within this historical period. 
Still, he (and the others before him) is not as complete in 
their dealings with the text as Hinsley. If there is one 
interpretation of Kant's Perpetual Peace that can match 
Hinsley's for its thoroughness and attention to detail, it 
is W.B. Gallie's attempt in his 1978 book Philosophers of 
Peace and War.104 He devotes twenty-eight pages to Kant's 
thinking on international relations and focuses almost 
exclusively on Perpetual Peace.
It must be said at the outset that though it is one of 
the most involved interpretations from this historical
102Parkinson/ The Philosophy of International 
Relations, p. 70.
103Parkinson/ The Philosophy of International
Relations, p. 70.
104W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 8-36.
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period, it does not differ much from the previous
interpretations in its approach to the treatise, its 
particular focus on certain articles, and in its
interpretive conclusions. In many ways, Gallie sums up all 
the ideas presented by interpretations within this period 
by the following statement. Accordingly, he confidently 
calls Kant "one of the most steadfast of 'statists' in the 
history of political thought."105 Like Hinsley and 
Parkinson above, Gallie understands Kant as saying that "An 
international order could be initiated only when certain
governments freely abjured their right to make war on each
other . . . [and] sought membership within the bond
(foedus) of mutual non-aggression."106
One of the reasons Gallie comes to this early 
conclusion of Kant as 'steadfast statist' is the reading he 
gives to the Second Preliminary Article. He writes,
105Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 21.
106Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 20. 
Speaking of the similarity in interpretation between Gallie 
and Hinsley regarding the treaty or foedus they both 
believe Kant advocates, Gallie seems persuaded, even 
influenced by the whole of Hinsley's interpretation. He 
states that Kant's position in Perpetual Peace "was as 
original and unique as it is difficult to extract from the 
text of his pamphlet, and which indeed no one succeeded in 
extracting completely, until Professor F.H. Hinsley did so 
some fifteen years ago." Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and 
War, p. 11.
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"Complete non-interference in the internal affairs of every 
signatory state seemed to [Kant] an essential precondition 
of faithful adherence, by any sovereign state, to the 
treaty which he proposed."107 Gallie pronounces that the 
text's commitment to the integrity of the sovereign state 
within this treaty might even seem "fanatical" to some.108
Gallie is certain that Kant rejects broad Pattern One 
conclusions on Perpetual Peace. First, Gallie remarks 
briefly on the readings past interpreters have given to the 
treatise. He states that, historically, the treatise "has 
been hailed as a harbinger of world-government, despite 
Kant's clear rejection of this ideal and his insistence 
that his project leaves states with all their sovereign 
right intact."109 And just as Gallie disagrees with 
interpretations that reveal the first phase of Pattern One, 
so he also disagrees with those that reveal the second 
phase. Accordingly, He remarks that Perpetual Peace has
been "frequently cited ---  although far from correctly --
as a notable precursor of the League of Nations idea."110
107Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 21.
108Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 20.
109Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 9.
110Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 9.
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Besides these general statements about past 
interpretation, Gallie offers more detailed reasons why he 
believes Kant rejects both world state and federation in
Perpetual Peace. As regards the world state, though Gallie 
refers to Kant as a "passionate legaliser" and is aware of
his "constant emphasis on the necessity of coercion to
sustain the law within any established state," he also is 
very careful to note that despite this, Kant is "equally 
emphatic that the idea of coercion, to sustain an 
international order, is both logically and practically an 
absurdity."111 Gallie uses the phrase "peace-by-empire" to 
describe the world state and asserts that such entities "do 
not solve the problem of inter-state relations, they merely 
replace it by a situation of large-scale tyranny within
which, by definition, specifically inter-state conflicts do 
not arise."112 The practical problem associated with "large 
empires" is that they "cannot command deeply based loyalty 
and support, and invariably break down into component 
warring groups for which the problem of creating a legal 
order will arise exactly as before."113
1:llGallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 20.
112Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 23.
113Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 23.
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Concerning federation, Gallie believes Kant is equally 
dismissive of it as he is of a world state. "Peace-by- 
federation," as Gallie calls it, "looks more promising" at 
first, but in the end is just as "delusive" for Kant as 
"peace-by-empire.//114 This is because "Any government that 
genuinely subscribes to the creation of a combined force, 
capable of imposing peace within the federation, will eo
ipso be putting itself out of business the last thing
that any government can be expected to do."115
Additionally, it seems Gallie does not believe a 
Pattern One, Phase Two-like federation to be even a 
possibility. The notion of shared powers between a state 
and a larger federation it makes up is a delusion. He 
states, "if the federation is strong enough to enforce 
peace, it will become in fact a super-state, inevitably 
overriding the rights of its members."116 Along these same 
lines, "if the federation is not strong enough to do this, 
the inevitable rivalries of its members will pull them back 
into international anarchy."117
114Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 24.
115Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 24.
116Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 24.
117Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 24.
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According to Gallie, Kant's "rejection of both these 
positions [world state and federation] puts him into a 
difficulty."118 If true to their name (and general 
description offered of them by interpretations from the 
first two periods), both world state and federation depend 
on public coercive laws above the state level to secure and 
maintain the peace. But as has been demonstrated, Gallie 
understands Kant to favor only such laws within the state, 
not between states throughout the text of Perpetual Peace. 
According to Gallie, Kant believes "there is a fundamental 
asymmetry between establishing and maintaining a just 
constitution within a state and in establishing and 
maintaining a just relationship between states."119
Gallie wonders how Kant expects to achieve and sustain 
peace if he rejects both of these solutions. A simple 
treaty or bond of mutual non-aggression between independent 
republican states is the primary solution Gallie 
understands Kant to propose. In the latter part of the 
interpretation, Gallie elaborates on this solution (and 
appears to delve into the Second Definitive Article more 
carefully). Gallie states, "Kant's positive proposal is
118Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 24.
119Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 24.
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that states should form a confederation for a strictly 
limited purpose."120 This confederation would result from 
the founding of the envisioned treaty.
As to what this confederation "binds its members to 
do," Gallie claims that "In Perpetual Peace the primary aim 
is, quite explicitly and unquestionably, the ending of all 
aggression between such powers as would sign his treaty of 
permanent mutual non-aggression."121 Treaty members or 
"signatories must enjoy what Kant calls a 'republican', 
i.e., in some degree a representative, constitution" while 
their union in the form of a confederation "must be of the 
barest kind, confined to a repudiation of war-like or war- 
making acts against each other, while the enforcement of 
laws of common benefit to the signatories must be left to 
the particular state that is most immediately concerned."122 
Importantly, Gallie makes the distinction between Perpetual 
Peace, which he says has the primary and sole aim of "peace 
between the signatories," and his other writings, such as 
The Idea of a Universal History and the Metaphysics of
120Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 25.
121Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 25 
(emphasis in original).
122Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 10 
(emphasis in original).
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Morals, where the primary aim is "to secure peace for the
signatories from aggression by other parties.1,123 This
is a relevant distinction to keep in mind.
In all of these texts, however, Gallie maintains that 
there is no "teeth" in this confederation to "effectively 
resist and progressively beat back aggressive outsiders."124 
Most importantly for our purposes, he insists "there is not 
a trace of it in Perpetual Peace."125 This clarifies what 
he means by a confederation of the "barest kind" or one
formed for a "strictly limited purpose." Obviously, he
foresees no international authority and enforcement 
mechanism above the level of states. The confederation of 
independent states will exist to preserve peace, however 
fragile it may be, between members who are obviously 
unwilling to sacrifice any of their sovereignty to a larger 
body. Finally, with all of the above commentary in mind,
it should now be easy to see why Gallie is the first
English-language interpreter since the initial publication 
of Perpetual Peace in 1795 to refer to Kant as a 'statist.'
123Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 25 
(emphasis in original).
124Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 25.
125Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 25.
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Gallie, rather convincingly, closes his discussion of this 
topic with the following thought:
For this makes it clear that [Kant's] vision of 
perpetual peace is not of a world kept at peace by a 
central confederate power, but of a world in which 
every state manifests its own independence in 
fulfilling the one job of enforcement which Kant's 
conception of international law requires.126
Though Gallie is less clear than other interpreters
from this period in his discussion of the First Supplement,
he is certainly as convinced as his colleagues about its
integral importance to the body of the entire treatise.
Coming to the same conclusion as other interpreters from
this time who understand the text to assert that the
sovereignty of the state should not be surrendered, he
seems just as puzzled by how such a loose bond of sovereign
states will stay together and guarantee perpetual peace
between them in the face of disagreements and quarrels that
will obviously develop. He explains, "Kant's repeated
insistence that his proposed confederation would not be an
'international state,' that it would leave its members as
sovereign as before, and that it expressly excludes the
idea of peace-enforcement, naturally gives rise to the
question."127 And this question, undoubtedly asked before
126Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 27.
127Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 27.
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by interpreters from this period, goes as follows: "what
else, over and above their recognition of the moral 
unacceptableness of war, will hold its members together
when, inevitably, differences, rivalries and suspicions 
arise between them?"128
First, Gallie is keen to point out that Kant "makes
clear in a number of passages he is not offering a
foolproof guarantee that his confederation will not break 
down . . . that it may not be overwhelmed at the outset by
militaristic powers which detest any idea or project for 
perpetual peace."129 This is obviously natural for a 
loosely bound collection of neighboring states. As such,
Gallie calls the term Kant uses - in this case
"guarantee" --  "ill-named."130 Still, he recognizes that
the "guarantee" in the form of nature is what Perpetual 
Peace puts forward as the answer to never ending problems 
resulting from the continuing existence of separate states. 
As Gallie explains, "It is Kant's way of urging, against 
those who find in human nature certain immovable barriers 
to political progress, that these barriers can always also 
be regarded as necessary challenges or springboards to
128Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 27.
129Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 28.
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rational human effort."131 The "animal" and "inherently 
egoistic" side of man prompt our "rational capacities" into 
positive actions.132 Without them, our rational side, 
however perfect in itself, would simply lie dormant. On a 
larger scale, the combination of all the former fusing
together to bring violence and ultimately war between
people and states, prompts 'the better angels of our
nature' to work together to end both.
Accordingly, Gallie remarks, "Only as war becomes 
patently more destructive and more costly, will men be 
moved to take the first difficult steps towards a permanent 
peace."133 Yet even as these steps are taken, and the 
association of states expands to include more and more 
states in the attempt to root out war, "backslidings" into 
violence and war will continue to occur.134 This is driven 
by the nature of man and results in very slow progress
towards peace.
In final analysis, Gallie appears more skeptical of 
the "guarantee" outlined in the First Supplement than other
130Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 28.
131Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 28.
132Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 28.
133Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 29.
134Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 29.
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interpreters writing during this period. Still, his
interpretation identifies it as the path through which 
peace will be achieved in the long run. In addition,
though he views progress towards peace to be a long and 
difficult journey, he never sways from his understanding of 
the text as one that expects the sovereignty of separate 
states to remain intact throughout.
To be sure, Gallie does not change this position he 
takes in a later article he writes on the subject of 
international relations in 1979. Presenting his own
arguments this time (instead of analyzing Kant's as he has 
already done before), Gallie explains that he "accepts in 
the main Kant's view that the ground of the distinction 
between these two great fields of political life [home and 
foreign politics] is to be found in the idea of 'public
legal coercion,' which, while indispensable in home
politics, has ---  so Kant maintains   simply no proper
application in connection with international problems."135 
As such, Gallie further states that he accepts "the main
135W.B. Gallie, "Wanted: A Philosophy of International 
Relations," Political Studies 27 (1979), p. 485. In direct
contrast to this statement by Gallie, it need not go 
unnoticed that interpreters such as Wheaton, Lorimer and 
Mead whose textual analyses help to reveal the first phase 
of Pattern One, view the text as favoring "public legal 
coercion" as a solution to the problem of war at the 
international level.
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consequence Kant draws" from this.136 This is Kant's belief 
that "the central task of international politics is to 
establish and maintain, on a purely voluntary basis, an 
association of states pledged to mutual non-aggression, to 
the settlement of their differences by arbitration, and to 
the steady expansion of their membership, simply by the 
attractive example of their success, until the association 
includes all existing states."137 Finally, he reiterates 
what he has already said earlier about the First 
Supplement. He states that he accepts Kant's proposition 
that "international initiatives and achievements along the 
lines just mentioned are not to be expected until certain 
'lower' human interests combine to support the promptings 
of reason and morality."138 In all three of these, ways, he 
remain's true to his original interpretation, even when he 
puts forward his own prescriptive claims.
136Gallie, "Wanted: 
Relations," p. 4 85.
137Gallie, "Wanted: 
Relations," p. 4 85.
138Gallie, "Wanted: 
Relations," p. 485.
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Concluding 'Statist' Interpretations from the Early 1980s: 
Susan Meld Shell and Patrick Riley
Moving into the early 1980s, Susan Meld Shell sounds 
very much like the above interpreters, especially Hinsley, 
in her discussion of Perpetual Peace. Like Hinsley, she 
recognizes the Preliminary Articles as offering 
unquestionable support for the independence of the state. 
Though referring to them as "preparatory steps," she sees 
these articles as "lay[ing] the foundation for peace by 
asserting the integrity of each individual nation.7/139 
Thereafter, the Definitive Articles "supersede" these and 
attempt to "establish cosmopolitan laws grounded in a
federation of free, republican states."140 From this 
general statement, it is not clear what she means by
"federation of free, republican states." Although use of 
the term "free states" certainly hints at an interpretation 
suggesting the continued existence of the sovereign state, 
the term "federation," as we have seen, requires some
fleshing out. Her commentary relating to the brief summary
139Susan Meld Shell, The Rights of Reason: A Study of 
Kant's Philosophy and Politics (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1980), p. 174.
140Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 174.
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she offers above of the three Definitive Articles is
helpful.
It is clear to Shell that Kant is not an advocate of a
world state. For practical reasons it is "impossible" and
would "immediately break apart or collapse into world 
despotism."141 Furthermore, the law of nations, which is 
what Shell understands Kant to be describing in Perpetual
Peace, "concerns the relations between citizens of 
different states."142 As such, "The individual state has a 
responsibility to its citizens and cannot rightfully be 
deprived of that sovereignty which they have duly 
authorized."143 For these reasons, Shell acknowledges that 
the way to peace for Kant lies in an "alliance or 
confederation which preserves the separate sovereignty of 
every member."144 Clearly, like Gallie above, Shell does 
not believe a federation of free states, confederation or 
alliance that may ultimately develop will have any 'teeth7 
like the authorities suggested by Pattern One interpreters. 
Further, in common with other post-1950 interpreters, Shell 
concludes, "The member-state, unlike the citizen, may
141Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 173.
142Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 173.
143Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 173.
144Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 173.
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withdraw from the union whenever it deems it necessary or 
just to do so."145 It has been one of the goals of this 
chapter to demonstrate that the idea of a voluntary and 
dissoluble alliance between states is what interpretations 
from this period suggest.
Finally, Shell agrees with other interpreters from 
this period when she offers the same answer to the
frequently asked question 'How can peace be guaranteed 
between independent states when there is no enforcement 
power above them such as a world state or powerful
federation?' She turns to the First Supplement for the 
answer. There she explains that in Perpetual Peace
"History or 'nature's art' emerges in Kant's thought as a 
substitute on a cosmopolitan scale for that enforcing power 
which renders feasible the civil state."146 Her
interpretation of the First Supplement differs little from
/
the above so there need not be repetition of the central
ideas interpreters from this period view it as offering. 
It is important to mention only to demonstrate her belief 
that it is what the text suggests will guarantee peace. As 
we have seen, little has been written about the First
145Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 173.
146Shell, The Rights of Reason, pp. 175-76.
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Supplement in interpretations that reveal both phases of 
Pattern One. The thought is that in both of these there 
exists an authority above the state level, which will 
reduce conflict by reducing sovereignty. In these, nature 
and history as outlined in the First Supplement seem less 
important as other mechanisms are in place to perform the 
same funct ion.
The final interpretation to be discussed from this era 
is by Patrick Riley in his 1983 book Kant's Political 
Philosophy. Riley uses the Preliminary Articles, the 
Second and Third Definitive Articles, and the First 
Supplement to demonstrate that Perpetual Peace indeed is in 
favor of "preserving substantial state sovereignty."147
First, Riley asserts, "far from undercutting the 
notion of state sovereignty," the Preliminary Articles of 
Kant's Perpetual Peace "actually reinforce it."148 After 
listing all of them, he specifically mentions the Second 
Preliminary Article, which indicates, "Like a tree, an 
[independently existing] state has its own roots, and to 
graft it on to another state as if it were a shoot is to 
terminate its existence as a moral personality and make it
147Patrick Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, (Totowa, 
NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983), p. 118.
148Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 117.
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into a commodity."149 Also, Riley turns to the final 
section of the Preliminary Articles where Kant speaks of 
which articles need or need not be executed at once and 
notes here that "Kant even insisted that, in principle, 
states which had lost their freedom (e.g., Poland) should 
have it restored."150
After this brief foray into the Preliminary Articles, 
Riley acknowledges that the Third Definitive Article is 
"Even more remarkable for its emphasis on the independence 
of the sovereign state."151 In the Third Definitive 
Article, Kant writes that world law or "cosmopolitan right 
shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality."152 
Simply on this statement alone, Riley contends that "This 
extreme limitation on world law indicates very plainly that 
Kant meant to preserve substantial state sovereignty."153
His interpretation of the Second Definitive Article is 
fairly standard for interpreters during this period. He 
sees Kant offering two primary reasons for rejecting the
149Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 94.
150Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 117.
151Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 118.
152Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 105.
153Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 118.
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state of nations in this article. He focuses first on 
Kant's statement that a "state of nations contains a 
contradiction" since many nations "would, in a single 
state, constitute only one nation" and the concern of this 
article is with "the rights of [separate and independent] 
nations towards each other."154 Second, Riley briefly 
discusses Kant's idea that states are in a different 
position than humans in a state of nature. As Riley 
explains, states are not "under the same obligation to 
leave that condition as 'natural' men."155 As states 
already have "internally a legal constitution . . . [they]
have outgrown the coercion of others who might desire to 
put them under a broadened legal constitution."156
From these two reasons,* Riley is persuaded that Kant 
"seems to say that a world organization must be worked out 
in terms of sovereignty, in terms of a free federation of 
corporate bodies voluntarily obeying international law, and 
not a world law for individuals."157 Once again, we see an 
interpreter from this era convinced that a reading of
154Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 116.
155Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 116.
156Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 116.
157Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 116 (emphasis 
in original).
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Perpetual Peace suggests that the sovereignty of the state 
is not to be abandoned in the pursuit of peace.
And finally, if in fact the existence of separate
states is not to be overcome in the interests of a stable 
and enforceable peace, then the rule of law grounded in the 
republican government of each separate state and the 
guarantee offered by nature will ultimately have to bring
it about. Riley sees the thrust of the text and its goal
of establishing peace as reliant on Kant's "historical view 
that nature's purpose for man was the extension of reason 
and reasonable conduct in the species as a whole through 
conflict."158 Furthermore, "a series of clashes" resulting 
from this natural conflict "would ultimately (though very 
late) bring states into new and more rational relations in 
which international good conduct would be voluntarily 
accepted. "159
158Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 12 0.
159Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 120.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, consistency between interpretations 
over a period is what makes the argument for patterns 
strong. As much as any, the interpretations written 
between the 1950s and early 1980s are remarkably similar in 
their outlook. This is even more surprising when one 
considers the attention to textual detail of 
interpretations found during this period, especially when 
compared to earlier ones where less text is analyzed and 
shorter, more general interpretations given.
There is a clear interpretive shift that occurs 
between those interpretations of Kant's Perpetual Peace 
written from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century and those written from the 1950s to the early 
1980s. For the first time, interpreters begin to focus 
more seriously on text outside the Second Definitive 
Article in their interpretations. Through discussion of 
the Preliminary Articles, the Second and Third Definitive 
Articles, and the First Supplement, the central theme 
running through all interpretations is Kant's acceptance of 
the sovereign state as the vehicle through which peace will 
to be achieved. Unlike both phases of Pattern One, where 
peace is understood to be established through a centralized
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authority above the state level, this historical period and 
the interpretations of Perpetual Peace that reveal this new 
Pattern view the text as defending state sovereignty. 
Clearly, the first phase of Pattern Two understands the 
text to recommend peace proposals at, not above, the state 
level.
Furthermore, though Pattern Two, Phase One suggests 
that the sovereign state may at some point come to exist 
within an alliance, association, confederation or free 
federation of politically like-minded states, each state 
will join voluntarily with the option to withdraw surviving 
in perpetuity. There will be no 'teeth' in any of these 
modes of international organization that may develop and 
they will only exist to help preserve the sovereign 
independence of each state. Finally, Pattern Two, Phase 
One understands peace between independent states and their 
peoples to be guaranteed not by a centralized authority 
above them, but by the external forces of nature and 
history working upon and through them.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PATTERN TWO, PHASE TWO: STATE SOVEREIGNTY PRESERVED I.
A NEW INTERPRETATION TAKES SHAPE IN THE EARLY 1980s
Introduction
The final historical period within which Kant's 
Perpetual Peace has been utilized, takes us, and pattern 
formation, up to the present day. The last interpretation 
within this period given consideration comes from Harold 
Kleinschmidt's The Nemesis of Power, published in 2000. 
The first within this period is by Michael Doyle, a leading 
'liberal peace7 theorist, in a well-known 1983 article 
entitled "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs." 
Like F.H. Hinsley7s 1963 interpretation, Doyle provides us 
with a pivotal textual analysis of Perpetual Peace, the 
influence of which is seen throughout this final historical 
phase. The article's originality, exclusive focus on
Perpetual Peace, and the idea and empirical proof of an 
ever-expanding zone of peace among liberal, sovereign
states that it sets forth, make it an interpretation 
crucial to the development of themes in this chapter and in 
Chapters Six, Seven and Nine to follow.
There are more interpretations of Kant's treatise
written during this short time span than in all other
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periods I have researched. In fact, the extraordinary 
number of important interpretations requires a discussion 
and analysis of them in three separate chapters. Why so 
many interpretations? Clearly, Perpetual Peace has
experienced a surge in popularity over the past two decades 
among academics in the fields of Political Science and 
International Relations. This is most likely a result of 
Doyle's influential work on 'liberal peace' theory and his 
use of Kant's Perpetual Peace as its intellectual 
foundation. Perpetual Peace is now recognized as one of 
the first Enlightenment-era essays to demonstrate, 
theoretically, the relationship between domestic republican 
government and international peace. While this claim did 
not go unnoticed during the century after publication of 
the work, it began to receive more attention as the 
twentieth century progressed. It finally was put to an 
empirical test for the first time in 1964 (though little 
recognition of it within Political Science and 
International Relations circles occurred until the early 
eighties).1
xDean Babst, "A Force for Peace," Industrial Research, 
April 1972, pp. 55-58. Originally published as "Elective 
Governments - A Force for Peace," The Wisconsin 
Sociologist, Volume 3, Number 1, 1964, pp. 9-14. Other
early studies include: R.J. Rummell, Understanding Conflict 
and War, Volumes 1-5 (Los Angeles: Sage, 1975-1981); Bruce
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Though these initial studies reasonably proved the 
generalization, there was no mention of Perpetual Peace as 
intellectual forebear of the 'liberal peace' phenomenon 
until Michael Doyle's seminal article on the subject in 
1983.2 Doyle's article was the first in what is now a long 
line of 'liberal peace' scholarship that hails Perpetual 
Peace as the "source of insight, policy and hope" for 
"appreciating the liberal legacy."3 A proliferation of 
studies on this popular hypothesis followed Doyle's 
influential article.4 Like Doyle's, many of these view
Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for
Choice (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1981); Peter Wallensteen,
Structure and War: On IR 1820-1968 (Stockholm: Raben and
Sjogren, 1973).
2Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign 
Affairs, Parts 1 and 2," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Volume 12 (3 and 4), 1983, pp. 205-35, pp. 323-53. Howard
Williams and Ken Booth note that this article, more than 
any other, "raised the profile of Kant's work [on 
international relations]." Howard Williams & Ken Booth, 
"Kant: Theorist Beyond Limits" in Ian Clark & Iver B.
Neumann, eds., Classical Theories of International 
Relations (Houndmills, Basingstroke, Hampshire and London: 
MacMillan Press, 1996), pp. 12-13.
3Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 2 06.
4To demonstrate the overflow of 'liberal peace' 
scholarship over the past fifteen years, included below is 
a pared down list of post-Doyle articles from the 
References section of Wade L. Huntley's, "Kant's Third 
Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace,"
International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996), pp. 45-76: B.
Bueno de Mesquita, R. Siverson, & G. Woller, "War and the
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Kant's ideas in Perpetual Peace as theoretical grounding 
for the 'liberal peace' claim as well.
This chapter focuses primarily on Doyle's notable 
study along with several other interpretations that take 
the thesis through the 1980s. Doyle's study and its 
analysis of Perpetual Peace influences more thorough-going 
interpretations of the text written from the first half of 
the 1990s and discussed in Chapter Six. Through analysis 
of several principal interpretations written from 1990 to
Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis," American
Political Science Review 86 (1992), pp. 638-46; S. Chan,
"Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries
More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (1984),
pp. 617-48; N. Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace," Journal of 
Peace Research 29 (1992), pp. 369-76; J.D. Hagan, "Domestic 
Political Systems and War Proneness," Mershon International 
Studies Review 38 (1994), pp. 183-207; D. Lake, "Powerful
Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political
Science Review 86 (1992), pp. 24-37; C. Layne, "Kant or
Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International
Security 19 (1994) , pp. 5-49; J. Levy, "Domestic Politics
and War, " Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988) ,
pp. 653-73; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 
Principles for a Post-Cold War Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993); D. Spiro, "The Insignificance of 
the Liberal Peace," International Security 19 (1994), pp.
50-86; H. Starr, "Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another?: 
Evaluating the Theory-Findings Feedback Loop," Jerusalem 
Journal of International Relations 14 (1992), pp. 41-59.
With the proliferation of these studies over the past 
several years, several scholars have reached the conclusion 
that the existence of a liberal peace is "as close as 
anything we have to an empirical law in international 
relations." Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace," p. 372 and 
Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," pp. 661-62 in Huntley, 
"Kant's Third Image," p. 46.
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1995, Chapter Six demonstrates that the new trend in 
analysis of the text begun by Doyle continues into the 
1990s. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the study of this 
period with an exploration of interpretations that, I 
argue, advance the second phase of Pattern Two through to 
the end of the twentieth century.
The following three chapters demonstrate that the 
'statist' interpretation of the text extends from the 1950s 
through the 1990s across both phases of the pattern. It is 
clear that a majority of these interpreters recognize the 
text as recommending peace proposals at the state level. 
Still, the increased emphasis on the First Definitive 
Article that these interpreters working after the early 
1980s offer, namely a consistent accent on the practical 
reason offered for adopting the republican constitution as 
the most important tool for achieving perpetual peace 
between states, makes this period worthy of division into 
two phases.
It is also important to note that this seventeen-year 
time span and the consistent interpretations of the text 
that can be found within it are necessarily ongoing. 
Little evidence suggests that the 'statist' interpretation 
of the text coupled with a greater emphasis on the 
practical aspects of the First Definitive Article will not
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continue in future interpretations completed after the year 
2000.5 Though there are enough similar interpretations of 
the text from 1983 to 2000 to put forth a sound argument 
for a second phase of Pattern Two, I contend that Pattern 
Two, Phase Two is still in formation as a new century 
begins.
I. The Principal Interpretation
Michael Doyle's Seminal Article on Kant and the 'Liberal 
Peace'
Before reviewing Doyle's interpretation of Kant's 
Perpetual Peace, it is worth noting his rather bold claim 
that follows from the empirical part of his study. He 
states, "Even though liberal states have become involved in 
numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally 
secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one 
another."6 Though his article is primarily devoted to
5See the Epilogue for evidence that Pattern Two, Phase 
Two is still predominant as the twenty-first century 
begins.
6Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign 
Affairs, Part 1," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983),
p. 213 (emphasis in original).
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development of this claim, he is very interested in finding 
a theoretical foundation for his argument from a notable 
(and liberal) philosopher. He first writes, "Most liberal 
theorists have offered inadequate guidance in understanding 
the exceptional nature of liberal pacification."7 He 
dismisses explanations by Montesquieu and others as 
insufficient. For example, he states that Montesquieu 
relies entirely on trade and commerce between nations in 
his explanation of liberal pacification.8 Doyle remarks 
that though such "developments can help account for the 
liberal peace, they do not explain the fact that liberal 
states are peaceful only in relations with other liberal 
states."9 Doyle is obviously more interested in why liberal 
states are aggressive with non-liberal states, though 
pacific with other liberal states. He believes that 
"Immanuel Kant offers the best guidance" in this area.10 He 
specifically discusses Kant's Perpetual Peace as the one
7Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 225.
8Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 225.
9Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 225.
10Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 225.
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text by the eighteenth century philosopher that most 
effectively explores the foundation of the liberal peace.
In his interpretation, Doyle begins by turning to the 
First Definitive Article. He nearly quotes Kant verbatim 
when he says that "The First Definitive Article holds that 
the civil constitution of the state must be republican."11 
Doyle is then interested in sorting out what Kant means by 
"republican" in this first pronouncement. "By republican," 
Doyle adds, "Kant means a political society that has solved 
the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and 
social order [and a political society] that preserves
juridical freedom --  the legal equality of citizens as
subjects --  on the basis of representative government with
a separation of powers."12 If they choose to discuss it 
(which many interpretations that reveal Pattern One do 
not) , this is a definition of "republican" that 
interpreters offer which stays relatively consistent 
through all historical periods. However, when we look at 
the reason(s) for adopting a republican constitution (as
opposed to the simple definition), the emphasis given by
i:LDoyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 225.
12Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," pp. 225-26.
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recent interpreters of the text to various passages within 
the First Definitive Article begins to shift as we move 
into interpretations from this period.
Kant's pronouncement that "The civil constitution of 
every state shall be republican" is offered as the initial 
framework. Immediately thereafter, Kant states, "The 
republican constitution is pure in its origin (since it 
springs from the pure concept of right)."13 As Chris Brown 
explains (and his full interpretation will be discussed 
later), "The reason that the civil constitution of states 
should be republican comes out of the general consideration 
of Kant's moral theory" or similarly, "Republicanism is 
desirable for its own sake."14 This is the normative 
explanation for adopting a republican constitution..
Kant further states that the "republican constitution 
also offers a prospect of attaining the desired 
result, i.e. a perpetual peace."15 This is, in effect, the 
practical reason for adopting this kind of political 
constitution. It is what Doyle sees as central to an
13Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Political 
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 100.
14Chris Brown, International Relations Theory (London: 
MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1997), p. 36.
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understanding of the First Definitive Article, indeed the 
whole of Perpetual Peace. Though it may be right in and of 
itself to promote republicanism within states, it is also 
desirable since, in the real world, its promotion
contributes to prospects for peace between liberal
republican states. As Doyle explains, "Kant shows how 
republics, once established, lead to peaceful relations."16 
Doyle understands Kant's central argument to be that "once 
the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed 
and once the habit of respect for individual rights is 
engrained by republican government, wars would appear as 
the disaster to the people's welfare that he and the other 
liberals thought them to be."17 According to Doyle, the 
"fundamental reason" why is as follows:
If the consent of the citizens is required in
order to decide that war should be declared (and in 
this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing 
is more natural than that they would be very cautious 
in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for 
themselves all the calamities of war. Among the 
latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the
costs of war from their own resources, having 
painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, 
and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves
15Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 100.
16Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 229.
17Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 229.
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with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace 
itself and that can never be liquidated on account of 
constant wars in the future. But, on the other hand, 
in a constitution which is not republican, and under 
which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of 
war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, 
because war does not require of the ruler, who is the 
proprietor and not a member of the state, the least 
sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his 
country houses, his court functions, and the like. He 
may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party 
for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect 
indifference leave the justification which decency 
requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to 
provide it.18
18Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 229. As noted in Footnote 1 from the 
Introduction, for purposes of uniformity throughout the 
thesis, any text quoted from Kant's Perpetual Peace, 
excepting only that commentary by authors who may quote 
directly from other translations in their interpretation of 
the treatise, derives from the following translation:
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Political
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Here, as
opposed to the Nisbet translation, Doyle chooses to use a 
translation of Perpetual Peace from Immanuel Kant,
Perpetual Peace in The Enlightenment, edited by Peter Gay 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), pp. 790-92.
Considering how central this passage is to Pattern Two, 
Phase Two interpretation, I believe it is helpful to my 
argument to demonstrate how similar the two translations 
are. Compare the above translation to the following 
translation by Nisbet of exactly the same passage:
If, as is inevitably the case under this 
constitution, the consent of the citizens is required 
to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is 
very natural that they will have great hesitation in 
embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this 
would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries 
of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, 
supplying the costs of the war from their own 
resources, painfully making good the ensuing 
devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to 
takes upon themselves a burden of debt which will
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Importantly, it should be noted that this is the only 
passage of any part of Perpetual Peace that Doyle quotes at 
length. His discussion of the Second Definitive Article, 
however brief, seems to be informed by his reading of the 
First. Doyle explains, "Liberal republics will
progressively establish peace among themselves by means of 
the 'pacific union' described in the Second Definitive 
Article of the Eternal Peace."19 Like several interpreters 
discussed in Chapter Four, for Doyle, "The pacific union is 
limited to 'a treaty of the nations among themselves' which 
'maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands.'"20
embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off 
on account of the constant threat of new wars. But 
under a constitution where the subject is not a 
citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is 
the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the 
head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner 
of the state, and a war will not force him to make the 
slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, 
pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned. 
He can thus decide on war, without any significant 
reason, as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly 
leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are always ready 
for such purposes) to justify the war for the sake of 
propriety. Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, 
trans. H.B. Nisbet, p. 100.
A detailed comparison of both reveals little difference 
between the two.
19Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 226.
20Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 226.
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Doyle's focus here is on the terms "steadily expands" which 
he further emphasizes in italics in another passage. He 
does not believe Kant expects perpetual peace to come about 
immediately, or even over a reasonable period of time. He 
states, "The world will not have achieved the 'perpetual 
peace' that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican 
freedom until 'very late and after many unsuccessful 
attempts.'"21 During this lengthy period of gradual 
progress mixed with many failures, the "'pacific union' of 
liberal republics [will] 'steadily expand' bringing within 
it more and more republics (despite republican collapses, 
backsliding, and war disasters) and creating an ever 
expanding separate peace."22
It remains to be seen what the nature of this pacific 
union is for Doyle. His first remark about it suggests 
what it is not. He states, "The pacific union is neither a
21Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 226.
22Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 226 (emphasis in original). As Doyle says in a 
footnote below this comment, "I think Kant meant that the 
peace would be established among liberal regimes and would 
expand as new liberal regimes appeared. By a process of 
gradual extension the peace would become global and then 
perpetual; the occasion for wars with nonliberals would 
disappear as nonliberal regimes disappeared." Doyle, 
"Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," p. 
226, Footnote 25.
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single peace treaty ending one war nor a world state or 
state of nations."23 The first, Doyle says, is
"insufficient," while the second and third are "impossible 
or potentially tyrannical."24 Most importantly, for the 
purposes of this chapter, Doyle then says that "Kant 
develops no organizational embodiment of this treaty, and 
presumably he does not find institutionalization 
necessary."25 In a footnote below this comment, he states 
that "[Kant] appears to have anticipated something like a 
less formally institutionalized League of Nations or United 
Nations."26 Finally, he explains, "One could argue that 
these two institutions in practice worked for liberal 
states and only for liberal states. But no specifically 
liberal 'pacific union' was institutionalized. Instead 
liberal states have behaved for the past 180 years as if 
such a Kantian pacific union and treaty of Perpetual Peace
23Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," pp. 226-27.
24Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 227.
25Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 227.
26Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 227, Footnote 26.
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had been signed."27 He finishes the footnote by saying, 
"This follows Riley's views of the legal, not the 
organizational, character of the foedus pacificum."2B Doyle 
is speaking here of Patrick Riley, whose interpretation was 
analyzed in Chapter Four. He believes (as does Doyle) that 
the establishment of the rule of law within and between 
republican states is what Kant envisioned in Perpetual 
Peace.
Unlike interpretations that reveal both phases of 
Pattern One, these two interpreters see no organizational 
element to Kant's project. They see the text endorsing a 
peace proposal at, not above, the state level.
Furthermore, Doyle is intent on placing Kant within the 
group of thinkers who believe domestic politics determines 
international politics. He explains that "representation 
and separation of powers," both central aspects of the 
republican constitution, "are produced because they are the
means by which the state is 'organized well' to prepare for
and meet foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the 
ambitions of selfish and aggressive individuals (by
27Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 227, Footnote 26.
28Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 227, Footnote 26.
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authority derived from representation, by general laws, and 
by nondespotic administration)."29 Doyle is convinced that 
the mere existence of authoritarian states increases the 
likelihood of war with other authoritarian states (and 
liberal states as well). Though he admits that liberal 
states can be just as aggressive with non-liberal states, 
he demonstrates with a high degree of empirical certainty 
that liberal states have behaved quite peacefully with each 
other over the past one hundred and eighty years. Again, 
his foundation for the idea of the 'liberal peace' is 
Kant's First Definitive Article, specifically the 'consent 
of the citizens' passage already quoted above. Doyle sees 
this article and its contents as fundamental to 
understanding what Kant was promoting in Perpetual Peace.
29Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 228. Doyle breaks down Kant's positions into 
the following three categories (as Kant does himself): 
constitutional law, international law and cosmopolitan law. 
The above discussion is obviously concerned with domestic 
constitutional law and is fundamental for Doyle in his 
interpretation of Perpetual Peace. As argued here, an 
established republic provides the "constitutional guarantee 
of caution" when it comes to potential war. Doyle, "Kant, 
Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," p. 230. But 
it should be noted that both international law ("a 
guarantee of respect") and cosmopolitan law ("the addition 
of material incentives" in the form of free trade and 
international commerce) are also discussed by Doyle as 
sources of long-term peace between states. Doyle, "Kant, 
Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," pp. 230-31.
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Doyle concludes his section on Kant and Perpetual 
Peace with several telling statements about the nature of 
relationships between liberal states and liberal to non­
liberal states. He first asserts that though "Liberal 
states have not escaped from the Realists7 'security 
dilemma,7 [defined as] the insecurity caused by anarchy in 
the world political system . . . the effects of
international anarchy have been tamed in the relations 
among states of a similarly liberal character."30 While 
"Alliances of purely mutual strategic interest among 
liberal and nonliberal states have been broken, [and] 
economic ties between liberal and nonliberal states have 
proven fragile,7 there exists a "political bond of liberal 
rights and interests [which has] proven a remarkably firm 
foundation for mutual non-aggression.7/31 Finally, he says 
simply, "A separate peace exists among liberal states."32 
As I have quoted Doyle before, the thinker who he believes
30Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part lt" p. 232.
31Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 232.
32Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 232.
187
"offers the best guidance" in these topics is Immanuel Kant 
in Perpetual Peace.33
According to Doyle, Kant "predicts" the ever-expanding 
pacific union of liberal states whose ties to each other 
amount to little more than a commitment to republicanism at 
home, which inevitably translates into a commitment to the 
expansion of the same political ideal abroad.34 Still, 
their relationship to each other as separate republican 
states is, as Doyle understands the text, a loosely bound 
togetherness in a "pact of mutual nonaggression" with 
little "organizational embodiment."35 This interpretation 
stands in direct contrast to both phases of Pattern One, 
and even differentiates itself from those interpretations 
that reveal the first phase of Pattern Two in the 
significance it gives to the First Definitive Article and 
the emphasis it places on a particular passage within that 
Article.
33Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 225.
34Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 225.
35Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 225.
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II. Subsidiary Interpretations
Analysis of Interpretations through the Rest of the 1980s, 
Including a Novel Reading of the Text by Leslie Mulholland
The predominant interpretation that leads me to 
suggest the existence of a separate phase of Pattern Two 
during this time period does not develop in full until the 
1990s. Only then do we see interpretations that strongly 
resemble Doyle's. After Doyle's, the rest of the 1980s are 
filled with relatively brief interpretations of the 
treatise. Some are similar to Doyle's interpretation with 
its emphasis on the First .Definitive Article and the 
concept of the aggressive nature of despotic regimes 
compared to the more pacific nature of liberal regimes in 
their relations with each other. Others sometimes resemble 
interpretations that reveal Pattern Two, Phase One. 
Importantly, all interpretations in the 1980s strongly 
defend a state-centric reading of Kant's treatise, as 
elaborated in the previous chapter. As stated earlier, 
like Pattern Two, Phase One, the primary component of 
interpretations that reveal Pattern Two, Phase Two is a 
'statist' reading of the text. The component of the latter 
that distinguishes it is not inconsistent with the former,
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simply an important addition to it. The point to remember 
in looking at this first group of interpretations is that 
they clearly remain in the 'sovereignty preserved' category 
of textual analysis.
Anthony Smith deals primarily with Kant's domestic 
political philosophy in his 1985 article "Kant's Political 
Philosophy: Rechtsstaat or Council Democracy?" Still, he
does make the brief comment that "On the international
plane . . . [Kant] does not call for a social contract on
an international scale to enter into a world state."36 He 
also offers reasons why he believes Kant thinks this is so. 
For Kant, according to Smith, a world state "would be 
conceptually incoherent, impossible from an administrative 
standpoint, and, even were it possible, would lead to 
despotism."37
Peter Calvocoresi offers a generally similar view to
Smith's in his 1987 book A Time for Peace: Pacifism,
Internationalism and Protest Forces in the Reduction of 
War. He understands Kant to "accept collisions between
36Anthony Smith, "Kant's Political Philosophy:
Rechsstaat or Council Democracy?" Review of Politics 47 
(April 1985), p. 258.
37Smith, "Kant's Political Philosophy: Rechsstaat or
Council Democracy?" p. 258.
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states as a fact of life."38 Further, he states that Kant 
"had no use for a superstate but envisioned a system in 
which states retained their independence and sovereignty 
but submitted to the overriding authority of law which they 
themselves freely and collectively would develop and
define.//39
The first interpretation from this period that offers 
a similar reading to Doyle's comes from Leslie A. 
Mulholland in a 1987 article entitled "Kant on War and 
International Justice." Mulholland's first comment
relating to Perpetual Peace is an observation on the nature 
of the state as a moral person. Mulholland says it is
important to "note that the status of a state as a
sovereign power, that is, its right with respect to itself 
(which would include the right to govern within its 
traditional territory and hence its right not to be 
conquered and enslaved) is not an acquired right but a
right whereby a state is constituted as a person in the
38Peter Calvocoresi, A Time for Peace: Pacifism,
Internationalism and Protest Forces in the Reduction of War 
(London, Melbourne, Auckland and Johannesburg: Hutchinson,
1987), p. 48.
39Calvocoresi, A Time for Peace, p. 48.
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international community."40 This sets the stage for the 
state-centric view of Kant's writing this interpreter puts 
forward. Though Mulholland does pay lip service to Kant's 
statement that "the voluntary production of a world state 
[is] 'correct in theory,'" the interpretation ultimately 
explains that for Kant in Perpetual Peace "there is no 
possible institutional solution to the problem of achieving 
world peace."41 According to Mulholland, the solution Kant 
offers is an "account of the conditions under which states 
can achieve the rule of law without the use of external 
coercive institutions."42 To demonstrate this, Mulholland 
turns to Kant's concept of republicanism and the First 
Definitive Article. Importantly, Mulholland spends almost 
the entire interpretation of the text discussing this and 
how crucial it is to achieving peace.
First, Mulholland takes from Perpetual Peace the 
quotation that "History offers examples of the opposite 
effect [to perpetual peace] being produced by all forms of 
government, with the single exception of genuine
40Leslie A. Mulholland, "Kant on War and International 
Justice," Kant-Studien 78 (1987), p. 33.
41Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice,"
p. 34 and p. 35, respectively.
42Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice,"
p. 35.
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republicanism, which, however, could be the object only of 
a moral politician."43 From this, Mulholland makes the 
statement that, for Kant, "republicanism must replace 
despotism in individual states."44 Further, "Once this is 
accomplished, states must voluntarily submit to the rule of 
law amongst them in a federation of republics and thereby
abolish war as a means of resolving disputes."45 After a
long discussion on despotic government and how it is "in 
principle incapable of voluntary adherence to the rule of 
law" and therefore, in its relations with other states, 
always "in principle in a 'state of war' even if there are 
no actual hostilities or declarations of war," Mulholland 
begins a thorough discussion of the First Definitive 
Article.46
For Mulholland, "the chief features of a republican 
constitution" for Kant are "that citizens have freedom to
pursue their own ends, private and moral . . . that no
subjects have any innate political privileges . . . and
43Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p. 35.
44Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p. 35.
45Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p. 35.
46Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p. 35.
that citizens be independent, i.e., have the right to 
participate in lawgiving, at least through voting for their 
representatives."47 Mulholland also points out Kant's 
insistence on the separation of powers. Accordingly, 
Mulholland states, "A republican constitution alone 
represents in its form the united will of the people in the 
giving and administration of laws."48
While Mulholland seems interested in the basic concept 
of the republic, the interpretation offered then exclaims 
that "Our chief concern with Kant's contentions regarding 
the republic . . .  is with whether and how the achievement 
of republican constitutions can help further peace and the 
rule of law."49 Mulholland turns to the practical argument 
Kant makes in the First Definitive Article. Mulholland 
states that "The practical problem in declaring war in a 
republic is that since the people suffer the most through 
the deprivations of fighting, paying the costs of war and 
rebuilding after a war they would be expected to be
47Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p. 35.
48Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice,"
p. 35.
49Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice,"
p . 36.
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cautious in consenting to declare war."50 However, "In a 
state run by a despot, there is no need to justify war to 
the people. Moreover, since a despot need suffer nothing 
personally by a war even if his side loses, he has no 
overwhelming prudential reasons to avoid war."51 This 
practical reason is also supplemented by the formal, a 
priori claim, that "Only in the case of a republic is there 
any reason to trust that the authorities will abide by 
their commitments" because "the general will and the 
concomitant element of the rights of man have priority as 
the principle of activity."52 This, by itself, is enough 
for Kant to believe that this form of government is the 
only one that can ever be trusted to commit itself to the 
rule of law in its relations with other states.
The key point that Mulholland makes is that "Kant's 
insight into the problem of international law is that there 
can be no rule of law and no. peace unless states can be 
trusted to commit themselves to law without there being an 
international executive force to ensure obedience to law
50Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p. 36.
51Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p. 36.
52Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," 
p . 36.
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through force."53 This can only happen in liberal 
republics.
Finally, unlike the organizational aspects from the 
Second Definitive Article invariably discussed in 
interpretations that reveal both phases of Pattern One or 
the historical aspects of the First Supplement focused on 
in interpretations that reveal Pattern Two, Phase One, 
Mulholland relies entirely on the execution of the First 
Definitive Article as the means for achieving peace. None 
of the other articles or supplements from the text are 
specifically discussed in this interpretation. Further, 
and much like Doyle, Mulholland clearly posits a strong 
relationship between the domestic political organization of 
the state and the significant influence this has on its 
behavior in international politics. All of this leads to 
the argument that, coupled with Doyle's initial 
interpretation, a somewhat different way of reading the 
text is beginning to develop during this period.
53Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice,"
p. 36.
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'What Kant Should Have Said' : An Interpretation by Thomas
L . Carson
Thomas L. Carson offers a conventional state-centric 
interpretation of Kant's Perpetual Peace in his 1988 
article "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have Said." In 
this article, Carson presents himself as a strong advocate 
of world government with coercive military power over 
individual states. In one of several passages, he states, 
"just as nations must maintain an effective monopoly on the 
kind of coercive power that can be used against 
individuals, so an international government must maintain a 
monopoly on military power."54 As will be demonstrated, 
Carson does not believe Kant favors world government in 
Perpetual Peace. In fact, he seems disappointed that Kant 
does not considering his own position.
Carson does discuss the Preliminary and Definitive 
Articles in his interpretation. As for the Preliminary 
Articles, he re-states them but provides little commentary. 
In his discussion of the First Definitive Article, he 
thinks it important to include, as did Doyle and Mulholland
54Thomas L. Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should 
Have Said," Social Theory and Practice 14, No. 2 (Summer
1988) , p. 184.
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before him, the practical reason Kant believes states 
should adopt a republican constitution. Carson first re­
states the definition of republicanism Kant suggests, i.e., 
"freedom for all members of society, the dependence of 
everyone upon a single common legislation, and legal 
equality for all" and distinguishes between the republican 
form of government and a democracy, i.e., the former 
requires a "sharp separation between legislative and 
executive powers."55 Carson then notes that "In republican 
forms of government 'the consent of the citizens is 
required to decide whether or not war is to be declared.'"56 
His commentary on this section goes as follows: "The
rationale for making republican government part of a 
proposal for peace is that since the general populace 
suffers the burdens and miseries of war, they will be very 
reluctant to bring these miseries down upon themselves" 
while "Monarchs and other autocratic rulers do not have the 
same kind of reluctance to begin wars."57 Carson then 
quotes at length a passage from the First Definitive
55Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 175.
56Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 175.
57Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 175.
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Article, what I have termed the 'consent of the citizens' 
passage. He finally states in another section of the 
article that "Michael Doyle has proposed a most intriguing 
defense of Kant's position."58 Though he does not discuss 
Doyle's 'liberal peace' idea, it is clear that he thinks 
implementation of the First Definitive Article and the 
potential impact on peace that follows it merits 
consideration.
His discussion of the Second Definitive Article is 
pretty standard for interpreters of this period. He notes 
that Kant "takes pains to stress that he prefers a 
federation of sovereign states to an international state."59 
In his description of this federation, he sounds even more 
'statist.' He says Kant's "federation would not interfere 
in the internal affairs of its member states; it would 
exist 'merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each 
state in itself.'"60 Furthermore/ he states that whatever 
form Kant's federation takes, "it should not [according to
58Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 180.
59Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 176.
60Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 176.
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Kant] have the power to coerce individual states to do its 
will."61
Additionally, Carson goes through four reasons why 
Kant rejects the world state as the path to peace. He 
states the following:
(i) The very idea of a world state is self- 
contradictory; (ii) that nations and peoples will be 
unwilling to make the kind of surrender of national 
sovereignty and national autonomy that would be 
required of a world state; (iii) that the rights of
sovereign states would be violated by the creation of 
a world state possessing the power to coerce them; and
(iv) that a world state would be likely to be
despotic.62
Even with all of these negative passages and comments about 
the world state, Carson, unlike most interpreters from the 
1950s onward, does suggest that there is one passage in the 
Second Definitive Article that generally says "if a world 
state could exercise its authority effectively . . .  it 
would be the best imaginable guarantor of peace."63 Still, 
Carson admits that Kant "denies in a later passage" that
the world state could exercise its authority effectively so 
that the federation is all that Kant can ultimately
61Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 176.
62Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 177.
63Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 179.
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support.64 His final comment on the text is that "The non- 
coercive federation that Kant proposes would have no power 
to prevent individual states from creating armies and using 
them to begin wars of aggression."65 Exactly after that, he 
notes, "It couldn't even compel nations to remain members 
of the federation."66 Carson would agree with W.B. Gallie 
that Kant's ultimate proposal has no 'teeth.' He obviously 
sees Kant's recommendation as little more than a voluntary 
coming together of sovereign republican states.
The End of the 1980s: Interpretations by Ian Clark and
Sissela Bok
Ian Clark's 1989 book The Hierarchy of States: Refoim 
and Resistance in the International Order "characterizes" 
Kant and his writings on international affairs as 
"utopian".67 Though he devotes an entire chapter to Kant
64Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 179.
65Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 179.
66Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have
Said," p. 179.
67Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and
Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 55.
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and "the tradition of optimism" (set against Rousseau and
"the tradition of pessimism in relation to the 
international order"), his thoughts on Perpetual Peace are 
relatively few.68
The most that can be said of Clark's analysis is that
it fits under the category of 'sovereignty preserved.' He
states that though "Kant appears to be following the logic 
of the domestic analogy, setting the scene for an
'international' social contract," such a global contract 
"is not Kant's solution."69 According to Clark, "many 
people wrongly believe that Kant was advocating world 
government but this is not the case and he is quite 
explicit on this point."70 Clark believes the solution Kant 
is offering is nothing more than a "league for peace 
(foedus pacificum)."11 Clark further states, "Kant insists 
that this league 'will not aim at the acquisition of any of 
the political powers of a State.'"72 He refers directly to 
the commentary of W.B. Gallie in support of his argument 
when he says that "Gallie is therefore correct to emphasize
68Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 49.
69Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 55.
70Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 55.
71Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 55.
72Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 55.
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Kant's position that 'the idea of coercion, to sustain an 
international order, is both logically and practically an 
absurdity.'"73 Finally, Clark notes, "for Kant, 'there is a 
fundamental asymmetry between establishing and maintaining 
a just constitution within a state and in establishing and 
maintaining a just relationship between states.'"74
The final interpretation of Perpetual Peace completed 
in the 1980s to be discussed is Sissela Bok's 1989 book A 
Strategy for Peace: Human Values and the Threat of War.
Like Clark's above, this is also a brief account of 
Perpetual Peace, though it is similar to Doyle's and 
Mulholland's in its focus on the First Definitive Article 
and its emphasis on the continued autonomy of the state. 
Bok explains that Kant's "plan involved a change, over 
time, to representative government in as many states as 
possible."75 Under Kantian representative government,
"freedom and equality . . . would be indispensable for
citizens of such states and would enable them to resist 
being drawn into new wars upon which their rulers were
73Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 55.
74Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 55.
75Sissela Bok, A Strategy for Peace: Human Values and 
the Threat of War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 32.
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otherwise all too likely to embark."76 Once again, we see 
the interpreter focusing on the relationship between 
unrepresentative government and the belligerent 
propensities of its rulers. This, I argue, is a primary 
ingredient of interpretations during the period between 
1983 and 2000.
Further, Bok claims that the "federation of free 
states" formed from these representative governments "would 
be most likely to promote justice within and between 
states, while preserving their unique characteristics and 
freedom vis-a-vis each other."77 Such a federation would 
involve "autonomous states joining in submitting 
voluntarily to laws they had themselves authored."78 
According to Bok, "Kant used a concept of 'autonomy' that 
the Greeks had applied primarily to states living under 
self-imposed laws; but he brought this notion of a law 
freely enacted and imposed upon oneself to bear on . 
the conduct of individuals, of communities or nations in 
internal affairs, and of a future federation of states."79
76Bok, A Strategy for Peace, p. 32.
77Bok, A Strategy for Peace, p. 32.
78Bok, A Strategy for Peace, p. 32.
79Bok, A Strategy for Peace, pp. 32-33.
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Bok briefly refers to Kant's categorical imperative 
when she states, "This self-imposed moral law would enjoin 
people, singly or collectively [as in a state] , to 'act 
only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law.'"80 Bok 
obviously sees Kant as respecting not only the dignity and 
autonomy of every individual but the dignity and autonomy 
of every state. The law that would develop between states
would come not from an external source, be it an all-
powerful federation or world state, but would begin with 
the autonomous state imposing a law upon itself based 
entirely on its internal political structure as a republic.
Conclusion
The principal focus of this chapter has been on 
Michael Doyle's 1983 study on the 'liberal peace,' which 
includes one of the most influential interpretations of
Kant's text. It also has discussed six subsidiary
interpretations of the text completed during the last half 
of the 1980s. In many ways, the new interpretation offered 
by Doyle is the pivotal textual analysis of this period.
80Bok, A Strategy for Peace, p. 33.
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Though relatively brief, the central themes developed in 
its representation of the treatise show up frequently in 
interpretations that complete this period and discussed 
further in Chapters Six and Seven to follow. The First 
Definitive Article takes center stage as the most important 
Article of Kant's treatise for Doyle and these 
interpreters. They make the 'consent of the citizens'
passage within the First Definitive Article the focal point 
for peace in their reading of the text and further develop 
the important theme that domestic politics determines 
international politics.
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CHAPTER SIX
PATTERN TWO, PHASE TWO: SOVEREIGNTY PRESERVED II.
INTO THE 1990S, THE STATE-CENTRIC READING AND ITS EMPHASIS 
ON THE FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE SOLIDIFIES
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War and following Doyle's 
authoritative study, Kant's Perpetual Peace experienced a 
surge in popularity during the first half of the 1990s.1 
Beyond the proliferation of 'liberal peace' advocates that 
reference Kant and the text in their various empirical 
studies during this period, there were a whole host of 
commentators who more substantively reviewed his text from 
1990 to 1995. In fact, this brief five-year time span has 
the greatest concentration of thorough interpretations of 
Kant's treatise in comparison with all other periods under 
consideration. In this chapter, I explore these
interpretations in detail and continue the argument
1Howard Williams and Ken Booth claim that the perceived 
"liberal triumphalism" at the end of the 1980 s and the 
notion that "World politics . . . seemed to be moving in a
'Kantian' direction elevated the status of the great
Prussian philosopher within International Relations
circles." Howard Williams and Ken Booth, "Kant: Theorist
beyond Limits" in Ian Clark & Iver B. Neumann, eds., 
Classical Theories of International Relations (Houndmills, 
Basingstroke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 
p. 73 .
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initially developed in Chapter Five that the practical 
reason for adopting a republican constitution outlined in 
the First Definitive Article becomes one of the most 
important parts of the text for this group of commentators 
in their search for what the work ultimately suggests to 
achieve peace. Considering the relative length of the 
chapter, I have chosen to divide it into two sections for 
the convenience of the reader. The principal
interpretations discussed first offer the most detailed, 
comprehensive analyses of the text. The subsidiary 
interpretations that follow present more concise accounts 
of Kant's work.
I. Principal Interpretations 
The Interpretive Outlooks of Andrew Hurrell and Chris Brown
Andrew Hurrell in his 1990 article "Kant and the 
Kantian Paradigm in International Relations" presents a 
compelling study of whether Kant is a 'statist' or 
'cosmopolitan' in his writings on international relations. 
According to Hurrell, the 'statist' paradigm "stresses 
Kant's explicit and clear-cut rejection of world government 
. . . the value Kant places on the autonomy of states and
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his insistence on the importance of non-intervention."2 
Further, "It points to the extent to which progress depends 
not on grandiose plans for the reform of the state system 
but on the internal improvement of states and, in 
particular, the achievement of republican government."3 
"Most crucially," Hurrell explains, the 'statist7 paradigm 
"argues that when Kant speaks of a 'federation of states,7 
he is thinking only of a loose league of republican states 
that have come together for the sole purpose of abolishing 
war."4 On the other side, the 'cosmopolitan7 paradigm 
emphasizes the universalistic aspect of Kant7s writings, 
suggesting a belief in the importance of overcoming the 
state system through the establishment of a global 
government that would insure the rights of a "global 
society of mankind."5
He thoroughly analyzes all four of Kant7s works on
international relations --  Perpetual Peace, The
Metaphysics of Morals, The Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, and Theory and Practice in
2Andrew Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in 
International Relations," Review of International Studies 
16 (1990), p. 183.
3Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm,7 p. 183.
4Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm,7 p. 183.
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coming to the conclusion that "the statist view of Kant is 
more broadly correct."6 Most importantly for our purposes, 
he notes, "In Perpetual Peace . . . Kant does indeed reject
both world government and a federation with the power to 
enforce the proscription of war."7 Hurrell suggests several 
reasons for this position he thinks Kant is taking in 
Perpetual Peace. First, the establishment of an
international state is "'not the will of nations according 
to their present conception of international right.///8 
Second, the civil state already has an internal 
constitution and thus "it has outgrown the coercive right 
of others to subject" it to an additional external 
constitution a state of nations would require.9 Third, 
Hurrell points to Kant's comment in the Second Preliminary 
Article that the state is a "moral personality" or, as 
Hurrell calls it, an "organic entity" the existence of 
which would be terminated if it is "grafted onto another
5Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 185.
6Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 185.
7Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 194.
8Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 189. 
Hurrell takes this quotation (along with all others in his 
article) from Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's 
Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by 
H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) .
9Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 190.
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state."10 According to Hurrell, "Kant's fourth and most 
powerful argument against the idea of an international 
state is that it is both impractical and contrary to the 
idea of freedom."11
Instead of the world state, Hurrell sees Kant as 
opting for a "'federation of free peoples,' i.e., 'a 
particular kind of league which we might call a pacific 
federation.'"12 Importantly, Hurrell explains, "Kant is at 
pains to underline the need to maintain the independence of 
states and to uphold a strict principle of non­
intervention."13 He further quotes Kant's 'statist' remark, 
"This federation does not aim to acquire any power like 
that of the state, but merely to preserve and secure the 
freedom of each state."14 His own comment in relation to 
the Kantian federation is that "the limited pacific 
federation discussed in Perpetual Peace . . .  is indeed 
designed to underwrite international law in such way as to
10Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 190.
11Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 190.
12Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 192.
13Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 192.
14Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," pp. 192-93 
(emphasis in original).
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protect the autonomy and independence of the state."15 
Finally, Hurrell states, "The sole purpose of this 
federation will be to abolish war, although its powers to 
do so will be strictly limited."16 "In Perpetual Peace," 
Hurrell concludes that "such a federation appears to Kant 
to be the limit of what is possible given the constraints 
of state sovereignty and the importance of state autonomy 
on the one hand and the need for a lawful framework for 
international relations on the other."17
Yet from where does this "lawful framework for 
international relations" and the prospects it holds for 
future peace derive? Hurrell turns to the First Definitive 
Article for the answer. After recognizing "Kant's belief 
in the inseparable connection between domestic and 
international society,"18 Hurrell explains, "Kant's answer 
[to the above question] is usually seen in terms of his 
insistence on the pacific tendencies of republican 
governments."19 Hurrell is convinced that, for Kant in 
Perpetual Peace, "the frequency of war is clearly
15Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 200.
16Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 193.
17Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 193.
18Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 186.
19Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 194.
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influenced by the character of domestic governments" and 
that "Kant never tires of denouncing the bellicosity of 
despots" throughout his treatise.20 "Republics" on the
other hand "will be less inclined to engage in wars . . .
because of the power of the citizens to restrain the 
aggressive tendencies of their leaders."21 After re-stating 
the frequently quoted 'consent of the citizens' passage, 
Hurrell goes on to say that "It is clearly important that 
the people should directly experience the costs of war."22
Hurrell also offers another reason he believes Kant
prefers republican government. A liberal state provides 
the conditions for the possibility of moral progress among 
individuals within a society. No other form of government 
does this. Only a liberal state protects the freedom and 
equality of each individual, which allows him or her to 
develop as a moral human being. Hurrell believes Kant is 
in favor of the proposition that "Progress towards 
perpetual peace is ultimately dependent on the moral 
progress of individuals."23 As he says, "By providing the 
framework within which moral progress is possible,
20Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 195.
21Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 195.
22Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 196.
23Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 196.
republican government is an essential step on the road to 
peace."24 Essentially, Hurrell believes Kant is linking the 
nature of the individual to the nature of domestic society 
and presenting to his readers the fundamental influence of 
both on the condition of international society.
This emphasis on the implementation of the First 
Definitive Article and the vital role it plays in the 
production of peace among independent states is a central 
component of interpretations during this period no less 
important to Hurrell than to Doyle, Mulholland and Bok 
above. Hurrell appropriately comes to the close of his 
analysis of Perpetual Peace with the following comment:
Kant's concern with the internal arrangement of 
states need not be seen, as it sometimes is, as 
subversive of interstate order, but rather as another 
means of perfecting it. First, because of this belief 
that peacefully inclined republican states represent 
the only means whereby a stable system of independent 
states can be maintained. Second, because of the 
extent to which constitutional states which guarantee 
the moral and political rights of their citizens 
remove an important element of instability and add to 
the legitimacy of the state system as a whole.25
Hurrell's state-centric reading and his reliance on the 
First Definitive Article as the key medium through which
24Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 196.
25Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm," p. 200.
214
peace will be achieved for Kant in Perpetual Peace should 
be evident by now.
Chris Brown, in his 1992 book International Relations 
Theory: New Normative Approaches, discusses the role of the 
state for Kant and how this relates to Kant's willingness 
or unwillingness to accept a world state as the solution to 
the problem of war. Brown first tells us, "Kant's 
principles of politics are normative (they tell us what we
should do) and based on R e c h t  a word that can only be
translated as a mixture of the English notions of law and 
justice."26 Later, Brown states that the "role of the state 
based on Recht is, essentially, negative; the state exists 
to allow free, equal and self-dependent people to find 
security for themselves and their property" and that is 
basically it.27
Brown then discusses Kant's general concern with war, 
its devastating effects on the lawful state, and the 
necessity of the rule of law between states in order to 
insure the development and stability of the lawful state. 
Brown suggests, "one way to abolish war would be to abolish
26Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New
Normative Approaches (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1992), p. 
31 (emphasis in original).
27Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 32.
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states, by creating a single world-state28 And according 
to Brown, this would seem to be the appropriate route for 
Kant. As he states, "since the role of the state is 
negative, and the political community is not in itself a 
source of value, there would seem to be no principled 
reason why the existing order of sovereign states should be 
valued" and therefore, no reason why Kant would be against 
the sovereignty of each state being removed in the 
interests of creating a world state. Yet even with this 
logic Brown puts forward, he is still certain that Kant 
"rejects the notion of a world-state."29 He summarizes 
Kant's objections to the world state as follows: 
"linguistic and religious differences between states" 
necessarily keep them apart; "princes will not agree to 
lose their sovereignty"; and "it is doubted whether a 
world-state would be viable on practical grounds."30 For 
Brown then, "since the establishment of a world-state is 
not the answer, a world without war must be achieved in a 
world of states."31
28Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 32.
29Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 33.
30Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 33.
31Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 33.
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Without even discussing, specifically, the Preliminary 
and Definitive Articles, Brown seems to have already 
established his 'statist' credentials. His next step is to 
consider these articles or, as he says, "unpack and
contextualise" them.32 Other than listing all of the
Preliminary Articles, he says little of note about them.
He simply states that the "six articles are best understood 
as a set of rules that could, and should, be applied in the 
absence of perpetual peace."33 His larger concern is with 
the three Definitive Articles, which "relate to" and "give 
content to" the following three legal orders: "a
constitution based on the civil right of individuals within 
a nation; a constitution based on the international right 
of states in their relationships with one another; and a 
constitution based on cosmopolitan right in so far as 
individuals and states, coexisting in an external 
relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as 
citizens of a universal state of mankind."34
32Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 34.
33Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 34.
34Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 36. The 
re-statement of the three different types of constitution 
is a direct quote from Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans 
Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, p. 98 (emphasis in original).
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Brown begins with the First Definitive Article. He 
does not spend much time on it. Like other interpreters 
from this period, however, he makes certain to point out 
the practical reason for adopting a republican 
constitution. As he states, "Republicanism is desirable 
for its own sake, but here Kant adds the important point 
that a republican constitution will be conducive to peace" 
as well.35 The reason he believes Kant thinks this is so 
need not be repeated again. Yet his commentary on the 
'consent of the citizens' passage is different from others 
above. He does re-state the conventional interpretation 
that "Unlike kings, who treat war as a sport, the citizens 
of a republic will have to bear the costs of war themselves 
and for this reason will be naturally peaceful."36 To this 
he adds the point that "Kant's republic is not a democracy 
(which is a variant of despotism) ,"37 This is important for 
Brown as he is aware of "the oft-stated view that 
democracies are inherently war-like."38 Understanding that 
Kant preached republicanism, not democracy, Brown justifies 
himself in saying such a view "does not touch [Kant's]
35Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 36.
36Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 36.
37Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 36.
38Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 36.
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argument" that republics, not democracies, are peaceful.39 
This is where he parts with Doyle who he thinks "sees
liberalism as coming in two varieties --  laissez faire and
social welfare --  neither of which corresponds to Kant's
republicanism."40 Though Brown does disagree with Doyle on 
this issue, he still calls his work "suggestive" and says 
"his picture of an expanding Pacific Union within which war 
is no longer an instrument of policy . . .  is true to 
Kant's reasoning in Perpetual Peace" and that there is 
"some reason to think that [Doyle's empirical] position . .
. is defensible."41
Brown sees Kant as preferring the "second-best 
solution" of a "peaceful federation, initially with a 
nucleus of republican states but gradually expanding" in 
the Second Definitive Article.42 The reasons for rejecting 
the world state have already been discussed. Brown does 
say that the "world republic" is an "impractical goal" for 
Kant but does not distinguish it from the "world-state" he 
talks of earlier (and says Kant clearly rejects) .43
39Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 36.
40Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 41.
41Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 41.
42Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 37.
43Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 37.
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Finally, Brown understands the Third Definitive Article 
wherein 'Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions 
of Universal Hospitality" to be "far more limited than some 
modern Kantians would wish."44
Defense of the Kantian Theory of International Law: An
Interpretation by Fernando Teson
Fernando Teson"s 1991 article, "The Kantian Theory of 
International Law," defends a liberal theory of 
international law and its "commitment to normative 
individualism" against traditional international legal 
theory"s exclusive focus on "the rights and duties of 
states."45 He pronounces, "The end of states and 
governments is to benefit, serve, and protect their 
components, human beings; and the end of international law 
must also be to benefit, serve, and protect human beings,
44Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 37.
45Fernando R. Teson, "The Kantian Theory of 
International Law," Columbia Law Review 92 (January 1992), 
pp. 53-54. Teson uses the following translation of 
Perpetual Peace throughout this article: Immanuel Kant,
Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History and 
Morals, introduction and translation by Ted Humphrey 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983).
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and not its components, states and governments."46 His hope 
is that some day "the notion of state sovereignty" will be 
"redefined" so that "the sovereignty of the state" will be 
"dependent upon the state's domestic legitimacy."47 The 
ultimate object of such a redefinition is that the "respect 
for states" will be "merely derivative of respect for 
persons."48 Teson believes that Kant is "the first to 
defend this thesis" and he "reconstructs and examines 
Kant's theory as put forth in his famous essay Perpetual 
Peace" to support his argument for a liberal theory of 
international law.49
While Teson is intent on demonstrating Kant's absolute 
commitment to international human rights, he is just as 
certain as other interpreters writing during this period 
that Perpetual Peace reinforces the concept of state 
sovereignty and does not advocate the removal of it in 
order to protect these individual rights. Further, in line 
with these interpreters, he is convinced of the singular
46Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
54 .
47Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
54 .
48Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
54 .
49Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
54 .
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importance of the First Definitive Article and sees its 
primary message as being that "internal freedom at home is 
causally related to peaceful behavior abroad."50 As he 
states more clearly a few paragraphs later, "Kant's 
originality stems . . . from having been the first to show
the strong links between international peace and personal 
freedom, and between arbitrary government at home and 
aggressive behavior abroad."51
Teson does not go into much detail in his section on 
the Preliminary Articles. Other than chastising those 
'realists' who "use" the Preliminary Articles to support an 
"interpretation that gives primacy to states and 
governments over the individuals," his basic point is that 
these articles "describe the most pressing steps to be 
taken if we want subsequently to proceed toward the lasting 
substantive solutions . . . contained in the
Definitive Articles."52 Further, he states that the norms 
outlined in the Preliminary Articles "are designed to 
govern the intermediate status of international relations
50Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
55.
51Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
56.
52Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," pp. 
58-59.
222
after the lawless state of nature is ended, but before the 
definitive law of nations is established."53
Teson's discussion of the First Definitive Article is 
twenty-four pages long, easily the longest of any 
interpreters' considered here. It is not necessary to 
consider every remark made by him about this article. 
Fortunately, much of his analysis concerns the three 
principles on which the republican constitution is based: 
freedom, due process, and equality. His analysis of these 
is philosophical exposition more than anything else, with 
the simple goal of locating Kant in the liberal framework 
of absolute respect for individual rights. Further, he
wants to differentiate himself from those like Hinsley who, 
he claims, "regard the state as deserving respect because 
it is an autonomous moral being and enjoys sovereignty in 
its own right" as opposed to his argument that "the moral 
standing of the state must be anchored" in the three 
"organizing principles of just republican states."54 Teson
understands Kant to be an international theorist who
believes that a state is only a "legitimate member of the
53Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
60.
54Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
70.
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international community" when it respects these principles 
for all individuals that live within it. The only 
constitution that can realize this is the republican.
Teson makes the important point that "The requirement 
of a republican form of government must be read in 
conjunction with the Second Definitive Article."55 He 
states, "Kant asserts that adherence to these requirements 
[outlined in the First and Second Definitive Articles] will 
result in an alliance of free nations that will maintain 
itself, prevent wars, and steadily expand."56 As far as the 
thesis goes, the operative word used here is "alliance." 
When we reach the discussion of his interpretation of the 
Second Definitive Article, it is easier to see why Teson 
chooses this word. Here, he simply says, as I have
55Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
60. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that Teson sees 
no difference between the terms "republican" and "liberal 
democracy." As other interpreters have done, he makes 
clear that Kant does not support a pure democracy, since it 
is neoessarily despotism. He says "Kant's explanation of a 
republican constitution strongly suggests the idea of a 
constitutional democracy, conceived as a participatory 
political process constrained by respect for rights" and 
one that "allows people to govern themselves and to 
legislate by majority vote, provided that the rights of 
everyone [meaning minority rights or the rights of 
dissenters] are respected" as well. Teson, "The Kantian 
Theory of International Law," pp. 61-62.
56Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
61.
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demonstrated other interpreters from this period have done, 
that such an "alliance of participant states that protect 
freedom internally and whose governments are 
representative" are the only ones that can guarantee 
peace.57 He then repeats what he has already said earlier: 
"Kant for the first time linked arbitrary government at 
home with aggressive foreign policies."58
Teson asserts Kant's "central argument" in Perpetual 
Peace "that if people are self-governed, citizens on both 
sides of any dispute will be very cautious in bringing 
about a war whose consequences they themselves must bear."59 
This is what Teson refers to as Kant's "empirical argument" 
within the First Definitive Article. I have lately been 
referring to it, as other interpreters have, as Kant's 
'practical argument' and both seem interchangeable as they 
rely on the same 'consent of the citizens' passage within 
the text. Teson says that unlike the citizen in a 
republic, "the tyrant does not suffer the consequences" of
57Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
61.
58Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
61.
59Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
74.
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a war so "it is relatively easy for a despot to start a 
war."60
Second, "from an institutional standpoint, the 
separation of powers inherent in a liberal democracy 
creates a system of mutual controls and relative diffusion 
of power that complicates and encumbers governmental 
decisions about war."61 According to Teson, "For Kant, that 
a multiplicity of decision-makers will participate in 
decisions to make war is implicit in the notion of autonomy 
inherent in the republican form of government."62 
Obviously, he sees Kant as supportive of a kind of 
government that places "institutional limits on power, 
including the power to conduct foreign relations."63
Teson offers up two more Kantian reasons, both part of 
the "empirical argument" why liberal, representative 
governments are peaceful. He says that in a Kantian 
republic, "citizens will be educated in the principles of 
right and therefore war will appear to them as the evil
60Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
74 .
61Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
75.
62Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
75.
63Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
75.
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that every rational person knows it is."64 Finally, and he 
turns briefly to the Third Definitive Article in this 
selection, Kantian liberal democracies "foster free trade 
and a generous system of international movement" that bring 
people closer together and make war seem costly since it 
interferes with both.65 In ending his discussion of the 
"empirical argument," Teson spends several pages strongly 
defending Doyle's claim that liberal democracies do not go 
to war with each other. He concludes by saying "The 
conjecture that internal freedom is causally related to 
peaceful international behavior is as safe a generalization 
as one can make in the realm of political science."66 
Admittedly, his endorsement of Doyle's position has little 
to do with the central concern of analyzing his 
interpretation of Kant's text. Still, the constant 
emphasis interpreters working from the early 1980s through 
the 1990s place on this aspect of the First Definitive 
Article, i.e., the Kantian point that domestic political 
structure substantially influences relations between states
64Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
75.
65Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
76.
66Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
81.
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(and Doyle's empirical proof of it), is important to the 
argument for the existence of a new phase of Pattern Two.
Teson also points out the "Normative Argument" made in 
the First Definitive Article. States should adopt the 
republican constitution not only because of the peace it 
brings, but because of "'the purity of its origin, a purity 
whose source is the pure concept of right.'"61 Grounding 
this argument in Kant's categorical imperative from his 
moral theory, he explains that "The normative argument is 
addressed to those who rank justice over peace; the 
empirical argument, to those who rank peace over justice."68
Moving to the Second Definitive Article, Teson first 
states that "Most modern commentators . . . agree that Kant
did not support world government."69 In making this 
statement, he cites Hinsley, Gallie, Waltz and the French 
interpreter, Jean-Michel Besnier. His own position on it 
is very similar. For Teson, "Kant's answer . . .  to this 
problem is to propose instead an alliance of separate free 
nations, united by their moral commitment to individual
67Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p. 
81 (emphasis in original).
68Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
82.
69Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
86.
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freedom, by their allegiance to the international rule of 
law, and by the mutual advantages derived from peaceful 
intercourse."70 He then comments that "The global
distribution of authority proposed by Kant is thus quite 
close to the modern international legal system: states have 
rights and duties under international law, because they 
represent autonomous moral beings. However, there is no 
sovereign to enforce them; enforcement is decentralized."71
It should be clear that Teson understands Kant to 
prefer a "loose organization of separate states" as the 
solution to the problem of war.72 Yet why does he think the 
text is inimical to a centralized authority above the state 
level. Teson's answer follows: "Kant defended separate 
states not only because he thought that in this way his 
proposal would be more realistic, but because he thought 
that such a loose system was morally justified."73 Kant 
seems quite clear on the point that "while world government 
may be an attractive idea in theory, it carries the danger
70Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p. 
86 (emphasis in original).
71Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," pp. 
86-87.
72Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
87.
73Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
87.
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of degenerating first into a world tyranny and ultimately 
back into international anarchy."74 Since Teson's main 
focus is on the freedom of the individual (and he thinks it 
is Kant's as well), he remarks that "world government 
presents too great a threat to individual freedom" so that 
"Liberty is better secured when political power is 
relatively diluted."75 Second, Teson states that, for Kant, 
"a system of separate states allows individuals to 
associate with those that share their same culture, 
customs, history, and language."76 He believes this 
develops and encourages a sense of community, which allows 
for the autonomy of the individual living within it to 
thrive. Teson develops this argument from Kant's point 
that differences in language, religion, and culture work to 
create an "'equilibrium of the liveliest competing powers' 
which alone can control the danger of the deceptive peace 
that despotism [in the form of world government] brings."77
74Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
87.
75Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
87.
76Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
87.
77Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
88. Here, Teson quotes from the 1983 Humphrey translation.
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As for the Third Definitive Article, Teson's main 
comment further supports the state-centric reading he has 
given thus far. He states, "Not only does Kant expressly 
disavow the creation of centralized world government, but 
the Third Definitive Article, establishing the Cosmopolitan 
Law, or the rules of free trade and universal hospitality, 
is inexplicable outside the context of a world of 
independent nation-states."78
Teson closes his lengthy but instructive article with 
the comment that "The community of free nations envisioned 
by Kant will hopefully expand gradually and maintain 
itself, as it has done for the past two hundred years, and 
the aim of perpetual peace will be achieved the moment when 
the liberal alliance comprises every civil society."79 This 
interpreter, however committed he is to the understanding 
of Kant as normative individualist, still reads Perpetual 
Peace as a 'state-centric' document. While he does believe 
that individual freedom and reason come first for Kant, he 
recognizes that such traits can only exist in a state that 
adopts the recommendation of the First Definitive Article,
78Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
86.
79Tesdn, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," p.
102 .
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i.e., the republican constitution. The legitimacy of the 
state within the international community is entirely 
dependent upon this. Once the republican constitution is 
adopted by several states, the alliance of republican 
states (and an alliance is the most he ever states Kant 
supports in this treatise) will bring peace between them.80 
The interpretive avenue he takes gives prominence to the 
First Definitive Article over all others, and understands 
the Second Definitive Article and its wholesale commitment 
to the state, in terms of it. Of all the thorough 
interpretations written during this period, Teson's is 
certainly one of the most clear and complete.
A Thorough Analysis of the Text: Gabriel L. Negretto's
Interpretation
Gabriel L. Negretto thoroughly analyzes Kant's 
Perpetual Peace in "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
80Cecelia Lynch offers the following summary of Teson's 
thesis in a 1994 interpretation of Perpetual Peace to be 
discussed more thoroughly later: "Fernando Teson, for
example, has combined a liberal interpretation of Kant with 
the findings of the 'democratic peace' literature to argue 
in favor of founding international law on principles of 
respect for the sovereignty of liberal states only." 
Cecelia Lynch, "Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral 
Guidance in International Law," Ethics and International 
Affairs 8 (1994), p. 46.
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Security," the 1993 Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay in the 
Journal of International Affairs. Negretto does not see 
any evidence of Kant favoring a world state or strong 
federation in his most famous text.
Negretto begins with the Preliminary Articles and 
states that this is where "Kant's absolute rejection of any 
kind of war of aggression" occurs.81 These articles are the 
"necessary conditions for perpetual peace" but are nowhere 
near as important as the Three Definitive Articles, which 
Negretto calls "arguably his most important contribution to 
the philosophy of international law."82 Though Negretto 
acknowledges "the importance of the third article," he 
notes that his analysis is limited to the first and second 
for purposes of the issue he is dealing with throughout the 
work 1 the problems of collective security.83
Negretto then turns to a discussion of the First 
Definitive Article with the statement that "Kant relied 
heavily upon the idea that European wars were mainly
81Gabriel L. Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of 
Collective Security," Journal of International Affairs 46 
(Winter 1993), p. 506.
82Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 507.
83Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 507.
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motivated by the greed of governments and statesmen rather 
than that of peoples."84 He infers this from the 'consent 
of the citizens' passage quoted directly thereafter. He 
calls the 'consent of the citizens' passage "an assumption" 
of Kant's and, at least initially, is concerned with the 
"naive" nature of such a comment.85 Negretto believes, 
apart from the text, that "More than once, history has 
shown that peoples can be as bellicose as their leaders, if 
not more so."86 Still, Negretto does agree in the end that 
"the existence of a republican constitution is not a 
guarantee of peace per se; rather, it is only a form of 
government that renders less likely the initiation of 
offensive wars for the purpose of advancing the ruler's 
political ambitions."87
Negretto calls "The establishment of a federal system 
the most controversial aspect of his project."88
84Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 507.
85Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," pp. 508-509.
86Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 508.
87Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective 
Security," p. 508 (emphasis in original).
88Negretto, " Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 508.
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Though he does acknowledge that, for Kant, "states --  like
individuals  must abandon the state of nature if they
desire peaceful coexistence," he does not see Kant as 
suggesting anything more than an "alliance . . . described
as a confederation of free and independent states, rather 
than a federal state."89 He also refers to Kant's
suggestion, borrowing a phrase from another book on Kant, 
as "a pact of collaboration among states . . . where the
efficacy of the pact of peace does not hinge on the
existence of a coercive power above individual states."90
Negretto also adds an interesting twist, augmenting 
his already state-centric interpretation. He quotes 
directly from Lewis White Beck's 1963 translation: "'This
league does not tend to any dominion over the power of the 
state but only to the maintenance and security of the 
freedom of the state itself and of other states in the
league with it, without there being any need for them to 
submit to civil laws and their compulsion, as men in a 
state of nature.'"91 Negretto's commentary on this
89Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," pp. 508-09.
90Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 508.
91Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 509. Negretto notes in Footnote 4 that
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quotation is that "Kant foresaw that if the federation were 
to become so strong as to enforce peace against aggressor 
states, it could become a super-state, inevitably 
overriding the rights of its members."92 After he gives the 
usual reasons for Kant's rejection of the world state and 
notes that "there are no 'teeth' in [Kant's] alliance for 
the prevention of war," Negretto concludes with the comment 
that "man must act as though perpetual peace were 
attainable and attempt to create the essential conditions 
for its attainment: a republican constitution in every
state and a league of peace comprised of independent and 
free nations."93 He ends his discussion of Kant by 
comparing the proposals outlined in Perpetual Peace with 
those of the American President Woodrow Wilson. Briefly, 
he states, "Wilson, like Kant, believed that world peace 
could only be established through an alliance of 
democratically governed nations."94
Kant's Perpetual Peace pamphlet is reprinted in Immanuel 
Kant, On History, edited and translated by Lewis White Beck 
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). Negretto, "Kant and the
Illusion of Collective Security," p. 503.
92Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 509.
93Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 510.
94Negretto, "Kant and the Illusion of Collective
Security," p. 513.
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Georg Cavallar's Novel Interpretation
The principal interpretations discussed thus far have 
been reasonably similar, with consistent focus on the First 
Definitive Article and state-centric readings of the text. 
One of the few 'outliers, 7 as I call them, during this 
historical period comes from Austrian Georg Cavallar's 
article "Kant's Society of Nations: Free Federation or
World Republic?" In final analysis, Cavallar does not 
disagree with other interpreters during this period; he 
only adds an interesting twist to his analysis.
First, like several other interpreters from this 
period, Cavallar recognizes the important relationship 
between the First Definitive Article and the Second 
Definitive Article. As he states, "Kant provides a short 
sketch of the peaceful, first step towards world peace" 
through the following passage: "'For if by good fortune one 
powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which 
is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace) , this 
will provide a focal point for federal association among 
other states.'"95 Cavallar claims that "Kant's contention
95Georg Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations: Free
Federation or World Republic?" Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 32 (July 1994), p. 476.
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that the 'focal point' for the federation will be a 
republic links the first and second definitive article 
together."96 His subsequent discussion of the First 
Definitive Article is similar to those discussed so far. 
He explains, "on two distinct levels . . . peace is
fostered by republicanism."97 At the first level, or as he 
calls it, the "transcendental" or "a priori" level, the 
Kantian republic simply "'by its nature' will adhere to the 
principle of justice in international relations."98 At the 
second level, or as he calls it, the "pragmatic" or "a 
posteriori" level, "Kant assumes that it is more likely 
that citizens as colegislators in a republic will refuse to 
consent to a declaration of war."99 Cavallar then discusses 
the difference between "The autocracy with a republican 
form of government" and "the 'true' republic, the 
'representative system of democracy,'" both of which he 
believes Kant endorses in the First Definitive Article.100 
Importantly though, he sees the former as "merely a
96Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 476.
97Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 476.
98Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 476.
"Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 476.
100Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 4 77.
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transitory stage" towards the latter.101 It was the 
representative system of democracy that he favored most, 
according to Cavallar, because "The actual consent of 
citizens to a declaration of war requires a representative 
republic."102
Cavallar obviously sees the important and clear role 
of the First Definitive Article in bringing about peace for 
Kant. Yet when it comes to the Second Definitive Article, 
he is less sure of the text and its recommendations. In 
speaking of all of Kant's writings on international 
relations, he initially states that he will side with those 
interpreters who view Kant as embracing a "free federation, 
with states having the right to leave it whenever they want 
to."103 Compared to Kant's other writings, he is even more 
convinced of Kant's choice in Perpetual Peace for a "weaker 
model of federalism where states do not submit themselves 
'to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces 
them.'"104 Since I am dealing solely with Perpetual Peace, 
this is the most important point for my purposes. Cavallar 
lists "pragmatic, legalistic, and moral arguments" for
101Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 477.
102Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 477.
103Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," pp. 461-62.
104Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 466.
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Kant's dismissal of a universal state.105 Cavallar does not 
seem impressed with the "pragmatic" argument. While he 
admits that Kant endorses the idea that the "larger the 
[universal state] becomes, the more inefficient and 
counterproductive it tends to be" and that "Nations are too 
different, in terms of languages as well as religious 
confessions" to think a universal state possible, he still 
thinks the "legalistic" and "moral" arguments are Kant's 
"more important reasons to criticize the universal state 
than mere prudential considerations."106
Cavallar states, "Kant's legalistic argument against 
an international state with coercive power is twofold."107 
Though "the weaker claim," as Cavallar sees it, the first 
argument against an international state with coercive power 
is that it is "inherently self-contradictory."108 As Kant 
says himself (here quoted by Cavallar), "The right of 
nations presupposes that there is 'a group of separate 
states which are not to be welded together as a unit.'"109 
Obviously then, to Cavallar, "The right of nations only
105Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," pp. 466-70.
106Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 466.
107Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 467.
108Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 467.
109Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 4 67.
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makes sense if there are independent nations."110 Cavallar 
believes the second argument is more potent. Unlike 
individuals in a state of nature, states "have already- 
acquired a 'rightful internal constitution'" and so "'have 
thus outgrown the coercive right of others to subject them 
to a wider legal constitution in accordance with their 
conception of right.7"111 According to Cavallar, this 
"passage makes clear why Kant defends the 'autonomy7 of 
states in the fifth preliminary article."112 But it is not 
just the Second and Fifth Preliminary Article that speaks 
on autonomy's behalf. Cavallar also states that the 
"second definitive article does not abandon or eliminate 
the autonomy of states set forth in the preliminary 
treaty.113 This "free federation of states" or "league," as 
Cavallar calls it, "is basically the rule of law among 
states that remain completely independent.7'114 The autonomy 
of the state, unlike that of the individual, cannot be 
compromised. His final comment is that "If states have no
110Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 467.
11:LCavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," pp. 468-69.
112Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 468.
113Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 471.
114Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 471.
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coercive force over others, then a free federation, not a 
universal state, is the idea demanded by pure reason."115
Cavallar's interpretation fits well within Pattern Two 
'statist' analysis of the text. Yet he is one of the few 
middle to late twentieth century interpreters of the text 
to confront, what he calls, "A difficult passage in 
Perpetual Peace."116 This difficult passage is exactly the 
selection that a number of interpretations that reveal 
Pattern One, Phase One rely on in their understanding of 
Perpetual Peace as a text in favor of the significant 
limitation of state sovereignty. Cavallar states, "A 
confusing passage in Perpetual Peaces however, cannot be 
integrated into [his] explanatory model."117 The model he 
has created and is referring to here basically maintains 
that all of Kant's writings on international relations 
after 1793 favor a 'statist' reading of the text.
The only statement of concern for Cavallar in relation 
to this "explanatory model" is towards the end of the 
Second Definitive Article. As Cavallar remarks, "At the 
end of the second definitive article, Kant seems to argue 
in favor of the kind of world government that has been
115Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 469.
116Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 470.
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criticized before: 'There is only one rational way in which 
states coexisting with other states can emerge from the 
lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like individuals, 
they must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adapt 
themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an 
international state. '//118 Though he firmly states, "The 
main body of the second definitive article and its closing 
section do not fit together," his interpretation and 
explanation attempts to reconcile the two conflicting 
arguments he has revealed.119 He understands Kant to 
endorse the free federation of independent republics as a 
first step, but hoped at some time in the distant future, 
such independent republics would "on their own decide to 
submit themselves freely under coercive laws."120 In doing 
so, they "would not have to abandon their sovereignty 
completely."121 Instead, "The sovereignty of the states 
over their subjects would remain intact, and would be
117Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 472.
118Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 472
(emphasis in original).
119Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 473.
120Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 472
(emphasis in original).
121Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 474.
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protected by the world republic" so that "It would limit 
states' sovereignty only in foreign relations."122
In final analysis, Cavallar's discussion of the Second 
Definitive Article is, unfortunately, as inconclusive as 
Kant's text seems to be to the interpreter. While he does 
develop the idea of a world republic as something 
republican states might choose to form in the future, he 
still says at the end of his analysis that "the true 
Kantian endorses a free federation of states."123 And when 
he does discuss the world republic, he says that 
sovereignty in foreign affairs is all that states would 
have to give up while sovereignty over their own citizens 
would remain intact. It is clear that the continued 
autonomy of states and the need for all of them to adopt a 
republican constitution are in the forefront of Cavallar's 
analysis. His struggle to reconcile this predominant 
interpretive thrust with an otherwise isolated passage is 
admirable, but not particularly clear. Still, this
interpretation is an interesting 'outlier' to consider 
during a historical period where commentators of the text 
interpret in very similar ways.
122Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 474.
123Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations," p. 480.
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The Kantian World View: An Important Interpretation by Jiirg 
Martin Gabriel
Jurg Martin Gabriel in his 1994 book World Views and 
Theories of International Relations discusses every 
Preliminary and Definitive Article in relative detail. 
After mentioning that the Abbe de Saint Pierre "drafted a 
complete charter for an international organization" and 
that this charter was "different from Kant's plan in every 
respect," he moves into a discussion of the Preliminary 
Articles.124 He says that the "preliminary articles 
indicate what should be avoided" and that "they represent 
the negative conditions for peace."125 While he believes 
the Definitive Articles contain the most important plans 
for peace, he does offer commentary on the Preliminary 
Articles.
As for the First Preliminary Article, "No treaty of 
peace shall be regarded as valid, if made with the secret 
reservation of material for a future war," Gabriel notes 
that "Eliminating secret reservations strengthens peace . .
124Jurg Martin Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories of 
International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press,
Inc., 1994), p. 51.
125Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 52.
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and it constitutes a step away from the realist 
conception of international politics where peace is but an 
interlude between wars."126 Gabriel then mentions that the 
Second Preliminary Article, which prevents the state from 
being acquired by another through "inheritance, exchange, 
purchase or donation" and thus preserves the right of the 
state to an independent existence, "actually postulates the 
right of self-determination which, of course, runs counter 
to the tradition prevailing at that time."127 As this is a 
"big step" according to Gabriel, Kant makes sure to note 
that this Article, unlike the First, need not be 
"instituted immediately."128 In the Third Preliminary 
Article, wherein Kant states that "Standing armies shall be 
abolished in the course of time," Gabriel makes the 
important point, and certainly one relevant to this phase 
of Pattern Two, that despite his aversion to standing 
armies, "Kant does not call for disarmament" here.129 
Importantly for Gabriel, Kant "rejects pacifism and does 
not argue that arms create war."130 In obvious reference to
126Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 52.
127Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 52.
128Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 52.
129Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 53.
130Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 53.
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the First Definitive Article, Gabriel notes in his 
commentary to the Third Preliminary Article that "As will 
become more evident later on, [Kant] sees social 
organization as the chief source of war."131
Finally, Gabriel explains that "If perpetual peace is 
to be established it is more important to change the nature 
of states than to eliminate weapons."132 These last two 
points by Gabriel clearly position him as an interpreter 
(like most post-1983 interpreters) who demonstrates that 
domestic political organization is important to Kant in 
Perpetual Peace in creating the conditions for peace. As 
will be seen, he elaborates on this point in his discussion 
of both the First and Second Definitive Articles. His 
commentary on the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Preliminary 
Articles is, on the whole, conventional and need not 
interfere with the more relevant interpretation he offers 
of the First and Second Definitive Articles.
Gabriel believes the Definitive Articles "contain the 
positive factors" or as he says "the dos rather than the 
don'ts" and, more than any other part of Perpetual Peace,
131Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 53.
132Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 53.
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"are generally known and have made the study so famous."133 
First, he "sums up Kant's view of republicanism" adopted by 
the First Definitive Article by saying that "it is a state 
based on the rule of law, on the separation of legislature 
and executive, on representation and, ideally, on a single 
ruler."134 Since "Power is divided and limited in numerous 
ways and cannot be misused" in Kant's republic, "self- 
discipline is imposed upon the state and promotes peace."135 
He then notes that "Consent of the governed is particularly 
crucial" and goes on to quote in full the 'consent of the 
citizens' selection that describes this idea.136 He 
explains that "This passage shows how much Kant believes in 
the potential for reason in man: people are able to weigh 
the costs and benefits of war, and they come to the 
conclusion that peace is rational while war is not."137
133Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, pp. 54-55.
134Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 55.
135Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 55.
136Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 56. While 
Gabriel calls it "crucial" here, James Lee Ray, in a book
about the 'liberal peace' written during this same period, 
refers to the 'consent of the citizens' selection from 
Perpetual Peace as "The essence of Kant's argument that 
democracy is an important force for peace." James Lee Ray, 
Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the 
Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia, S.C.: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1995), p. 1.
137Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 56.
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Simply put, "If they have a voice in government their views 
will prevail and wars will end."138 This, however, is not 
true of the "absolutist ruler" who "'is not a citizen . . .
and does not lose a whit by the war.'"139
Just as Gabriel explores the practical reason for
adopting republican government in the First Definitive
Article like many before him, so he adopts a view of Kant's 
suggested federation that definitely aligns him with other 
interpreters from this time. According to Gabriel, "Such a 
federation, for Kant, is not a supranational organization 
or a world state. A world state would contradict the basic 
objective of his plan, which consists not only in achieving 
perpetual peace but also in maintaining the sovereignty, 
independence and liberty of all republican states."140
Instead of a world state, Gabriel understands Kant to 
advocate "only a loose and informal alliance of republican 
states."141 Furthermore, he says the text "never calls for 
the creation of an international organization, and he
certainly does not use the term 'League of Nations.'"142
138Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 56.
139Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 56.
140Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 56.
141Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 56.
249
This plainly distinguishes Gabriel's interpretation from 
those that reveal Pattern One, Phases One and Two.
In final analysis, Gabriel remarks that Kant "places 
great faith in the inherent peacefulness of republican 
government, and in this respect is a typical second-image 
theorist," using Kenneth Waltz's now familiar category.143 
Not viewing the text as calling for a world state or 
international organization, Gabriel concludes that the 
"centerpiece of [Kant's] scheme is an enlightened state 
image."144 He ends his discussion of the text with the 
following comments that are as good as any in summing up 
the thread that holds the interpretations within this 
chapter together. Gabriel succinctly writes that "Given 
the benevolent nature of republican government, the lives 
of such states are peaceful and order in anarchy becomes 
possible. Domestic politics determines international
politics, the primacy of domestic policy is assured. 
Republicanism produces a convergence of national interests 
that guarantees perpetual peace."145 "Order in anarchy"
142Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 56.
143Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 58.
144Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, pp. 57-58.
145Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories, p. 58.
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seems a helpful way to describe a pattern that sees peace 
achieved at, not above, the state level.
Charles Covell's 'Statist' Reading of the Text
Charles Covell begins his discussion of Kant's 
Perpetual Peace with the assertion that the First 
Definitive Article and the significance it places on the 
republican constitution "occupied a very important position 
in Kant's explanation of how a lasting peace was to be 
achieved between states in the international sphere."146 
Further, he states, "The idea of the republican 
constitution was central to Kant's argument in Perpetual 
Peace."141 After a general discussion of the nature of 
liberal republican government for Kant, including its 
clearly representative aspect and commitment to the 
separation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches, Covell turns to the Preliminary Articles. He
146Charles Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of 
Justice in the International Order, Studies in the History 
of International Relations, Band 1 (Munster; Hamburg: Lit,
1994), p. 23.
147Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice,
p. 25.
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lists them without commentary, then discusses the ideas 
that "inform" them.148
First, the Third Preliminary Article, which "called 
for the gradual abolition of standing armies, looked 
forward to the principle, widely accepted by statesmen and 
policy-makers in the contemporary world, that international 
peace must depend not upon the maintenance of a balance of 
military power between states, but upon the preparedness of 
states to give up voluntarily, and on a permanent basis, 
the means at their disposal to wage aggressive war."149 In 
terms of determining whether he adopts a ' statist' reading 
of the text, Covell offers "another idea informing the 
preliminary articles, and one which requires special 
emphasis in connection with the concerns of the present 
monograph."150 Covell explains: "This is the idea that the
basic institutional element of an international order 
committed to perpetual peace had to be the institution of 
the sovereign state."151
148Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 27.
149Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 27.
150Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 27.
151Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 27.
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He then points to the Fifth Preliminary Article, which 
posits the duty of non-interference. According to Covell, 
this Article "underlined the respects in which the law of 
nations must be founded in principles enshrining the 
freedom and independence essential to the sovereignty of 
the state."152
Covell' s 'statist' reading stems not only from his 
look at the Preliminary Articles, but from the three 
Definitive Articles as well. As he states most
significantly, "Kant's commitment to the principle of the 
freedom and independence of the sovereign state is 
everywhere apparent in his statement and explanation of the 
three definitive articles of perpetual peace."153 Covell is 
especially convinced that the Second Definitive Article 
suggests the requirement of a sovereign state to achieve 
perpetual peace. He remarks, "It is the second definitive 
article of perpetual peace which brings out most clearly 
the value and importance that Kant assigned to the 
principle of state sovereignty."154 Covell elaborates
152Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
pp. 27-28.
153Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice,
p. 28.
154Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice,
p. 29.
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further, "it is this article which underlines that Kant did 
not consider that the founding of an international order 
committed to lasting peace required the separate states to 
relinquish the rights and powers which defined their 
freedom and independence as states."155 As Kant fully
rejected the "international state, or a state of all the 
nations" according to Covell, so he accepted a federation 
in its place.156 "The essence" of this federation "was not 
an international government structure that compromised the 
freedom and independence of the states that were its
members" but "the general treaty or agreement among the
member states through which the federation was brought into 
being, and then maintained in being in perpetuity."157
The distinctive point Covell makes here is that "the 
treaty establishing the pacific federation possessed the 
character of the standard treaty in that it involved an
agreement between states which actually presupposed their 
autonomy and independence."158 One of the final comments he
155Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 29.
156Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 29.
157Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice,
p. 30.
158Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice,
p. 30.
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makes on the Second Definitive Article sounds as if it came
straight from Hinsley. The following passage certainly 
establishes, once and for all, Covell's 'statist' 
credentials:
For Kant, then, the founding of the law of 
nations, and hence the founding of an international 
order committed to perpetual peace, depended not upon 
the existence of a system of international government, 
but upon the voluntary acceptance by independent 
states of a rule of law which could not, as a matter 
of definition, be enforced or otherwise supported by 
any institutions whose rights, powers and 
organizational structure were analogous to those that 
embodied the sovereign independence of the state.159
159Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 30. Covell also re-af firms this in another similar 
passage in Chapter Three of his book:
For Kant, no international order could promote a 
lasting peace between states which required the 
separate states to surrender their sovereign 
independence to an international state, or to a world 
government. Hence, he insisted that international 
peace could come about only through the voluntary 
acceptance by states of an international rule of law, 
where this rule of law presupposed, as the condition 
of its own legitimacy, the retention by the states 
that accepted its authority of the rights that were 
essential to their sovereignty and independence. 
Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice, 
p. 71 (emphasis in original).
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II. Subsidiary Interpretations
Brief Analyses of the Text by Daniele Archibugi and Michael 
Williams
The following concise accounts offer relatively state-
centric readings of Kant's text and a focus on the
importance of like-minded, homogenous states to Kant's 
peaceful alliance. Daniele Archibugi, writing in 1992,
explains that "For the first time" among many peace 
projects, Kant's First Definitive Article tells us that "if 
international peace is to be 'perpetual,' it must imply a 
homogeneity of the political constitutions of the 
individual states, the model for which is to be sought in 
the republic."160 Archibugi then follows the typical line 
of interpreters during this period by selecting for direct 
quotation the 'consent of the citizens' passage from Kant's 
text. Archibugi's explanation is that "Since republican
government involves the direct participation of citizens in 
the management of public affairs, it will necessarily be
160Daniele Archibugi, "Models of International 
Organization in Perpetual Peace Projects," Review of 
International Studies 18 (1992), p. 311.
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peaceful."161 As for the Second Definitive Article, 
Archibugi states that Kant opts for the "diffused model" of 
international organization and, as such, "supports the 
existence of both autonomous states and a voluntary 
confederation of states."162 Importantly, Archibugi
believes "the truly significant article" of Kant's 
Perpetual Peace is the Third Definitive Article. Yet even 
under the notion of Cosmopolitan Law, "States continue to 
enjoy full sovereignty and are invited to voluntarily join 
an international confederation."163
Michael C. Williams, in his article "Reason and 
Realpolitik: Kant's Critique of International Politics,"
has equally little to say about Perpetual Peace. As far as 
"Kant's vision" goes for Williams, he is sure that "Each 
state remains independent" and that "this is not a call for 
world government."164 Instead, "each state recognizes the 
basis for its independence to be its recognition of the
161Archibugi, "Models of International Organization,"
p. 311.
162Archibugi, "Models of International Organization,"
p. 312.
163Archibugi, "Models of International Organization,"
p. 312.
164Michael C. Williams, "Reason and Realpolitik: Kant's 
Critique of International Politics," Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 25 (March 1992), p. 110.
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rights of other states and their mutual recognition of its 
own."165 There will be a "slow but gradual extension of 
this mutual recognition, beginning with a small number of 
like-minded states and eventually encompassing the entire 
globe."166
Otfried Hoffe's Biography of Kant, an Interpretation by 
Jens Bartleson, and a Brief Look at the Eighth 
International Kant Congress
The German writer Otfried Hoffe has written a 1992 
biography of Immanuel Kant. Though Hoffe gives little 
attention to Kant's international political theory, 
choosing to focus instead on his more widely known 
critical, moral, and legal philosophy, he has a few words 
to say about Perpetual Peace. He states, "Kant's essay On 
Eternal Peace thus has the form of a contract describing 
the legitimacy and principles of the voluntary union of all 
nations which reason demands."167 Such a "union, or league,
165Williams, "Reason and Realpolitik," pp. 110-11.
166Williams, "Reason and Realpolitik," p. 111. 
Williams references Doyle's 1983 article after making this 
comment.
167Otfried Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, translated by Marshall 
Farrier (Originally published in German by G.H. Beck'sche
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of all nations should not take the form of a world 
government, which would lead to unfettered despotism."168 
Instead, Hoffe understands the text to suggest, "The league
of nations has no sovereign power which would allow it to
interfere in a nation's internal affairs."169 At most, Kant 
promises "a federation of free nations which all have 
republican constitutions."170
Jens Bartleson, from the University of Stockholm, 
would agree with Hoffe's assessment. Writing in 1995, 
Bartleson explains that "the creation of such a federation 
would anticipate the coming of perpetual peace, but it 
would not aim to acquire any power or authority over and 
above each constituent state. It would aim solely to 
preserve the autonomy of each state, as long as this is
compatible with the equal autonomy of every other 
confederated state."171 If no coercive power exists above 
separate states to prevent conflict between them, then
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1992; Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1994), p. 187.
168Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, p. 187.
169Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, p. 187.
170Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, p. 187.
171Jens Bartleson, "The Trial of Judgment: A Note on
Kant and the Paradoxes of Internationalism," International 
Studies Quarterly 39 (1995), p. 266.
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according to Bartleson's reading of Kant "the effective 
realization of this federation depends on the internal 
perfection of states."172 Bartleson's understanding of the 
process by which states perfect themselves internally 
deserves mention. This explanation, in detail, prefaces 
the 'consent of the citizens' passage:
The will of the state must be brought to coincide 
with the will of the people through a constitution 
derived from an original social contract. Sovereignty 
must be depersonalized and dispersed throughout the 
entire body politic. Rousseau's general will, which 
Kant elevates into a principle of reason, must be 
reflected in public law, permeate political 
institutions, and provide the touchstone for 
particular political decisions. Only a constitution 
derived from an original contract based on the idea of 
general will can spur the gradual cultivation of men 
into citizens by means of civic education and 
political liberty.173
Such a political constitution then allows for the rationale 
behind the 'consent of the citizens' passage to work 
successfully to serve peaceful ends. As Bartleson states 
exactly before he quotes Kant from this passage: "Only such
a state will be inclined to seek peace."174
With this next remark by Bartleson, there is no 
question he falls into line with other interpreters from
172Bartleson, "The Trial of Judgment," p. 266.
173Bartleson, "The Trial of Judgment," p. 266.
174Bartleson, "The Trial of Judgment," p. 266.
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this period. He states that "Where international right 
prescribes what ought to be done in relations between 
states, political right prescribes what ought to be done 
within states. Taken together, internal perfection and a 
free federation are necessary conditions of perpetual 
peace."175 Like other interpreters from this time, 
Bartleson integrates the First and Second Definitive 
Articles through a reading of the text, which understands 
peace between states to be determined by the internal 
perfection of states. In essence, the adoption of
republican constitution within a group of several states 
will lead to a voluntary federation of them as peaceful 
neighbors, though neighbors that maintain their sovereignty 
and independence vis-a-vis each other.
The Eighth International Kant Congress was held in
1995. Scholars from Western Europe, North America, Eastern 
Europe, Asia and Latin America gathered to "commemorate the 
two hundredth anniversary of the publication of Kant's
essay, Zum ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwurf
(Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project) 176
175Bartleson, "The Trial of Judgment," p. 267.
176Allen Wood, "Kant's Project for Perpetual Peace" in 
Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, 
Memphis 1995, Volume One (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1995), p. 3.
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After research into several of the Kant Congresses over 
past years, I discovered very little consideration of
Kant's Perpetual Peace until this one.177 Though I will not
discuss any of the papers given at the Congress, it is 
significant enough to note that six of seven
interpretations acknowledge that Kant's Perpetual Peace is 
anti-world government and in favor of a voluntary
federation of republican states that exists principally to 
protect the sovereignty of each member.178
177In addition to the more relevant Eighth 
International Kant Congress, the following Kant Congresses 
were considered in my research: L.W. Beck, ed., Proceedings 
of the Third International Kant Congress, Two Volumes 
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1972);
Gerhard Funke & Thomas M. Seebohm, eds., Proceedings of 
the Sixth International Kant Congress, Two Volumes 
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1989) .
178The following papers from the Eighth International 
Kant Congress that generally discuss Perpetual Peace can be 
found in Hoke Robinson, ed. , Proceedings of the Eighth 
International Kant Congress, Two Volumes (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1995): Sharon Byrd, "Perpetual
Peace: A 20th Century Project," pp. 343-57; Sharon Byrd,
"The State as a 'Moral Person,"' pp. 171-89; Georg 
Geismann, "On the Philosophically Unique Realism of Kant's 
Doctrine of Eternal Peace," pp. 273-89; Paul Guyer, 
"Nature, Morality and the Possibility of Peace," pp. 51-69; 
Ludwig Siep, "Kant and Hegel on Peace and International 
Law," pp. 259-72; Harry Van der Linden, "Kant: the Duty to 
Promote International Peace and Political Intervention," 
pp. 71-79; Allen Wood, "Kant's Project for Perpetual 
Peace," pp. 3-18.
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A Return to the Anglo-American Study of International 
Relations: Interpretations by Kenneth W. Thompson and
Cecilia Lynch
Kenneth W. Thompson's well-known book Fathers of 
International Thought includes a small section on Kant and 
Perpetual Peace. After summarizing his metaphysics and 
moral philosophy, Thompson turns to the First Definitive 
Article of Perpetual Peace to discuss Kant's contribution 
to political thought. He states that Kant's "first 
definitive article for a perpetual peace is republican 
government in nation-states around the world."179 First, 
Thompson likens the Kantian state of nature to that of 
Hobbes' where the "natural condition of men living side by 
side in nature is a state of war."180 For Thompson, "to 
change this condition . . . It is not enough to end
hostility."181 Instead, "the civil constitutions of every 
state must be republican."182 Thompson then seeks to 
explain Kant's reason for choosing a republican
179Kenneth W. Thompson, Fathers of International 
Thought, The Legacy of Political Theory (Baton Rouge & 
London: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), p. 108.
180Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, p. 108.
181Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, p. 108.
182Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, p. 108.
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constitution over all others and, more specifically, why 
republican constitutions established across the globe would 
be more likely to end war. Essentially, Thompson does 
little more than offer the 'consent of the citizens' 
passage. After quoting from that passage, Thompson then 
makes the important point that Kant is advocating liberal 
republicanism, not democracy, as the best possible 
political option. A representative government with a 
separation of powers, which is the "only system of 
government which makes republicanism possible," is far more 
likely to calm "an inflamed public or assembly" that "can 
sometimes be more belligerent and uncompromising than a 
monarchy or aristocratic regime."183
Consistent with interpreters writing during this 
period, Thompson sees the federation of states Kant 
advocates in the Second Definitive Article as responsible
for one, and only one, function --  the preservation of the
sovereign state. He first explains, "Nations, like 
individuals in a state of nature, live in fear of one 
another paradoxically because they are neighbors."184 "For 
Kant," the only "way out" is "unambiguously a federation of
183Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, pp. 108-
09.
184Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, p. 110.
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states."185 He states that the "aim of such a federation . 
. . would not be to gain power or coerce individual states"
but "simply to secure and preserve the freedom of each 
state."186
Cecelia Lynch focuses very little on the text of 
Perpetual Peace, but offers general commentary about the 
treatise that is worthy of a closer look. The title of her 
1994 article, "Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral 
Guidance in International Law," says a lot in itself. Many 
of the post-1983 interpreters of Kant's treatise readily 
point out Kant's disdain for democracy and his advocacy of 
republican, representative government. Still, when giving 
him credit as the intellectual forebear of the idea of the 
'liberal peace,' they never make what would seem to be the 
more consistent claim if being true to his work is 
important. This is simply that the intellectual father of 
the 'liberal peace' should receive his just dessert by 
reference to his brainchild as the 'republican peace.' 
Cecelia Lynch does this in the first instance. As she 
states in her initial paragraph:
185Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, p. 110.
186Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, pp. 110-
11.
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Not only has Kant's thought provided the 
underpinnings of one of the major traditions of 
international law, but there is a groundswell of 
interest among international relations scholars today 
in the question of whether contemporary events, 
particularly the proliferation of republican states 
and attempts to create them, signal the march forward 
to the Kantian ideal of republican peace.187
Further, she states that "The fashionable return to Kant 
has done much to demonstrate that domestic factors play a 
far greater role in decisions about foreign policy than
realist analysis has allowed, and that the behavior of
certain types of states toward each other does indeed go 
against the predictions of structural realists."188
Though she discusses several aspects of the 
'republican peace7 after these initial introductory 
statements and their relationship to Kant7s thought, her 
focus on the text of Perpetual Peace is spotty. Regarding 
the Second Definitive Article, her only remark is that 
"most analysts now agree that Kant7s aversion to despotism 
would proscribe any such teleology [a world government] and 
that the most stringent limitation on international anarchy 
that Kant could envision was a voluntary federation of
187Lynch, "Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral
Guidance in International Law,7 p. 39.
188Lynch, "Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral
Guidance in International Law,7 pp. 40-41.
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republican states."189 The selection she chooses to quote 
from the First Definitive Article is the ubiquitous salute 
to the practical reason why representative democracy is the 
best political system for avoiding war. Before quoting the 
'consent of the citizens' passage, she comments on Doyle's 
earlier thesis and remarks that "the most often quoted or 
paraphrased passage from Kant by contemporary theorists of 
the liberal peace is the following: If the consent of the
citizens is required in order to decide that war should be 
declared . . . etc."190 Though she discusses the Second
Preliminary Article in connection with Kant's "caution 
against interventionism," the rest of her essay is general 
commentary on Kant's moral philosophy and philosophy of 
history.191
189Lynch, "Kant, the Republican Peace,
Guidance in International Law," p. 41.
190Lynch, "Kant, the Republican Peace,
Guidance in International Law," pp. 45-46.
191Lynch, "Kant, the Republican Peace,
Guidance in International Law," p. 54.
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Conclusion
This group of interpretations of Kant's Perpetual 
Peace, specifically the principal interpretations discussed 
above, continues the themes developed in Doyle's original 
interpretation into the 1990s. As stated in the
Introduction to this chapter, a high concentration of 
interpretations were written during this period and I have 
argued that a majority of them view the First Definitive 
Article as central to Kant's solution to the problem of war 
developed in Perpetual Peace. The 'consent of the
citizens' passage --  the practical reason for adopting the
republican constitution --  becomes crucial to
understanding the most important recommendations of Kant's 
treatise for these interpreters. Further, these
interpreters defend a 'state-centric' reading of the Second 
Definitive Article. Even if they suggest a voluntary 
federation, association or alliance of states to develop, 
they clearly point out that there will be no 'teeth' in 
these entities and that the only reason for their existence 
is to protect and preserve the sovereignty of each state. 
Interpretations from this period enhance the argument for a 
second phase of Pattern Two.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
PATTERN TWO, PHASE TWO: SOVEREIGNTY PRESERVED III.
ACCENT ON THE FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE THROUGH THE END OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Introduction
This chapter explores a final collection of 
interpretations of Kant's Perpetual Peace and considers a 
relatively small group of interpreters. It initially 
discusses the evolution of thoughts on Perpetual Peace by 
three writers who have written about the text more than 
once since the second phase of Pattern Two began to take 
shape with the appearance of Doyle's article in 1983. This 
section of the chapter demonstrates that, within this 
period under consideration, several writers who consider 
Perpetual Peace a second (or even a third time in one 
instance) generally stay consistent in their 
interpretations of the treatise. If anything, they embrace 
a more 'state-centric' view of the text and place greater 
importance on the practical reason for adopting the First 
Definitive Article in their most recent interpretations to 
date. Their readings of the text offer even greater 
support for the argument that a second phase of Pattern Two 
has solidified by the second half of the 1990s. The last
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half of the chapter closes the analysis of interpretations 
of Perpetual Peace with a discussion of several 
commentaries on the treatise that have appeared in the last 
two years, including one by the prominent American 
political philosopher John Rawls. These carry the argument 
of pattern formation up to the present.
Evolution of Thoughts on Perpetual Peaces Interpretations 
by Howard Williams
Over the past two decades, Howard Williams has 
published more articles on Kant's international theory than 
any other scholar in the field of International Relations. 
Each of his writings focuses primarily on Perpetual Peace. 
As will be shown, Williams' interpretations from 1983 to 
1996 become progressively more state-centric.
His first interpretation is from his 1983 book Kant's 
Political Philosophy. In a sense, this interpretation lays 
the foundation for those that follow, though each 
interpretation evolves ever so slightly from its 
predecessor. Here, he covers almost every aspect of the 
Preliminary Articles, the First Definitive Article, and the 
Second Definitive Article. In his Introduction to Chapter 
Ten which he entitles "Kant's Plan for International Peace:
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the Highest Political Good and the Highest Moral Good," his 
analysis begins, much like his contemporary Doyle does, 
with the following statement: "Kant holds that the problems 
of internal order within states and the problems of 
external order amongst states are inextricably linked and, 
thus, the supposed division between domestic and 
international politics is an artificial one."1 This is a 
key statement found throughout interpretations that reveal 
Pattern Two, Phase Two and distinguish it from those that 
reveal Pattern Two, Phase One. Again, its origins are 
rooted in the emphasis these interpreters place on the
practical argument within the First Definitive Article --
peace between each sovereign state will result if there is 
republican government in place within each state. Before 
discussing his understanding of the First Definitive 
Article, it is important to consider his understanding of 
the Preliminary Articles, which clearly begin to establish 
some 'statist7 credentials.
In explanation of Preliminary Articles One, Five and 
Six, which must be "applied immediately,7 Williams remarks 
that "There is no possibility of building up trust amongst 
states if leaders are not prepared to honor existing peace
toward Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (New 
York: St. Martin7s Press, 1983), p. 244.
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treaties, and the sovereignty and independence of other 
states."2 Of all the articles, Williams believes the Second 
Preliminary Article, which states that "No independently 
existing state, whether it be large or small, may be 
acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, 
purchase or gift," is "the most important of the 
preliminary articles."3 He further explains that "This 
article sets the tone for the kind of international society 
that Kant hopes to see, namely, one in which the autonomy, 
as well as interdependence, of states is respected."4 After 
quoting directly from Kant's commentary to the article, 
which essentially describes the historically independent 
state as "a moral personality" never to be ruled by another 
state, Williams asserts, "The universally recognized 
independence of states must be the basis for world peace."5 
His final point regarding the Second Preliminary Article is 
that "we cannot expect progress at all if the fundamental 
principle of the autonomy of states is not recognized."6
2Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 246.
3Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 250.
4Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 250.
5Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 250.
6Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 250.
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Williams' above reading of the Preliminary Articles 
initially projects a state-centric view of Kant's treatise. 
Still, he has more to say about the First and Second 
Definitive Articles, which to a small extent, seems to call 
into question his commitment to this interpretive outlook. 
With regard to the First Definitive Article, Williams 
states, "A republican constitution [required by the 
article] rests on the assumption that each citizen gives
his consent to the actions of the sovereign through being
directly or indirectly represented in the legislature."7 
The importance of this is that "The citizen can in a moral 
sense, therefore, regard all laws as emanating from his 
will. Equally, he can regard the actions of the executive
as susceptible to his control because it can only act
within the confines of laws framed by the citizen's 
representatives."8 From here, Williams reaches Kant's
'consent of the citizens' passage. Williams states that 
the representative aspect of republican government "in
Kant's view, furnishes a powerful lever of control over 
governments, and curbs their aggressive instincts."9 As 
"those who have to bear the brunt of the financial and
7Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 254.
8Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 2 54.
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human costs of war have the power to decide whether or not 
they wish to prosecute the war."10
As Williams begins discussion of the Second Definitive 
Article, he first notes, "Positive law requires the 
existence of a sovereign authority to ensure that all 
illegal acts are justly punished, but Kant's notion of a 
federation of free states appears to contradict the idea of 
one sovereign authority."11 Williams remarks, "He [Kant] 
puts great stress on the fact that the federation he has in 
mind 'would not be the same thing as an international 
state.'"12 Instead, "Kant's object" in Perpetual Peace "is 
to advocate the gradual coming together of independent 
nations into one international organization without 
sovereign powers."13 This is because "the federation as it 
develops and grows [should] not be a completely sovereign 
body, as each nation's need for an identity and 
independence has to be respected."14
9Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 254.
10Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 254.
i:LWilliams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 254.
12Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 254.
13Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 255.
14Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 258.
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Yet Williams makes the further point that "the seeds
of an international state can be sown even in an
international system made up of sovereign states."15 He 
says this because he believes, at least in this first
article, that Kant "is both advocating an international 
state as the ultimate goal, but not advocating it as
something to be realized in the immediate or near future."16 
Though he still regards the international state as an
"unattainable ideal" for Kant, he says it should be "an
objective to put to the back of our minds" when dealing 
with the treatise.17
What is confusing for the reader of his book is that 
he immediately reverts back to his initial view that Kant 
"does not place much stress on such organizational
initiatives" in his proposals to bring about perpetual 
peace.18 Instead, Williams, in the final section of his
essay, sounds much like Pattern Two, Phase One interpreters 
writing during the very recent years before his 1983 
publication who rely on Kant's philosophy of history as the 
ultimate guarantor of peace. Even more baffling is
15Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, pp. 255-56.
16Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 256.
17Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 256.
18Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 259.
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William's Footnote 13 where he states that "What F.H. 
Hinsley says in his book, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, 
is essentially true, namely, that for Kant 'it was no more 
logical to hope to solve the international problem by the 
supersession of states than it would have been logical to 
try to end the civil state of nature by abolition of 
individuals.'"19 I do not see how he can successfully weave 
this clear anti-international state position (along with 
all others he sets out above) into an interpretation that 
also seems to see the international state as Kant's 
ultimate ideal without being contradictory.
Williams' first interpretation of Kant's Perpetual 
Peace is puzzling and, to say the least, a difficult one to 
fully grasp. To his credit, even Williams does not seem 
completely confident in his assessment. He refers to his 
thorough anti-international state reading (gathered from 
the Preliminary Articles and the Second Definitive Article) 
together with the pro-international state reading he offers 
towards the end of his analysis as a "paradox."20 When we 
get to his second work on the subject of Perpetual Peace in 
1992, we see Williams drop the pro-international state
19Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 269.
20Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 256.
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reading almost completely. And by the third article, 
written in 1996, he presents a reading of the text as 
'statist' as any this thesis has discussed so far.
Williams begins Chapter Eight of his 1992 book 
International Relations in Political Theory in the same way 
as his previous interpretation. He explains, "For Kant the 
problems of internal political order and external political 
relations cannot be separated."21 In order to avoid 
repeating what has already been stated plainly above, it is 
important to note that this second interpretation is based 
almost entirely, sometimes even word for word, on the first 
interpretation. There is no need to re-visit his thoughts 
on the Preliminary Articles in this interpretation. Also, 
his understanding of the First Definitive Article 
demonstrates little change of heart as well. In accordance 
with one of the aims of his book, which is to demonstrate 
the relationship between classical political theory and 
political history, he does suggest that the United States 
constitution more likely resembles Kant's republican 
constitution than any other.22 This is because of its
21Howard Williams, International Relations in Political 
Theory (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992), p. 80.
22Williams, International Relations in Political 
Theory, p. 87.
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representative aspect and the separation of powers that 
exists between the executive and legislative branches. He 
additionally states that the "right of declaring war was 
further enshrined as a power of the congress in the United
States in the early 1970s" and that such "a stress on the
right of the people would probably meet with Kant's strong 
approval.//23
As for the Second Definitive Article, Williams gives 
almost no attention to his earlier claim that the 
international state is an ideal towards which all states 
should move. He explains, "Kant puts great stress on the
fact that the federation he has in mind would not be the
same thing as an international state."24 According to 
Williams, Kant is concerned with the difficulty of ruling 
such a genuinely large area with one central government and 
therefore sees such a state as impossible to establish. He 
uses the example of the USSR in the 1990s where due to "its 
sheer size the control of the centre over the periphery 
unavoidably declines."25 Instead, he is convinced that the
23Williams, International Relations in Political
Theory, p . 88.
24Williams, International Relations in Political
Theory, p . 88.
25Williams, International Relations in Political
Theory, p . 88.
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sole "object of the [Kantian] federation is rather to 
safeguard the independence and maintain the security of the 
individual states."26 Further, it shall be "without 
sovereign powers.//27
Moving to his final interpretation, the first comment 
that Williams makes regarding Perpetual Peace (and it must 
be acknowledged that this chapter within the 1996 book 
Classical Theories of International Relations is co- 
authored by Ken Booth) is that "The sufficient factor for 
Kant [in the determination of peace] . . . is a states-
system comprised of states with republican constitutions."28 
This statement encompasses both the First and Second 
Definitive Articles.
Concerning the First Definitive Article, Williams 
notes, echoing his former interpretations and the views of 
many other interpreters during this period, that "Kant saw 
a close relationship between bad governments at home and
26Williams, International Relations in Political
Theory, p. 89.
27Williams, International Relations in Political
Theory, p. 88.
28Howard Williams & Ken Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond
Limits" in Ian Clark & Iver B. Neuman, eds., Classical
Theories of International Relations (Houndsmills,
Basingstroke & London: MacMillan Press, 1996), p. 81.
279
aggression in external policy."29 He explains that unlike 
the "sharp dividing line between 'domestic' and 'foreign' 
policy' . . . traditionally drawn" in International
Relations theory, Kant "emphasises the intimate 
relationship not only between internal and external in 
terms of an individual country's foreign policy, but also 
in terms of the character of the international system."30
Still, the most relevant comparison is between 
Williams' views on the Second Definitive Article in the 
prior two interpretations and what there is to say here. 
He first recognizes the similarities between the Hobbesian 
state of nature and the Kantian state of nature. He 
remarks, "For Kant, as for Hobbes, the state of nature was 
one of war."31 "The response of Hobbes" of course "was for 
individuals to submit to the Leviathan of the sovereign 
state, which by definition turned the international arena 
itself into a state of nature, since the sovereign state 
and international anarchy are two sides of the same coin."32
29Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
89.
30Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
89.
31Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
90.
32Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
90.
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But what does Kant say? What does he recommend to the 
world to replace the anarchy between states that has 
resulted? According to Williams, "Given Kant's
cosmopolitan perspective with common humanity as his 
referent, it might have been expected that his recommended 
global polity would be one of world government."33 He 
continues by saying that Kant not only "rejected this" but 
actually "believed that perpetual peace must be based on 
free, equal and independent states."34 Finally, Williams 
offers a most potent observation, especially in comparison 
to his original musings on the subject. He states, "In 
this and in other respects Kant is more statist than his 
reputation would suggest."35
What are we to make of the three Williams' 
interpretations? It could be said that the last one is not 
his since it was co-authored. This might be a good 
argument except for the fact that many of his statements 
throughout the final interpretation follow his former 
interpretations word for word. The best answer is simply
33Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
90.
34Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
90.
35Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
90.
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that his thought has evolved over time. It is clear though 
that his final look at the treatise yields an 
interpretation quite similar to those already discussed 
(and those yet to come).
Interpretation through the mid-1990s: Michael Doyle and
Charles Covell Revisited
Before examining what Michael Doyle and Charles Covell 
have to say about Kant's Perpetual Peace the second time 
around (and to determine whether they remain consistent to 
their previous interpretations), three relatively brief 
mid-1990s interpretations need to be considered.
At the beginning of his paper on the subject, Wade L. 
Huntley asserts: "Much recent scholarship has focused upon
the apparent absence of war among liberal democratic states
  the liberal peace."36 He goes on saying, "To help
explain the phenomenon, many refer to the political 
writings of Immanuel Kant, and the central role he 
envisioned for the liberal republic as the foundation for
36Wade L. Huntley, "Kant's Third Image: Systemic
Sources of the Liberal Peace," International Studies 
Quarterly 40 (1996), p. 45.
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'perpetual peace.'"37 Huntley then considers the Three 
Definitive Articles. Regarding the First Definitive 
Article, he states, "Kant maintains that the republic, in 
addition to its domestic merits, also manifests an inherent 
inclination towards peace."38 After quoting the 'consent of 
the citizens' passage, Huntley remarks, "Kant clearly 
contends that republics will not initiate aggressive war."39
His next task is to show the important relationship 
between the First and Second Definitive Articles. In a 
first attempt, he explains, "To depict the specific 
circumstances under which republics can be more republican 
is the principal aim of Kant's second article, calling for 
a 'federation of free states.'"40 His view of the First and 
Second Definitive Articles is similar to many of his 
contemporaries. He believes that "this federation is 
possible only among republics, not states of any sort" and 
that "the extension of the rule of law among states depends 
upon extension of the rule of law within states."41 Yet 
what makes Huntley's interpretation so similar to those
37Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 45.
38Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 49.
39Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 50.
40Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 50.
41Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 50.
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that have come before his during this period is the 
statement that "Taken together [meaning the First and 
Second Definitive Articles], then, Kant is holding that 
establishing freedom and the rule of law domestically and 
internationally are mutually dependent, symbiotic processes
  and he is often credited as the first to insist
explicitly on this link."42
He is just as convinced that Kant "explicitly rejects 
the idea of a 'world state.'"43 Instead, "Kant contends
that nations can establish the rule of law among themselves 
without, as people must, an overarching authority."44 And
in what he calls "a key juncture in Kant's argument," he 
cites Hinsley, Gallie and Doyle in making the argument that 
"'The individual must impose the state on himself in order 
to remain free. In the same way, free federation for Kant 
was what the state must impose on itself while remaining
free.'"45 Huntley's final point concerning the Second 
Definitive Article is an important one. He maintains that, 
for Kant, "progress towards an international rule of law
42Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 50.
43Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 50.
44Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 51.
45Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 51 (emphasis in 
original).
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does not necessitate (and in fact contradicts) diminishing 
the sovereignty of power of separate states."46 In 
Huntley's words, "Kant departs far enough from the 
'domestic-international' analogy to hold that a rule of law 
can grow among sovereign states without centralized
authority."47 Once the rule of law in the form of a 
republican constitution is established within states, "the
'free federation' is ' self-enforcing' ---  in the same
manner (but to a greater degree) as is any republican 
constitution."48
In a 1997 book about Francis Fukuyama's The End of 
History and the Last Man, three authors discuss Kant's view 
of history in relation to Fukayama's work. They spend a 
small portion of a chapter discussing Perpetual Peace as 
well. Compared to the Idea of a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose, the authors state, "In this essay 
[Perpetual Peace] , Kant puts more emphasis on the role that
states themselves can play in the development of world
harmony."49 They then turn directly to the First Definitive
46Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 60.
47Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 60.
48Huntley, "Kant's Third Image," p. 60.
49Howard Williams, David Sullivan & Gwynn Matthews, 
Francis Fukayama and the End of History, Political
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Article. To it they mention, "The first definitive article 
of the essay on perpetual peace requires states to bring 
about republican constitutions" and that "By working 
towards a republican constitution within their states they 
can contribute to the gradual development of a peaceful 
world situation."50 Though they do not quote the 'consent 
of the citizens' passage directly, they make obvious 
reference to it in the following comment: "Kant believed
that republican states based on these principles would 
incline towards peace with their neighbours because their 
citizens would no longer be subject to oppressive rule, and 
because their representatives would have the responsibility 
for considering whether or not to declare war."51
Unlike the Idea of a Universal History, which the 
authors say "relies too much on the accidental and 
contingent" in efforts to make international progress 
towards peace, "Here [in Perpetual Peace] we have the 
notion of improved civil states which are able to set an 
example for other states to follow" as an alternative
Philosophy Now (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997), 
p. 12.
50Williams, Sullivan & Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and 
the End of History, p. 12.
51Williams, Sullivan & Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and 
the End of History, p. 13.
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"mechanism to lead to a more peaceful international 
order."52 And how do they say Kant's treatise suggests the 
achievement of this? Like other interpreters before, peace 
results from a combined implementation of the First and 
Second Definitive Articles. According to them, "Kant sees 
this as coming about through a loose federation of states 
which have republican constitutions or are developing 
them."53
Finally, Fareed Zakaria, a former Managing Editor of 
Foreign Affairs, makes reference to Kant's writing in a 
well-known 1997 article in the same periodical entitled 
"The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Though it is brief, he 
does focus on the 'consent of the citizens' selection from 
the First Definitive Article. Zakaria notes, "Kant, the 
original proponent of the democratic peace, contended that
in democracies, those who pay for wars --  that is, the
pu b l i c  make the decisions, so they are understandably
cautious."54 His other reference to Kant directly follows 
this when he explains Kant's dislike of pure democracy and
52Williams, Sullivan & Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and 
the End of History, pp. 12-13.
53Williams, Sullivan & Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and 
the End of History, p. 13.
54Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 
Foreign Affairs (November/December 1997), p. 36.
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his belief in a representative form of government including 
"a separation of powers, checks and balances, the rule of 
law, [and] protection of individual rights."55 Considering 
the context of his article, which deals with domestic 
problems that exist when democracies arrive on the scene 
without constitutional liberalism as essential partner, it 
is no wonder Zakaria does not discuss the Second Definitive 
Article. Still, his mention of the logic behind the 
'consent of the citizens7 passage is suggestive of a 
relationship between his and other interpretations of this 
period.
While analysis by these authors of Kant7s text is 
brief, they still place emphasis on those aspects of the 
text and interpret meanings therefrom in a very similar way 
to those writing before them in this period. Even more 
valuable is to look at those interpreters who return to 
Perpetual Peace after some years away from it. Both 
Michael Doyle and Charles Covell are examples of this and, 
as will be seen below, their second interpretations of 
Kant7s treatise are very similar to their first.
Michael Doyle7s initial comment, from his 1997 book 
Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism,
55Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,7 p. 37.
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is that "Kant's states continue to live in international
anarchy in the sense that there is no world government
  but this anarchy is tamed and made subject to law
rather than to fear and threat of war."56 After listing the 
Preliminary Articles and introducing the First Definitive
Article as one that mandates the formation of republican
constitution, he explains that the "pacific union" of 
liberal republics "is neither a single peace treaty ending 
one war nor a world state or state of nations."57 Further, 
exactly as he stated in his 1983 article, Kant "develops no 
systematic organizational embodiment of this treaty, 
presumably because he does not find institutionalization
conecessary."
Doyle stays completely true to his first 
interpretation. In fact, he adds little in the way of new 
insight into the text and presumably is satisfied with his 
first reading. Importantly though, even after fourteen 
years, he still recognizes that Perpetual Peace stands for 
the proposition that the autonomous republican state, not a
56Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism,
Liberalism, and Socialism (New York & London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1997), p. 254.
57Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, p. 258.
58Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, p. 258.
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centralized authority above the state, is the primary 
avenue to peace. Doyle remains one of the founding fathers 
of 'liberal peace' theory and he always acknowledges that 
his assumptions about this controversial idea rest on 
Kant's Perpetual Peace.
It may seem difficult for any interpreter to offer a 
more 'statist' reading of Perpetual Peace than Covell's 
first interpretation from 1994. Yet Covell's second 
interpretation completed in 1998, when looked at carefully, 
is an even more state-centric reading of the text than his 
first.
Covell begins with a discussion of the Preliminary 
Articles where he focuses almost exclusively on the Second 
and Fifth Preliminary Article throughout the discussion. 
After explaining that the "second preliminary article of 
perpetual peace laid down a principle of the law of nations 
which affirmed the freedom and independence of states," he 
makes the more important claim, for him at least, that "it 
is the fifth preliminary article that most clearly brings 
out that Kant conceived of the law of nations as a body of 
law that was to work to guarantee the rights of states
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which were essential to their freedom and independence."59 
Covell then refers to the "principle of non-interference" 
set for in the Fifth Preliminary Article as "unconditional 
and overriding."60 Finally, Covell states that "Not only 
did the principle of non-interference laid down in the 
article serve to guarantee the freedom and independence of 
states in regard to their internal constitution and 
government," it also "served to give recognition to the 
formal juridical equality of states, in the respect that 
the freedom from external interference it guaranteed to 
states was a freedom that was to be guaranteed to all 
states equally and without exception."61
While Covell's 'statist" reading begins to take shape 
with his look at the Preliminary Articles, his 
understanding of the First and Second Definitive Articles 
is where it takes hold. As important, he demonstrates the 
important relationship between the First and Second 
Definitive Articles.- He .initially states, "Kant's 
commitment to the republican constitution, as a
59Charles Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace: A Study in 
the Philosophy of International Law and International 
Relations (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998), p. 104.
60Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 104.
61Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 106.
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precondition for peace among men and states, was qualified 
by his commitment to what he conceived of as a founding 
juridical principle of the international order. This was 
the principle of the freedom and sovereign independence of 
states."62 Covell believes his commitment to the republican 
constitution, however, "occupies a central position in the 
argument of Perpetual Peace."63 Before offering to the 
reader the entire 'consent of the citizens' passage, he 
nicely summarizes it in the following way:
In a state based in the republican constitution, 
the consent of the citizen-body was required in order 
to decide whether or not the state should declare war. 
This consent would be difficult to obtain in such a 
state, for the citizens therein would not readily opt 
for war given that they would have to suffer the 
hardships and deprivations resulting from it. 
However, the situation was quite different in a state 
without a republican constitution (i.e. a despotism). 
For, here, the ruler of the state remained subject to 
virtually no constraints preventing him from waging 
war at his own arbitrary will and discretion.64
To the idea that domestic politics determines international 
politics, Covell adds, "it was Kant's view that the 
establishing of a lasting international peace required a 
fundamental transformation in the structure of internal
62Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 67.
63Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 67.
64Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 121.
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domestic political organization existing within states."65
This "vitally important feature of [Kant's] 
international thought," as Covell calls it, relates 
directly to Covell's understanding of the Second Definitive 
Article as one that advocates the preservation of the 
powers of the sovereign state as opposed to their 
limitation. An established republican constitution within 
a state necessarily makes it more peaceful, especially in 
its relationship to other republican states, because of its 
commitment to the rule of law internally. Such a 
commitment internally will necessarily lead to a commitment 
externally, and avoid the necessity of creating a 
centralized authority above separate republican states to 
preserve and foster peace. As Covell explains, "Kant's 
view of the law of nations, as law underwriting the freedom 
and independence of states, finds its clearest expression 
in the second definitive article of perpetual peace."66 As 
opposed to the "idea of an international state or a world 
state, where the separate states were to be brought 
together under a system of international government 
possessing functions and powers analogous to those which he
65Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 122.
66Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 124.
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saw as belonging to government as it was constituted in the 
civil state," the Second Definitive Article actually called 
for "a voluntary, progressively expanding association of 
free and independent states, whose defining purpose was 
merely to bring a permanent end to war."67
All these observations lend credence to Covell's 
initial claim that "Certainly, Kant's was a more radical 
view of sovereignty than anything that is to be found in 
the thought of Hobbes, or in that of Vattel."68 The 
sovereign republican state is the foundation for an 
"international rule of law" that would ultimately develop 
between like-minded states, enhancing the prospects for 
peace.69 The establishment of the republican constitution 
within the state and the preservation of the freedom and 
independence of that state vis-a-vis its neighbors is
67Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 125. As do 
several of the interpreters writing from the mid-twentieth 
century onwards, Covell contrasts the Kant's proposal in 
Perpetual Peace with the Abbe de St. Pierre's. He states
quite clearly that "Kant's rejection of international
government within the framework of an international state 
or world state, as the basis for a lasting peace between 
states, underlines the fundamental contrast between the 
argument of Perpetual Peace and the argument contained in a 
notable plan for perpetual peace which had been set out in 
the early decades of the eighteenth century." Covell, Kant 
& the Law of Peace, p. 125.
68Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 97.
69Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 97.
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ultimately Kant's counsel in his quest to improve upon the 
state of international order in Perpetual Peace. 
Importantly, Covell even imagines what Kant would have 
thought of the world today. He states, "There is no doubt 
that Kant would have approved of the dedication of the 
present-day international community to the cause of the 
rights of men."70 Still, he makes the all-important point 
that "Equally, there is no doubt that he would have had 
misgivings about the erosion of the rights and powers of 
states and their governments that the concern with the 
protection of human rights has led to."71
Covell's reading of the text is state-centric through 
and through. Further, the importance he places on the 
First Definitive Article and its relationship to the 
establishment of peace need not go unnoticed either. 
Finally, he does not even hint that Kant might be, from a 
pure standpoint of reason, in favor of international 
government and the erosion of state sovereignty. His 
interpretation fits well with others discussed in the post- 
1983 interpretive context.
70Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 183.
71Covell, Kant & the Law of Peace, p. 183.
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An Important Interpretation by John Rawls in The Law of 
Peopless Perpetual Peace as 'Liberal Peace'
John Rawls certainly comes to similar conclusions 
about Kant's famous treatise as his contemporaries writing 
during the 1990s. In discussing the principles of his 'Law 
of Peoples,' Rawls notes that he will choose to "follow 
Kant's lead in Perpetual Peace (1795) in thinking that a
world government --  by which I mean a unified political
regime with the legal powers normally exercised by central
governments --  would either be a global despotism or else
would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil 
strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their 
political freedom and autonomy."72
72John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge & London: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 36. In coming to this 
conclusion, Rawls quotes the following passage:
The idea of international law presupposes the 
separate existence of independent neighboring states. 
Although this condition is itself a state of war 
(unless federative union prevents the outbreak of 
hostilities), this is rationally preferable to the 
amalgamation of states under one superior power, as 
this would end in universal monarchy, and laws always 
lose in vigor what government gains in extent; hence a 
condition of soulless despotism falls into anarchy 
after stifling seeds of good. Rawls, The Law of 
Peoples, Footnote 40, p. 36.
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Several pages on he discusses the 'liberal peace' idea 
and its relationship to history. Within this discussion, 
he gives Kant and, specifically, Perpetual Peace credit for 
the "hypothesis" that "armed conflict between democratic 
peoples will tend to disappear as they approach [the] 
ideal" of a "foedus pacificum."12 He further states that 
these "democratic peoples . . . will engage in war only as
allies in self-defense against outlaw states."74 Though he 
does not mention it, it appears that he is drawing 
primarily from the First Definitive Article and briefly 
from the Second Definitive Article in coming to this view. 
Importantly, and this will play a part in the discussion in 
Chapter Nine, Rawls expressly states that "I believe this 
['liberal peace'] hypothesis is correct and think it 
underwrites the Law of Peoples as a realistic utopia."75
Rawls' commentary on Kant's treatise is admittedly
sparse. Still, he falls into line with the majority of 
interpreters from this period that see the text as 
rejecting world government in favor of an association of 
independent democratic states who consistently avoid war
73Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 54.
74Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 54.
75Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 54.
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between each other while maintaining their defensive 
posture towards non-liberal states. Rawls seems generally 
impressed by the 'liberal peace' hypothesis and sees 
Perpetual Peace as its intellectual foundation. It is 
important to note the concise comments on this topic by one 
of the most influential political philosophers of the 
twentieth century. More importantly, Rawls' interpretation 
and complementary insight into the 'liberal peace' idea 
have important ramifications for my analysis in Chapter 
Nine.
Harold Kleinscmidt's The Nemesis of Powers A Concluding 
Interpretation
It seems fitting to conclude this chapter with a 
recently published book on the history of International 
Relations theory. Harold Kleinschmidt's The Nemesis of 
Power, published in 2000, discusses a variety of authors 
and offers generally thorough interpretations of their 
works. Kant's name is referred to throughout the book and 
Kleinschmidt devotes several paragraphs to Perpetual Peace 
exclusively. After noting that Kant "explicitly rejected 
Saint-Pierre's and Rousseau's proposals" (as many within 
this pattern have done before), Kleinschmidt turns his
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attention to a brief discussion of the main body of the 
treatise.76 He first states that Kant's treatise is in the 
form of a "hypothetical peace treaty."77 Via "the First 
Definitive Article," Kleinschmidt points out that for Kant 
"peace must be willed explicitly."78 Further, he explains, 
"Kant took the view that perpetual peace as a universal 
condition of international relations was categorically 
different from partial peace treaties."79 Kant believed 
peace treaties that ended wars emerged, as Kleinschmidt 
says, from "temporary conditions."80 "Perpetual Peace," as 
opposed to constantly disregarded peace treaties, can only 
emerge if the peace established is "universal."81 
Kleinschmidt then goes through the list of Preliminary 
Articles, which follow from this.
What distinguishes his interpretation from Pattern One 
and, even further, places his ideas on Kant's treatise 
properly within the second phase of Pattern Two is his
76Harold Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power: A History 
of International Relations Theories (London: Reakton Books 
Ltd, 2000), p. 138.
77Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 138.
78Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 138.
79Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 138.
80Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 138.
81Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 138.
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discussion of the First Definitive Article that follows. 
Kleinschmidt notes that Kant "further requested a specific 
domestic condition within each polity, namely that the rule 
of law should be accepted as the very basis of what he
referred to as a 'republican' constitution."82 Kleinschmidt 
describes this constitution as one in which "rule was 
accepted as rule by law and by the consent of the ruled and 
in which the ruler's competence was confined to the
exercise of force against those who chose not to abide by 
the law."83 "Consent of the ruled" had another part to play 
in this proposal as well. Though Kleinschmidt does not 
directly quote the 'consent of the citizens' selection so 
often emphasized by Pattern Two, Phase Two interpreters, he 
does explain that "Kant saw in what he termed a 
'republican' constitution an essential condition for a 
lasting peace because he believed that polities with a 
'republican' constitution would not develop attitudes of 
aggression towards their neighbours."84 Here Kleinschmidt 
hints at the 'liberal peace.'
More importantly, there is a definite emphasis by 
Kleinschmidt on the First Definitive Article as the primary
82Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 138.
83Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, pp. 138-3 9.
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textual avenue to peace. Other than a brief remark in 
another chapter where Kleinschmidt states that Kant 
"sceptically rejected the idea of world rule," the 
interpreter barely touches the Second Definitive Article.85 
His only other indirect reference to the Second Definitive 
Article is developed in terms of the First Definitive 
Article. Relevant to this, he states that in Perpetual 
Peace, Kant "insisted that 'republican' constitutions were 
possible only within sovereign territorial polities and 
urban communities because only in such polities could rule 
be rule by consent."86 Because Kant "rigorously adhered to 
contractualism," Kleinschmidt concludes that Kant "denied 
that a 'republican' constitution was conceivable for 
frameworks overarching sovereign polities."87 Essentially, 
world 'republican' government, in Kleinschmidt's reading of 
the text, "would be an illegitimate reduction of the rights 
of the ruled to appoint and sanction their rulers."88
As such, Kleinschmidt ends his interpretation on a 
rather 'statist' note. He understands the main thrust of
84Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 13 9.
85Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 152.
86Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 139.
87Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 13 9.
88Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of Power, p. 13 9.
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the text to suggest the preservation of sovereignty within 
independent states that willingly adopt 'republican' 
constitutions. Only when this form of constitution is 
adopted by the independent state is perpetual peace 
possible. In the end, the "sovereign territorial polity," 
as he calls it, need not and should not cede any portion of 
its power away to a larger international body. This would 
only undermine the original 'republican' constitution, 
which derives its legitimacy from the consent of the 
citizens and promotes peace simply by its existence within 
the territorially defined sovereign state. This is 
certainly a reading of Perpetual Peace that recommends a 
peace proposal at the state level.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a clear majority of interpretations 
written during the last half of the 1990s further indicate 
a shift in textual emphasis to the First Definitive 
Article, specifically, the 'consent of the citizens' 
passage within it. According to these interpreters' 
reading of the text, the solution to the problem of war 
between states is seen as the recommendation of liberal 
republican government in every state. Interpreters during
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these years continue to view Perpetual Peace as a treatise, 
which demonstrates the important link between domestic 
political structure and international conduct. Like their 
predecessors writing after Doyle's 1983 article on the 
'liberal peace,' this last group of interpreters also views 
the text as the intellectual foundation for this now famous 
claim.
Furthermore, though the Second Definitive Article is 
important to these interpreters, they read Kant as saying 
that it is the implementation of the key First Definite 
Article, which ultimately determines whether or not peace 
will someday be achieved between states. Essentially, a 
state-centric reading of the Second Definitive Article is 
predominant because the independent liberal republic, not 
any form of international government above it that might 
reduce its sovereignty, is seen as the primary vehicle to 
peace. The end result is a reading of the text wherein the 
sovereign republican state is preserved and the prevention 
of war is understood to occur through, not above such a 
state. The second phase of Pattern Two has clearly 
established itself as we enter a new century of commentary 
on Kant's celebrated treatise.
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PART FOUR
SHIFTING HOPES, SHIFTING PATTERNS
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PATTERN FORMATION AS A FUNCTION OF THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
HOPES FOR PEACE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
Introduction
In completing an interpretive history of Immanuel
Kant's Perpetual Peace from the mid-nineteenth to the end 
of the twentieth century, I argue that two clear patterns 
are revealed through an analysis of English-language
interpretations over this historical period. The first 
pattern, which develops between the middle to late 
nineteenth century and survives to the mid-twentieth 
century, views Kant's treatise as favoring peace proposals 
above the state level. The second pattern, which develops
from the mid-twentieth century and survives through to its
end, views Kant's treatise as favoring peace proposals at 
the state level.
The final two chapters of the thesis offer a principal 
and a subsidiary explanation for these patterns. In 
Chapter Eight, I present the argument that the formation of 
the two patterns is a function of the rise and fall of 
hopes for peace through international organization. In 
brief, the principal explanation for Pattern One is the 
enthusiasm and hope for the prevention of future wars
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through international organization, which prevailed from 
the middle to late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century. The explanation for Pattern Two is the loss of 
faith in international organization as a path to peace that 
has prevailed from the mid-twentieth century to the 
present. In Chapter Nine, I offer a subsidiary
explanation. It considers the steady increase in the 
number of liberal states in the western hemisphere over the 
past one hundred and fifty-five years and the affect of 
this evolving historico-political phenomenon on the minds 
of interpreters of Perpetual Peace living during this time 
and generally within this geographical space. Importantly, 
this subsidiary explanation complements the principal 
explanation presented in Chapter Eight.
The Dream of Peace through International Organization
During the seven decades from the mid-nineteenth 
century to the end of World War I, at which time Pattern 
One emerged and became the dominant interpretation, I argue 
that there was a general rise in hopes for peace through 
the mechanism of international organization. This was 
especially true in Britain where many intellectuals and 
politicians (especially of the liberal internationalist
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bent) became very enthusiastic about the possibility of 
forming a unique world organization that would ultimately 
work to prevent wars between states. In developing an 
explanation for the existence of Pattern One, specifically 
the first phase of the pattern, it is important to 
contextualize the argument with the acknowledgment that a 
majority of interpreters writing about Perpetual Peace 
during this period were British.
It is necessary to begin with some historical 
background to develop this initial argument. Inis Claude, 
Jr. writes that "Before the nineteenth century, rulers of 
Europe were so preoccupied with their Sovereign Dignity 
that they were virtually unable to do anything more at 
international conferences than argue about questions of 
precedence and prestige."1 Yet once the Napoleonic Wars 
ended, the rest of the century teemed with what Claude 
refers to as the "great conferences of the nineteenth
1Inis Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems 
and Progress of International Organization (New York: 
Random House, 1959), p. 26. Claude comically quotes 
Rousseau who once described international conferences of 
the eighteenth century as places "where we deliberate in 
common council whether the table will be round or square, 
whether the hall will have more doors or less, whether such 
and such a plenipotentiary will have his face or back 
turned toward the window." Claude, Swords into Plowshares, 
pp. 26-27.
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century."2 These began with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
that "initiated a series of developments which made it 
possible to speak of a nineteenth century conference system 
without precedent in the modern world."3 Unlike those of 
the eighteenth century, these conferences "contributed 
notably to the facilitation of serious consideration of 
problems by the representatives or rulers of sovereign
states."4 Most importantly for Claude, "the political
conference system . . . produced the prototype of a major
organ of modern international organization --  the
executive council of the great powers."5
According to Claude, the successful experience of the 
nineteenth century conference system, which brought on even 
greater hopes for further international organization, 
culminated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. As 
Claude writes, "the Hague Conferences . . . represented the
climax of a century of development in which attention 
shifted more and more to the possibilities of international
2Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 27.
3Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 23 (emphasis in 
original).
4Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 27.
5Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 28.
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institutions as instruments of world peace."6 He believes 
one of the most significant achievements of the Hague 
Conferences was their "mark of a new peak in development of 
collective activity for the purpose of general permanent 
reform of the system of international relations, as 
distinct from the purpose of dealing with specific and 
temporary situations."7 Differentiating this from the 
political conference system of the nineteenth century, 
Claude explains that "More conspicuously than the Concert 
of Europe, the Hague System was divorced from immediate 
problems raised by particular wars or disputes and was 
concerned with international problems in the abstract."8
In final analysis, however, Claude is less impressed 
with the concrete achievements of the two conferences than 
with the less tangible hopes and promise that they 
inspired. He states, "The Hague Conferences were notable 
events in the history of international organization not so 
much because of their actual accomplishments as because of 
the conceptions to which they gave expression, the hopes 
which they dramatized."9 These hopes manifested themselves
6Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 32.
7Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 30.
8Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 30.
9Claude, Swords into Plowshares, pp. 32-33.
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in what Claude calls an "urge toward institutionalization" 
among those thinkers and political activists involved. For 
the first time, there was generous "attention given to the 
task of institution-building" within the international 
sphere.10 Agreeing with Claude, Clive Archer explains, 
"Although the Hague Meetings did not prevent the 
catastrophe of August 1914, they did produce some modest 
achievements and also pointed the way for the institutional 
development of organized international relations."11 
Finally, Claude notes that "The statesmen gathered at the 
Hague . . . clearly believed they were favored to be the
founding fathers of a permanently functioning, efficiently 
organized mechanism for the maintenance of world peace."12 
As far as the history of international organization goes, 
this sincere and now realistic hope for 
institutionalization was something new and unique. 
Clearly, over the course of the nineteenth and certainly 
through to the first part of the twentieth century, there
10Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 31.
11Clive Archer, International Organizations (2nd ed.)
(London: Routledge Press, 1992), p. 10.
12Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 32.
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developed an ever-increasing enthusiasm for international 
organization as a method of preserving peace.13
Another leading analyst, John Pinder, certainly 
concurs with Claude. Yet for him, it was not just the 
general idea of and hope for international organization as 
a path to peace which successfully made its way into the 
minds of political leaders and intellectuals during this 
era. According to Pinder, federal proposals above the 
state were very much apart of the British intellectual and 
political context from the mid-nineteenth century to the 
First World War. He notes that "even before 1870, [the 
British began] to show their capacity for applying the 
federal principle to the affairs of other states."14 He 
further states during the period from the 1870s to the 
First World War, " [British] liberals were the most active
13Claude, Swords into Plowshares, pp. 19-42.
14 John Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British 
Liberal Tradition" in Andrea Bosco, ed., The Federal Idea: 
The History of Federalism from Enlightenment to 1945, 
Volume I (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991), p. 107. 
Here, he offers the examples of Canada, Australia, and 
South Africa as places where both British Liberals and 
Conservatives promoted federal proposals during the 
nineteenth century.
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in responding with federal proposals to solve international 
problems."15
One of the several British thinkers Pinder discusses 
to buttress his argument is James Lorimer. Lorimer was 
Edinburgh Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and 
Nations when he published his well-known two-volume work, 
The Institute of the Law of Nations, in 1884. Pinder
explains that this work "clearly took account of the 
federal principle embodied in the US Constitution."16 He
further sums up Lorimer7s main proposal in the following 
way:
There was to be a government for international 
purposes, with a two-chamber legislature, a judiciary, 
an executive and an exchequer. The government was to 
dispose of a small standing force and the member- 
states to disarm to the level required for municipal 
needs. There would be an international tax, levied by
the states, and their internal affairs would be
excluded from the scope of central government, save in 
the event of civil wars.17
Hidemi Suganami has also utilized Lorimer7s work in 
his thinking on the subject of the 'domestic analogy in 
world order proposals.7 He notes that "in Lorimer7s view,
15Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal
Tradition," p. 107.
16Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal
Tradition," p. 108.
17Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal
Tradition," p. 108.
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an international government, embracing the functions of 
legislation, adjudication and execution was indispensable" 
to the preservation of order and achievement of peace.18 
Clearly, Pinder and Suganami would both agree that 
Lorimer's treatise sets forth a peace proposal above the 
state level. In referring to middle to late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century thinkers on world order, Suganami 
notes, "before the Great War, many thinkers had advanced 
arguments based upon it [the domestic analogy]."19 As 
Suganami describes it, "the domestic analogy is analogical 
reasoning according to which the conditions of order 
between states are similar to those of order within them, 
and therefore those institutions which sustain order within 
states should be transferred to the international system."20 
The "institutions" at the state level he speaks of, once 
transferred, becomes "institutions" above the state level. 
Middle to late nineteenth century British and American
18Hidemi Suganami, Domestic Analogy in Proposals for 
World Order, 1814-1945: The Transfer of Legal and Political 
Principles from the Domestic to the International Sphere in 
Thought on International Law and Relations (University of 
London Ph.D. Thesis, 1985), p. 29.
19Suganami, Domestic Analogy in Proposals for World 
Order, p . 28.
20Suganami, Domestic Analogy in Proposals for World 
Order, p . 2.
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thinkers like Lorimer and William Ladd, the founder of the 
American Peace Society, who employ the domestic analogy 
according to Suganami, also clearly advance peace proposals 
above the state level in their works.21
For the purposes of the thesis, the brief though 
important point to take from Suganami7s work and Pinder"s 
article is that each (and especially Pinder"s) shows that 
peace proposals above the state were a significant part of 
the British political and intellectual landscape during the 
period in which the first phase of Pattern One emerged. 
Furthermore, Lorimer, the writer referred to by both Pinder
21Suganami, Domestic Analogy in Proposals for World 
Order, pp. 66-90. Regarding nineteenth century thinkers 
like Lorimer and Ladd who apply the domestic analogy, 
Suganami states the following:
It is little wonder then that these nineteenth 
century writers believed that there was something to 
be learned from their domestic experience. Whether 
they were right in applying it to the international 
sphere in the way they did is open to question. But 
it is clear that they were all favourably impressed by 
the advances made in the domestic sphere of some 
states, saw this as a mark of human progress, and thus 
thought it right to apply the relevant principles of 
domestic organisation to the hitherto comparatively 
underdeveloped area of international relations .
It is important to note that the international system 
of the period, in which these writers produced their 
plans, was largely lacking in formal international 
organisation. The relative lack of formal
organisation at the international level may explain 
why these writers relied rather conspicuously on 
concrete domestic models. Suganami, Domestic Analogy 
in Proposals for World Order, p. 92.
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and Suganami in their separate projects, actually discusses 
Kant's Perpetual Peace in his important work. Similar to 
Lorimer's own ideas summarized here, Lorimer also views 
Kant's text as one in favor of a peace proposal above the 
state level.22
As Pinder states in his conclusion, "By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the federal idea had indeed made great 
progress in British thinking" and "it seemed by 1914 that 
federalism had secured a firm place in British political 
culture."23 Little changed during the years of the First 
World War. Another influential British thinker of the 
time, J.A. Hobson, wrote important works recommending 
international government in the form of an international 
federation. David Long writes: "In Towards International
Government and the Union of Democratic Control pamphlet, A 
League of Nations, Hobson addressed the question of 
international peace, security and order, and suggested 
international government as an alternative to the Balance 
of Power system which, he believed, had been a major cause
22This point is made with more detail and analysis in 
Chapter Two.
23Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal 
Tradition," p. 113.
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of the First World War."24 Long then explains that Hobson's 
international government would certainly "have extensive 
powers and functions ceded to it by states."25 Broadly 
speaking, Long remarks that "Hobson's proposals for an 
international government involved extended provisions from 
arbitration and conciliation and the establishment of an 
international force."26 Finally, Long notes that Hobson's 
"international federation would be a single overarching 
political structure for the world."27
The well-known English writer, H.G. Wells, was also a 
strong proponent of federation during this time. In 
September of 1918, Wells contributed a piece to the London 
"Morning Post" in which he wrote of the importance of 
controlling the world's armaments. There he stated that
"a world control of armaments implies and there is no
good whatever in shirking the f a c t  some sort of world
council, some sort of pooling of the naval, military, and
24David Long, J.A. Hobson's Approach to International 
Relations: An Exposition and Critique (University of London 
Ph.D. Thesis, 1991), p. 177.
25Long, J.A. Hobson's Approach to International
Relations, p. 178.
26Long, J.A. Hobson's Approach to International
Relations, p. 177.
27Long, J.A. Hobson's Approach to International
Relations, p. 188.
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air forces of the world under that council, and a 
representation of the States of the world thereon to a 
degree commensurate with their strength and will."28 
Theodore Marburg, the American diplomat and chairman of the 
foreign organization committee of the League to Enforce 
Peace, acknowledges that Wells7 remarks were clearly "an 
approach to world federation.7/29
In this wartime context, it is also helpful to briefly 
consider Martin Ceadel7s writings on the British peace 
movement. Ceadel explains that from the First World War, 
"the peace movement made a general commitment to 
supranational ism which was to last for over forty years7 to 
the mid-twentieth century.30 According to Ceadel, the
28H.G. Wells quoted in John H. Latane, ed., Development 
of the League of Nations Idea: Documents and Correspondence 
of Theodore Marburg, Volume II (New York: MacMillan, 1932), 
p. 784.
29Latane, ed., Development of the League of Nations 
Idea: Documents and Correspondence of Theodore Marburg,
Volume II, p. 784. Latane notes the following in his 
Introduction to this work: "The steady progress of the
movement for a League of Nations, which resulted in the 
incorporation of the Covenant of the League of Nations in 
the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, was due to the efforts of 
groups of public-spirited men in this country [America] and 
in England, reinforced later by smaller groups in other 
countries, both belligerent and neutral.7 Latane, ed., 
Development of the League of Nations Idea: Documents and
Correspondence of Theodore Marburg, Volume II, p. VI.
30Martin Ceadel, "Supranationalism in the British Peace 
Movement during the Early Twentieth Century7 in Andrea
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Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace 
(the oldest British peace society founded in 1816), the 
Union of Democratic Control (the first of the wartime peace 
societies), the Independent Labour Party (ILP), the 
journalist and ILP member H.N. Brailsford, J.A. Hobson, and 
other influential academics, barristers and politicians 
such as G. Lowes Dickinson, F.N. Keen and Lord Bryce all 
"produced numerous declarations in favour of 
supranationalism" during this period.31 Though the
aforementioned peace societies and distinguished 
individuals did not all agree on the exact form this 
international authority would take, the key point for the 
purposes of the thesis is to understand that they all
clearly supported some version of supranationalism --
something above the nation-state to prevent another war. 
Furthermore, many of their thoughts, words and plans were 
influential in the development of the League of Nations 
idea.32
Bosco, ed., The Federal Idea: The History of Federalism
from Enlightenment to 1945, Volume I (London: Lothian
Foundation Press, 1991), p. 169.
31Ceadel, "Supranationalism in the British Peace 
Movement," pp. 176-89.
32Latane, ed., Development of the League of Nations 
Idea: Documents and Correspondence of Theodore Marburg,
Volume II, pp. 763-828.
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Another important figure favoring supranationalism and 
discussed by Ceadel is M. Campbell Smith. Noting that 
Smith was "the first English translator of Kant's Perpetual 
Peace," he quotes the following passage from the 
introductory essay to her translation: "'We are moved to
the conclusion that a thoroughly logical programme cannot 
stop short of the principle of federation. Federal troops 
are necessary to carry out the decrees of a tribunal or 
arbitration, if that Constitution is not to run a risk of 
being held feeble or ineffectual.'"33 Within the same 
introductory remarks, Smith also asserts, "it is impossible 
to ignore a clearly marked tendency towards international 
federation, towards political peace."34 Further, she 
states, "No political idea seems to have so great a future 
before it as this idea of a federation of the world."35 I
33Ceadel, "Supranationalism in the British Peace
Movement," p. 175 citing M. Campbell Smith's introductory 
essay in Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
Essay, introduction and translation by M. Campbell Smith, 
preface by Professor R. Latta (London: Swan Sonnenschein & 
Co., Limited) .
34Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Essay, introduction and translation by M. Campbell Smith, 
preface by Professor R. Latta (London: Swan Sonnenschein & 
Co., Limited), pp. 1-2.
35Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, intro, 
and trans. by M. Campbell Smith, preface by Professor R. 
Latta, p. 2.
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argue in Chapter Two that James Lorimer, whose pro- 
federation views were summarized earlier in this chapter by 
John Pinder, takes this same view in his interpretation of 
Perpetual Peace. Consistent with her pro-federation views 
quoted by Ceadel here, I have argued in Chapter Two that 
Smith also views Kant's text as one in favor of a peace 
proposal above the state level.
Like Lorimer and Smith, Leonard Woolf was also 
familiar with Kant's treatise. Only a year before the 
publication of his formidable work International 
Government, Woolf had written in the New Statesman the 
following lines: "Kant [in Perpetual Peace] has succeeded
in laying down the conditions of international relationship 
and government which would have to exist in order to make 
perpetual peace possible."36 In the same article, he also 
states that Perpetual Peace is "full of political wisdom 
and [by] far the most 'practical' work ever written upon 
the subject."37 Peter Wilson notes that the "Woolf-Webb 
draft convention for a 'Supranational Authority that will 
Prevent War' . . . bears a close resemblance to the League
36Leonard Woolf, "Review of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace,'" 
New Statesman (July 31, 1915), p. 399.
37Woolf, "Review of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace,"' p. 399.
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Covenant."38 He further states that "the similarities are 
striking" and that "in respect of the technical, social, 
and economic functions of the League, Woolf's influence was 
[even] more direct."39 For the purposes of the thesis, it
38Peter Wilson, The International Theory of Leonard 
Woolf: An Exposition, Analysis, and Assessment in the Light 
of his Reputation as a Utopian (University of London Ph.D. 
Thesis, 1997), p. 153.
39Wilson, The International Theory of Leonard Woolf, p. 
153 and p. 154, respectively. Wilson demonstrates that the 
similarities between the Woolf-Webb plan and the League 
Covenant were very evident, especially with regard to the 
following:
The outlawing of aggression; the notion of making 
'common cause' against any state in breach of its 
fundamental obligations; the emphasis placed on 
economic and social sanctions; the distinction between 
justiciable and non-justiciable disputes (and the 
definition of justiciable disputes); the obligation to 
refer all other unresolved disputes to an 
International Council; the idea of a 'cooling-off 
period' (twelve months in the Woolf-Webb plan, three 
months in the Covenant); the obligation to submit all
treaties to a League Secretariat for registration and
publication; and the obligation to promote cooperation 
in the economic and social spheres. Wilson, The 
International Theory of Leonard Woolf, pp. 153-54.
Wilson also demonstrates the practical impact of Woolf's 
International Government on the League Covenant. He 
remarks:
Late in 1918, Sydney Waterlow, a member of the 
newly formed League of Nations Section of the Foreign 
Office, was asked to write a paper on 'International 
Government under the League of Nations.' Waterlow had 
recently read Woolf's, book on the subject and was
greatly impressed. He drew extensively from it when 
writing his paper and, indeed, 'lifted almost
verbatim' the sections dealing with the international
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is certainly useful to note the probable influences of
Kant's Perpetual Peace on Woolf's writings, especially the 
Woolf-Webb plan and International Government, and their 
impact on the development of the ideas and provisions 
expressed in the League Covenant. Importantly, Lorimer, 
Smith and Woolf were three influential British thinkers 
living within the period in which the whole of Pattern One 
is manifest, who understood Perpetual Peace in broadly
similar terms.
To the League of Nations
Once we move into the years following World War I, it 
is clear that the earlier era of hope, or what Claude calls
"the era of preparation for international organization,"
becomes reality with the founding of the League of 
Nations.40 Claude refers to this new period as the "era of
cooperation on labour conditions, public health, 
transport, and economic and social policy. The paper 
was well received by Lord Cecil, the head of the 
section, and the bulk of it was subsequently 
incorporated into the British Draft Covenant. This 
later formed the basis of discussions between the 
British and US delegations at Versailles. Wilson, The 
International Theory of Leonard Woolf, pp. 154-55.
40Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 43 (emphasis in 
original).
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establishment of international organization."41 The
appalling devastation of World War I was fundamental to the 
transformation of the "era of preparation for international 
organization" to the "era of establishment of international 
organization." Gerard Mangone explains, "the very enormity 
of the world disaster spurred men into a new crusade for an 
international organization which would promote peace."42 
Claude adds, "the League was, in important respects, the 
product of the First World War."43
The grand hopes for international organization as a 
way to peace that carried over from the nineteenth century 
and the Hague Conferences combined with the acute sense of 
urgency experienced by influential thinkers during the War 
years to lead to the "Anglo-American enterprise" to draft 
the Covenant of the League of Nations.44 Mangone refers to
41Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 43 (emphasis in
original).
42Gerard J. Mangone, A Short History of International 
Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1954), p. 120-21.
43Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 47.
44Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 45. Claude is
emphatic that the formation of the League was influenced by 
these two primary factors. Besides the obvious point that
the League was a "product" of World War I, he is careful to
give credit to the aspirations for international 
organization that flowed from the nineteenth century. He 
notes that "The League was also the product of nineteenth- 
century beginnings in the sense that it picked up ideas,
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the League as "the first permanent international 
organization for peace."45 Archer notes that "The whole 
League system can be seen as a crucial link which brought 
together the strands of pre-1914 international 
organizations and wartime co-operation into a more 
centralized and systematic form on a global scale."46 
Finally, according to Claude, the new League gave "the
modern world" its first ever "taste of institutional 
centralization" in the international sphere.47 Never before 
had "the multi-state system [been] equipped with a central 
institutional instrument of unprecedented utility."48
However delighted the League's proponents might have 
been over its supposed "institutional centralization" in 
the form of a permanent Council, Assembly, Secretariat and 
Court of International Justice, it was far from a super­
state. Still, remarks by Sir Alfred Zimmern, R.B. Mowat, 
Martin Ceadel and Mangone do indicate that the League
adopted the assumptions, and reacted to the awareness which 
had been emergent in that earlier period." Claude, Swords 
into Plowshares, p. 46.
45Mangone, A Short History of International
Organization, p. 132.
46Archer, International Organizations, p. 23.
47Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 46.
48Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 60.
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certainly intended to curb the sovereignty of its member- 
states. Writing about the League during the 1930s, Zimmern 
notes, "The League, in fact, lies in an intermediate zone 
between these two extremes (a multi-lateral treaty and a 
super-state)."49 "Or, to use a more fitting image," Zimmern 
remarks, "it swings between these two poles, drawing nearer 
sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other but never 
remaining fixed."50 Speaking generally of its successes, 
Zimmern states, "It has even exercised authority, 
controlled the rulers of states and prevented war."51 
Further, Mowat acknowledges, "The League of Nations offers 
a reasonable compromise between the sacrifice of 
independence on the part of the constituent States, on the 
one hand, and the wielding of universal despotic dominion 
on the other."52 Ceadel understands the League to be 
"clearly supranationalist" though "the most limited form of
49Zimmern, Sir Alfred, The League of Nations and the 
Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (London: MacMillan & Co., Limited,
1939), pp. 287-88.
50Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 
1918-1935, p. 288.
51Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 
1918-1935, p. 290.
52R.B. Mowat, The European States System: A Study of 
International Relations, 2nd edition (London: Oxford
University Press, 1929; first published in 1923), p. 94.
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supranational ism.#/53 Finally, discussing both the League of 
Nations and the United Nations, Mangone notes, "Both 
organizations valiantly attempted to reconcile the virtues 
of national independence and sovereignty with the patent 
need for a supernational force to rebuff arrogance and 
destroy aggression."54
Clearly, none of these scholars see the League as a 
super-state though they all suggest, especially consistent 
with the second phase of Pattern One, the sovereignty of 
member-states is to be curbed by this international 
organization. According to Mangone, curbing sovereignty is 
exactly what the League did during the notable first decade 
of its existence. Mangone points to the resolution of the 
Greco-Bulgarian Crisis of 1925 and the War in the Gran 
Chaco of 1928 as two shining examples of League success 
during the 1920s.55 He explains that "Both the Greco- 
Bulgarian Crisis dispute and the Bolivian-Paraguay conflict 
high-lighted a remarkable evolution of international law
53Ceadel, "Supranationalism in the British Peace
Movement," p . 171.
54Mangone, A Short History of International
Organization, p. 172.
55Mangone, A Short History of International
Organization, pp. 144-46.
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through international organization."56 In reference to 
these successes, Mangone notes that "with rare audacity the 
new collaborators on international organization struck a 
blow at the most hallowed pillar of national sovereignty: 
the unqualified right to declare war."57 A. Leroy Bennett 
further comments:
During the early years of League experience, 
there were high hopes that the organization could 
ameliorate tense situations that exhibited the 
potentiality for erupting into major conflict. The 
League Machinery was utilized for the hearing of at 
least thirty disputes during the first decade of its 
existence, and a majority of these were resolved 
satisfactorily.58
Based on the League's resolution of these conflicts, both
of these writers recognize the continued enthusiasm for
'international organization as peacemaker' that carried
over from the period in which the first phase of Pattern
One is revealed into the League of Nations era.
These early successes during the 192 0s, however, were
short-lived and things began to unravel for the League in
the 1930s. Clearly, the Manchurian Crisis and the Italo-
56Mangone, A Short History of International
Organization, p. 145.
57Mangone, A Short History of International
Organization, p. 145.
58A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations:
Principles and Issues (London: Prentice-Hall International,
Inc., 1995, Sixth Edition), p. 35.
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Ethiopian War in the 1930s did much to undermine this 
initial faith in the League as a permanent international 
organization generally effective at preventing aggression. 
As the 193 0s wore on and another European war appeared 
imminent, it became clear to most that the League could no 
longer accomplish what it set out to. Mangone candidly 
describes the situation of the League and the world's 
powers in the immediate years after these two failures:
Whatever the reality of [Japanese and Italian] 
aggression proved, the fledgling international 
organization in 1931 and 1936 could not soar beyond 
its own limitations: the provincialism of the United
States, the pessimism of France, the opportunism of 
the Soviet Union, the conservatism of Great Britain, 
all shuddered under the ruthless arrogance of Japan, 
Italy, and Germany while the small states, too, 
frequently played with callous ambition or petty 
covetousness.59
Still, even with its relative impotence described 
here, it is important to note that the League was an 
original experiment in permanent international 
organization. Not anything as grand as a League of Nations 
had ever been tried before. Even though the League itself
  indeed the first concrete manifestation of hopes for
peace through international organization --  may not have
succeeded, it was not as if hopes for 'international
59Mangone, A Short History of International 
Organization, p. 153.
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organization as peacemaker" were entirely dashed as a 
consequence of its uneven record.
Bruce Collins explains that during the entire period 
of the League's existence, through its successes and its 
failures, a feeling of hope was sustained that some form of 
organization with institutional authority above the state 
level could bring peace to the world. He specifically 
states, "World War I provoked a great deal of 
experimentation in the effort to create supra-national 
organization. Trying to prevent the slide into further 
European war in the late 1930s encouraged yet more 
federalist activity."60
Peter Wilson confirms this. He explains that through 
the "intellectual, organisational and propagandist" 
activities of the Federal Union, founded in London in 193 8, 
"federalism came to occupy a central place in thinking 
about European political organization."61 He notes that the 
movement attracted "considerable support" from across the
60Bruce Collins, "American Federalism and the Sectional 
Crisis, 1844-1860" in Andrea Bosco, ed., The Federal Idea: 
The History of Federalism from Enlightenment to 1945, 
Volume I (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991), p. 51.
61Peter Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime 
Britain" in Philomena Murray and Paul Rich, eds., Visions 
of European Unity (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 50.
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political, military and academic spectra.62 The British 
public was also very committed. He writes, "By the spring 
of 1940, [the Federal Union] had over 8,000 members, in 
over 200 branches, including branches in France and Geneva" 
and "organised frequent public meetings, attendance at 
which sometimes reached 2,500."63 More specifically, with 
regard to the intelligentsia, Pinder remarks that there was 
a "flowering of British federalist literature in the late 
1930s and the first period of World War Two, by authors 
such as Williams Beveridge, Henry Noel Brailsford, Ivor 
Jennings, Cyril Joad, Ronald Gordon Mackay, Kenneth Wheare 
and Barbara Wooton."64 Pinder also notes other proponents 
of the federal idea whose writings were influential during 
this period including Phillip Kerr (Lord Lothian), Lionel 
Curtis, and Lionel Robbins.65 Similarly, Wilson explains, 
"During the 1930s and early 1940s the idea that the 
institution of national sovereignty was the main villain of
62Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p . 50.
63Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 50.
64Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal 
Tradition," p. 114.
65Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal 
Tradition," p. 114.
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the peace received a chorus of approval" from influential 
British thinkers like Leonard Woolf, Clarence Streit, 
Lionel Robbins, Friedrich Hayek and David Mitrany.66 He 
notes, "Though there were differences on how it might be 
done, all were agreed that the sovereignty of states needed 
to be limited in some way."67
Wilson thinks "this view found its most clear 
expression in the work of Leonard Woolf."68 By the 194 0s, 
Woolf had come to the conclusion that sovereignty was 
"'incompatible with law, order, and p e a c e . 69 According to 
Wilson, Woolf believed "the wings of sovereignty of both 
the small and the great powers had to be clipped."70 
Further, "Both [the small and the great powers] needed to
66Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 47.
67Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 46.
68Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 46. Wilson draws from Woolf's The War for Peace 
(London: George Routledge, 1940), The Future of
International Government (The Labour Party: Transport
House, 194 0) and The International Postwar Settlement 
(London: Fabian Publications, 1944) in making the above
points.
69Leonard Woolf, The International Postwar Settlement, 
p. 6 quoted in Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime 
Britain," p. 47.
70Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p . 46.
331
consent to submit themselves to some form of international 
government.7 71
As for the others Wilson discusses, Streit thought 
sovereignty should be "transcend[ed]" if Europe was to have 
any hope of a future peace.72 Robbins believed the "right 
to make war" was "central to the concept of sovereignty" 
and had to be surrendered. For him, "'There must be 
neither alliance nor complete unification, but 
Federation.7"73 With his underlying faith in the
"interdependence of the modern world," Mitrany was "the 
most sophisticated critic of state sovereignty" according 
to Wilson.74 Importantly, Wilson notes "the central 
proposition of Mitrany7s functional theory" that 
"sovereignty needed to be transferred from the territorial 
unit to the functional unit."75 Finally, Hayek expressed
71Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain,7
p . 46.
72Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain,"
p. 47.
73Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International 
Order (London: MacMillan, 1937), p. 240 quoted in Wilson,
"The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," p. 47.
74Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain,"
p. 48. Wilson draws from Mitrany7s A Working Peace System 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, first published 1943) in 
making the following points.
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"the need for an international political authority" and 
thought it even more necessary than an international 
economic authority.76 With these five preeminent thinkers 
in mind, Wilson points out that "the idea of restricting 
state sovereignty by creating a federal or some other kind 
of international authority became the dominant idea of the 
period."77
According to Andrea Bosco, it was not just these 
intellectuals who advocated federal solutions during this 
time. Bosco explains "not only intellectuals, but also
some of the most prominent politicians --  such as
Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Eden, Attlee, Bevin, 
Sinclair, and Amery . . . openly supported the federalist
project."78 Bosco also states that "The major national
daily and weekly newspapers --  Times, Daily Telegraph,
Manchester Guardian, News Chronicle, Daily Express, Daily
75Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 49.
76F .A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: George
Routledge & Sons, Limited, 1944) , p. 172 quoted in Wilson, 
"The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," p. 47.
77Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 47.
78Andrea Bosco, "Introduction" in Andrea Bosco, ed., 
The Federal Idea: The History of Federalism from
Enlightenment to 1945, Volume I (London: Lothian Foundation 
Press, 1991), p. 11.
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Herald, Daily Worker, Observer, Sunday T i m e s  gave wide
space to a lively debate on federalism."79 Most revealing 
of all, Bosco quotes Churchill's and Sir John Colville's 
weighty comments from 1940. He states, "the afternoon of 
16 June, a few hours before the French Government accepted 
the capitulation, Churchill made the famous offer of 
'indissoluble union.'"80 Bosco then offers a telling quote 
from Churchill's private secretary, Sir John Colville. 
Colville explained, "'we had before us the bridge to a new 
world, the first elements of European or even world 
federation.' "81
Anglo-Saxon political leaders continued to express 
faith in international organization as the most effective 
path to peace throughout the war years. Michael Howard 
begins with the assertion that, if anything, "The failure 
of the League of Nations to achieve the goal of 
'international security' was taken by Anglo-Saxon leaders 
in World War II as a reason, not to abandon the concept, 
but to try again."82 And try again they did according to
79Bosco, "Introduction," pp. 11-12.
80Bosco, "Introduction," p. 12.
81Bosco, "Introduction," p. 12.
82Michael Howard, "The Historical Development of the 
UN's Role in International Security" in Adam Roberts & 
Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided World:
334
Claude. Claude supports Howard's assertion with his
statement that "The war years were marked by an
unprecedented volume of plans and proposals for postwar 
international agencies."83 According to Claude, "From non­
governmental sources came suggestions ranging from the 
utopian blueprints of idealistic dreamers to the carefully 
considered proposals of well-organized groups of experts."84 
More specifically, both the United States and Britain were 
the primary governmental sources of postwar organizational 
thinking. Claude notes, "Official consideration of the
problems and possibilities of postwar organization was 
seriously undertaken, particularly in the United States and 
Britain."85 Significantly, Claude asserts, "Secretary of 
State Hull initiated American preparatory work almost 
immediately after the war began in Europe, and was 
responsible for the most concentrated and elaborate study
of international organization ever conducted by a 
government."86
The UN's Roles in International Relations, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 63.
83Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 63.
84Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 63.
85Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 63.
86Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 63.
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Claude states, "The climatic event in the long process 
of building the new world organization was the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization at San 
Francisco."87 Mangone writes of the "high hopes of San 
Francisco" in the days leading up to the founding of the 
United Nations.88 Claude then claims that the fifty-nation 
conference at San Francisco "was history's nearest approach 
to a global constitutional convention" and further that 
"The formal completion of mankind's most ambitious 
international structure was celebrated on June 26, 1945,
with the signing of the Charter."89 Following all these 
remarks, Claude concludes that the "establishment of the 
United Nations represented a renewed effort to achieve 
world peace through international organization."90 Leland 
M. Goodrich further asserts that the United Nations was 
truly intended as a "fresh approach to world problems of 
peace and security."91 These scholars indicate that there
87Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 65.
88Mangone, A Short History of International 
Organization, p. 199.
89Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 65.
90Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 76 (emphasis in 
original).
91Leland M. Goodrich, "From League of Nations to United 
Nations," International Organization 1 (1) (February 1947),
p. 3.
336
was a general belief at the time that a second attempt at 
permanent international organization was not simply meant 
to advance more limited economic and social goals 
throughout the world, but to genuinely and powerfully 
commit itself to the maintenance of world peace and the 
provision of security.
In America especially during this time, there was a 
groundswell of individuals and movements in favor of peace 
proposals above the state level, many of whom thought the 
United Nations had not gone far enough. More specifically, 
their efforts were in reaction to the uncertainty and fear 
that the atomic age inspired. First, Joseph Baratta 
discusses the interests of nuclear scientists in such 
proposals:
[The] Advent of the atomic age seemed to many 
people, particularly Americans, to be a challenge to 
man that could only be met by the establishment of 
world federation. The political unification of
humanity was no longer a distant.ideal but a practical 
necessity if the world were to be saved. The 
scientists who had developed the atomic bomb led the 
political struggle to bring atomic energy under 
international control. 'One World or None' became 
their slogan. Many of their early position papers 
looked to ultimate world government.92
92 Joseph Preston Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World 
Federalist" in Andrea Bosco, ed., Annals of the Lothian 
Foundation, Volume I (London: Lothian Foundation Press,
1992), p. 200. Wilson traces the evolution of Leonard 
Woolf's views on international government from the more 
modest proposals of the Fabian Society Study "Suggestions 
for the Prevention of War" published in 1915 through his
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Baratta adds that Milly Blake, a founder of World 
Federalists, USA "recalled that people who were inclined to 
federalism during the war had trusted Roosevelt to take 
care of the peace. They now became open federalists and 
were galvanized into action."93
Baratta then points out several pro-federalist 
individuals and groups whose ideas and plans became ever 
more ambitious and idealistic during the short period 
between 1945 and 1950. The mood of the times clearly 
catching him, Mortimer Adler, in How to Think about War and 
Peace (1944) , "revised his estimate of when world 
government would come from 500 years to five."94 The 
prominent New York lawyer and UN reform advocate, Grenville 
Clark, "hurried up his plans for a new world constitutional 
convention like that in San Francisco and assembled a 
private group of leading internationalists in October 1945
more radical proposals of the 1940s. Wilson, The
International Theory of Leonard Woolf, pp. 86-149. Wilson 
notes that, like the Americans, Woolf advocated a "world 
authority" to bring atomic energy under control during the 
1940s. Wilson, The International Theory of Leonard Woolf, 
p. 146.
93Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p. 201.
94Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p. 201 
(emphasis in original).
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for a conference near his home in Dublin, New Hampshire."95 
This conference "issued a ringing declaration in favor of a 
universal federal world government."96
Baratta further notes that "Many people who had been 
preparing for the Senate fight over the UN, such as those 
in Americans United for World Organization, demanded 
stronger policies."97 This prompted Americans United to 
change their name to Americans United for World 
Government.98 He then states that Clarence Streit's 
Atlantic Union group "began to break up, as members drifted 
off to stronger, universalist organizations like Americans 
United or World Federalists."99 Finally, Cord Meyer, first 
president of the United World Federalists, writes that 
"paid-up membership" in the United World Federalists 
"exceeded fifty thousand" by the late 194 Os.100 He then 
explains, "At the high tide of our campaign in June 1949, 
sixty-four Democrats and twenty-seven Republicans in the
95Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p. 187 
and p. 201, respectively.
96Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p. 201.
97Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p. 201.
98Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p. 201.
"Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p. 201.
100Cord Meyer, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to 
the CIA (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980), p. 45.
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House of Representatives joined in sponsoring a concurrent
resolution which declared the following:
It should be a fundamental objective of the 
foreign policy of the U.S. .to support and strengthen 
the U.N. and to seek its development into a world 
federation open to all nations with defined and 
limited powers adequate to preserve peace and prevent 
aggression through the enactment, interpretations and 
enforcement of world law."101
Commenting on Kant's text in the year 1948 during this
intense period of interest in peace proposals above the
state level, it is no wonder the noted Harvard scholar and
UN advocate C.J. Friedrich interpreted Perpetual Peace to
be in favor of world federalism.
The Nexus
From the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, 
there existed a growing interest, primarily within Anglo- 
American intellectual and political contexts, in permanent 
international organization as a potential peacemaker. 
Hopes that a centralized authority above the state might be 
a solution to the problem of war began with the great 
political conferences of the nineteenth century, gained 
strength during the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and
101Meyer, Facing Reality, p. 45.
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finally became reality with the establishment of the League 
of Nations and the United Nations.102
It seems beyond doubt that interpretations of Kant's 
famous text from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century are largely a function of this phenomenon. As 
demonstrated in Chapter One, discussion of international 
organization pervades the text of Perpetual Peace, 
especially in the controversial and most cited Second 
Definitive Article. Upwards of eight interpreters of the 
text who comment on the League of Nations, either as 
supporters or simply as scholarly observers of the League's 
tenets, interpret Kant's proposals in Perpetual Peace as 
being in favor of international organization, then 
demonstrate the similarity between his proposals and those 
of the League of Nations (and one even with the United 
Nations). These interpreters, including Leonard Woolf, 
Jessie Wallace Hughan, D.P. Heatley, Nicholas Murray 
Butler, Mehan Stawall, C.J. Friedrich, R.B. Mowat and A.C.
102Mangone states that the "Hague Peace Conferences of 
the early twentieth century tried to regulate practices of 
international war; the League of Nations from 1920 on 
sought to regulate war itself. During the Second World War 
the United Nations, under the benign guardianship of the 
five great powers, was designed to eliminate all aggressive 
wars . . . all three endeavours to block the arbitrary
practice of violence by nations against each other." 
Mangone, A Short History of International Organization, p. 
7.
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Armstrong, all wrote during the historical period under 
consideration. As discussed earlier, the pro-federalists 
James Lorimer and M. Campbell Smith (and even to a degree, 
Leonard Woolf) all discuss Perpetual Peace during this 
period and interpret it (similar to their own plans) as 
favoring a peace proposal above the state level. Finally, 
considering the intellectual and political contexts of the 
time in Britain and the United States, it is not surprising 
that a treatise like Perpetual Peace takes on the 
interpretation that it does. Pattern One, which sees the 
text as favoring organizational proposals above the state 
level to prevent war, thus reflects the historical rise in 
hopes for peace through international organization.
The Decline of Hopes for Peace through International 
Organization
During the past half century, there has been a general 
decline of hopes for peace through international 
organization. What was once believed by many intellectuals 
and political activists in the Anglo-American world to be a 
new and potentially effective way to prevent aggressive 
wars between states, lost attractiveness and credibility 
with the outbreak of the Cold War and the beginning of the
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East-West rivalry. Essentially, hopes that international 
organization might act as a focal point for the collective 
maintenance of peace and security were largely shattered 
from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The majority of 
scholars referred to in the previous section (and a few 
others not yet discussed) support this position.
First, both Ceadel and Pinder, who recognize British 
enthusiasm for peace proposals above the state that existed 
from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, 
clearly demonstrate that this did not persist through the 
last half of the twentieth century. Ceadel initially 
asserts that from the mid-fifties onwards, the British 
Peace Movement "for the most part abandoned 
supranationalism altogether."103 With more detailed
analysis, he concludes his essay with the following 
remarks:
The fifth phase, which began in the mid-1950s, 
saw the peace movement retreat from the supranational- 
ism to which it had given priority for over forty 
years. It did so largely in response to the failures 
of the United Nations, the materialistic, bloc-like 
nature of the European Communities, and a fear that 
the issue of nuclear weapons could not be postponed 
until after the structural reform of the international 
system. This fifth phase persists today.104
103Ceadel, "Supranational ism in the British Peace 
Movement," p . 173.
104Ceadel, "Supranational ism in the British Peace 
Movement," p . 189.
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Pinder also notes, "far from seeking federal solutions to
postwar problems, the British suppressed the memory of 
their prewar federalist revival."105 Writing in the early
nineties, Pinder further suggests that "contemporary
Britain . . . does nothing to promote the application of
the federal principles more widely in the world."106
Also writing during the early nineties, Long notes
that "plans for international government have since fallen 
out of favour, making Hobson's ideas [in support of 
federation] appear rather quaint."107 As stated earlier,
Suganami demonstrates that many thinkers set forth
arguments based on the 'domestic..analogy’ before the First 
World War through to the creation of the League of Nations. 
However, he then acknowledges, "in the contemporary (post- 
World War II) study of international relations, we tend to 
encounter the critics of the domestic analogy rather more 
frequently than its adherents."108 The notion that settled
105Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal
Tradition," p. 115.
106Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal
Tradition," p. 115.
107Long, J.A. Hobson's Approach to International 
Relations, p. 209.
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legal and political principles at the state level should be 
transferred to a level above the state to achieve world 
order is far less influential today than it once was.
Finally, Wilson writes that after World War II, 
"Britain's future was seen in terms of continuing to foster 
the 'special relationship' with America, or in terms of 
strengthening the bond of the Commonwealth," rather than in 
European unity or federation.109 A revival of faith in 
British sovereignty followed the success of "standing 
alone" against Hitler.110 The thought was "if the British 
state could triumph in wartime it could also triumph in 
building a prosperous and secure social order in peace 
time."111 The result was that "there was no need to 
surrender sovereignty" to a higher European or 
international authority.112 Instead, the opposite was 
actually true: "To fulfill national objectives, British
108Suganami, Domestic Analogy in Proposals for World 
Order, p. 20.
109Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 56.
110Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 57.
11:LWilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 57.
112Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 57.
power and influence needed to be preserved and, if at all 
possible, enhanced."113 Wilson concludes the point with the 
statement that "This marked a significant departure from 
the assault on national sovereignty which characterized 
much British political thought between 1938 and 1944.//114
A similar pattern of thinking was emerging in the U.S. 
Writing in the early 1950s and obviously conscious of the 
emerging bi-polar rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, Mangone dismally concludes that only "Five 
years after the high hopes of San Francisco, the United 
Nations had been dragged down by the rankling division of 
the world into two ideologies and two armed camps."115 The 
year 1950 marked the North Korean invasion of South Korea. 
To the American-based United World Federalists movement, 
flourishing only a few years before, this was the most 
serious blow to hopes for peace through international 
organization. Clearly, the North Korean invasion was the
113Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 57.
114Wilson, "The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain," 
p. 57.
115Mangone, A Short History of International 
Organization, p. 199.
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key world event, which triggered the end of these hopes for 
those involved with the movement. Baratta writes:
The Korean War all but destroyed the world 
federalist movement. The North Korean invasion was so 
obviously a case of communist aggression that 
federalists were hard pressed to maintain that anarchy 
was the cause of wars. McCarthyism and slurs on 
federalists7 loyalties overwhelmed ordinary members' 
sense of kinship with all humanity.116
Thereafter, Baratta notes, "A mass exodus began from 
the movement."117 Besides membership losses, this exodus 
occurred in the following ways. First, the United World 
Federalists eliminated their field program and replaced it 
with a 'top-level' approach in 1951.118 During the same 
period, the student division all but disappeared.119 
Further, two important publications supporting their 
efforts were terminated. Common Cause, published by the 
Chicago Committee to Frame a World Constitution, ceased 
publication when its prominent member Robert M. Hutchins
116Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," pp. 
208-09.
117Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p.
209.
118Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p.
209.
119Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist," p.
209.
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left the University of Chicago.120 World Government News 
failed the following year because of declining support.121 
Most telling of all, Cord Meyer, who became first president 
of the United World Federalists during the heyday of its 
movement in the late 1940s, vacated his position and joined 
the CIA as an operations officer in the clandestine service
in 1 9 5 1  a strikingly short span of years to go from one
extreme to the other and clear evidence that whatever hopes 
he had maintained in 'international organization as 
peacemaker7 were completely dashed by the early 1950s.122 
Baratta notes that Meyer7 s case was "extreme . . . but not
atypical77 considering the times.123 "It was time,77 Baratta 
explains, "to come to the aid of one7s country7 since "To 
work for world federation when Russia and America seemed to 
be locked in a death grip was truly to ignore reality.77124
Hopes that the establishment of a centralized 
authority above the state might prevent conflict were
120Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist,7 p.
209.
121Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist,7 p.
209.
122Meyer, Facing Reality, pp. 44-65.
123Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist,7 p.
209.
124Baratta, "Grenville Clark, World Federalist,77 p.
209.
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clearly beginning to diminish as the 1950s were underway. 
The idealistic advocates for a world federation more potent 
than the existing United Nations body were clearly 
disillusioned. Yet even those more practical and willing 
to work within the current system were not particularly 
sanguine about its prospects. For most, the reality of the 
limited ability of the United Nations to achieve its 
primary goal of maintaining world peace and security in the 
face of Gold War rivalry had set in. Writing only a few 
years later in 1954, Mangone captures the mood of the times 
with the following remarks: "the UN struggled for eight
years, carrying on its mission despite the bitter dregs 
left by the Second World War, the deep cleavages between 
the views of the Soviet Union and those of the United 
States, and the ever-ready cynicism of international 
politics.//125
Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury lay initial 
responsibility for UN failure to preserve the peace on the 
Security Council veto system and unanimity provision. The 
maintenance of international peace and security is the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council. The Five 
Permanent Members (China, France, Russia, the United
125Mangone, A Short History of International 
Organization, p. 175.
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Kingdom, and the United States) dominate the proceedings 
and each retains the power to veto any draft resolution on 
matters of substance.126
Further, Roberts and Kingsbury note that "The veto 
system privileges a group a five states in a way that is 
bound to be contentious; and it is widely perceived as 
having held the UN back from fulfilling its functions in 
the Cold War years."127 Claude notes that, with the veto 
privilege, there was always the "potentiality that the. 
collegium of the powerful might be unable to act at all, 
either to dominate the world or to save it."128 Adding 
support to these claims, Meyer writes in his autobiography, 
"To me, this veto power was incontrovertible evidence that 
the major nations intended to retain their complete 
sovereign independence within the new structure."129 Meyer 
goes on to say that "Indeed, in certain respects, the new 
structure seemed to me even more impotent than the old
126Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, "Introduction: 
The UN's Roles in International Society since 1945" in Adam 
Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided 
World: The UN's Roles in International Relations,
Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 8.
127Roberts & Kingsbury, "Introduction: The UN's Roles
in International Society since 1945," p. 41.
128Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 81.
129Meyer, Facing Reality, p. 36.
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League of Nations, whose defects Professor Spykman at Yale 
used to describe with mordant wit."130
Roberts and Kingsbury then offer four examples of 
conflicts that occurred over the course of the period that 
reveals Pattern Two, Phase One, where the existence of the 
veto prevented the United Nations from fulfilling its 
primary role. Existence of the veto meant the Security 
Council contributed little to the resolution of armed 
conflicts in which its permanent members were directly
entangled --  for example, in Hungary (1956) , the Suez
(1956), Vietnam (1946-1975) and the Sino-Vietnamese War 
(1979) .131 In the case of the first two conflicts, Michael 
Howard demonstrates with some historical detail the 
negative impact of the Security Council veto and the 
accompanying futility of attempts by General Assembly 
resolutions to compensate for the divisiveness that 
resulted from the use of the veto as a Great Power 
instrument, especially when the United States and the 
Soviet Union were involved.
Regarding the Suez crisis, France and Britain vetoed 
any Security Council action over their 1956 attack on
130Meyer, Facing Reality, p. 36.
131Roberts & Kingsbury, "Introduction: The UN's Roles
in International Society since 1945," p. 11.
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Egypt. Thereafter, an immediate cease-fire in addition to 
the withdrawal of forces from the Suez Canal was called for 
by the General Assembly.132 France and Britain then 
"acquiesced," according to Howard, "less out of any respect 
for or fear of the united strength of the United Nations 
than because of the effective economic muscle of the United 
States."133 Howard seems to acknowledge that in cases of 
veto use by lesser powers such as Britain and France, the 
'persuasive7 ability of the General Assembly resolution 
might, on occasion, be successful at overcoming the veto7s 
usual effectiveness at obstruction. Still, by his quote, 
it is obvious that he sees its 'supposed7 accomplishment 
here as little more than coincidence.
More importantly, when either of the two superpowers 
was directly involved, he demonstrates the clear weakness 
of the United Nations system to deal with the conflict at 
hand. In the case of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 
1956, he notes, "a similar and nearly simultaneous 
resolution by the General Assembly calling upon the Soviet
132Michael Howard, "The Historical Development of the 
UN7s Role in International Security" in Adam Roberts & 
Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided World: 
The UN's Roles in International Relations, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 67.
133Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN7 s Role 
in International Security,7 p. 67.
352
Union to withdraw its forces from Hungary was ignored, and 
no action followed."134 He further claims that "This was 
not simply because France and Britain were 'persuadable' in 
a way that the Soviet Union was not." Instead, "It was 
because in the case of the Soviet Union the UN did not dare 
to do more than try to persuade, and the Russians knew 
it."135
Howard is convinced that after these two incidents in 
1956, the future ahead for the United Nations in its 
attempts at fulfilling its primary role of maintaining 
peace and security would be more or less predictable, 
especially when a conflict erupted in which either of the 
two superpowers had national interests at stake. He 
explains:
The lessons of 1956 were clear. First, the UN 
could take action against 'aggression' only if the two 
great powers were agreed, or if one of them was 
indifferent; second, there were only two powers who 
counted. So, for many years, it remained. Whatever 
resolutions might be passed in the General Assembly, 
the UN was no more likely to take action against the 
Soviet Union over, say, Afghanistan than it was 
against the United States over Nicaragua. Whatever 
measure of collective security might be created, the 
superpowers could effectively defy them, and any state
134Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role 
in International Security," p. 67.
135Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role 
in International Security," p. 67.
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enjoying the vigorous support of either could probably
do the same."136
Even as early as 1956, emerging lack of faith in the 
United Nations as an effective force for peace was evident. 
Roberts7 and Kingsbury's first passage quoted above takes 
UN inaction through 1979. Howard continues this line of 
argument with further evidence of UN intransigence. Here, 
he notes several more instances of UN inaction during the 
1970s and 1980s: "While the UN General Assembly spent
countless hours of time and reams of paper discussing 
grandiose projects for disarmament, no action was taken 
over such instances of inter-state aggression as Iraq's 
assault on Iran in 1980, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 
1982, or Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1975.7/137
However disillusioned people were with the prospects 
for peace through international organization from the 1950s 
through the 1980s, there appeared to be a renewed sense of 
hope that as the Cold War ended, the United Nations might 
finally be in a position to achieve what it set out to in 
1945. Paul F. Diehl notes, "The prospects for expanding 
the roles, functions, and powers of international
136Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role 
in International Security," pp. 67-68.
137Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role 
in International Security," p. 77.
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organizations in global governance seemed bright at the 
'beginning of the 1990s."138 Indeed, even Howard
acknowledges effective UN action during the Gulf War. 
Still, his following comments suggest the unique 
circumstances of the period and more cynical motives behind 
Security Council collaboration than enthusiastic agreement 
on halting aggression. He states:
Only in 1990, confronted with the blatant 
aggression of Iraq against Kuwait, did the UN take any 
action, and the circumstances were exceptional. The 
interests of all major Western powers were involved; 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China 
were virtual pensioners of the United States; the 
great majority of Middle Eastern states were alarmed 
at the prospect of Saddam Hussein so suddenly and 
brutally extending his power. For the first time the 
UN acted as its founders had intended. It is an 
encouraging precedent, but we would be deceiving 
ourselves if we thought that such an exceptional 
combination of circumstances was likely often to
1 *50
recur."
The "encouraging precedent" that Howard believes was 
established by the Gulf War in the early 1990s was short­
lived. According to Diehl, "a series of events underscored 
the problems and limitations of international organizations
138Paul F. Diehl, "Introduction" in Paul F. Diehl, ed. , 
The Politics of Global Governance: International
Organizations in an Interdependent World (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), p. 3.
139Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role 
in International Security," p. 77.
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as they approached the twenty-first century."140
Importantly, he explains, "The enhanced ability of the 
Security Council to authorize new peacekeeping missions did 
not necessarily translate into greater effectiveness in 
halting armed conflict or promoting conflict resolution."141 
He then offers examples of conflicts during the 1990s in 
which the UN either acted and failed or failed to act. He
notes, "The UN was largely ineffective in stopping the
fighting in Bosnia, could not produce a political 
settlement in Somalia, and was too slow to prevent genocide 
in Rwanda."142 Writing in the early to middle 1990s, Brian 
Urquhart would clearly concur with Diehl's 1997 remarks. 
Urquhart states that "The credibility of the UN is being 
tested and found wanting in former Yugoslavia, as it was in 
Angola after the 1992 election. It may be seriously damaged 
in Cambodia and Somalia."143 Focusing as well on the
Security Council, he asserts that "Many of the Security 
Council's decisions on conflict resolution at present lack
140Diehl, "Introduction," p. 3.
141Diehl, "Introduction," p. 3.
142Diehl, "Introduction," p. 3.
143Brian Urquhart, "The UN and International Security 
after the Cold War" in Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, 
eds., United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in
International Relations, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1993), p. 82.
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either the legal and political strength to make them 
respected, or the means to implement them in an effective 
way."144 What appeared to be an auspicious time for UN 
engagement and potential success at deterring conflict 
immediately following the Cold War never materialized. 
Urquhart concludes, "After a brief post-Cold War honeymoon, 
the UN is once again suffering from the inability to 
enforce its decisions in critical situations, this time 
without the excuse of the obstacles created by the Cold 
War. "145
The above scholars commenting on the United Nations 
conclude that it has generally failed to carry out its 
primary objective: the collective maintenance of
international peace and security. Several of these same 
scholars recognize its accomplishments in other areas and 
it is important to note that the thesis does not argue that 
the United Nations has not made significant contributions 
in the economic and social realm or with regard to human 
rights (or that international organizations, in general, 
have not proliferated or have not been influential during
144Urquhart, "The UN and International Security after 
the Cold War," p. 82.
145Urquhart, "The UN and International Security after 
the Cold War," p. 82.
357
the twentieth century) .146 However, over the course of the 
second half of the twentieth century, the period during 
which Pattern Two is indeed revealed, the history of the UN 
has been such that faith in permanent international 
organization as a way to peace and security has clearly 
subsided. Howard reminds us that the United Nations "has 
not succeeded in its primary task. It has not created a 
new world order in which every state derives its security 
from the collective strength of the whole. It has been 
able only to reflect the disorders, fears, and rivalries of
146Howard notes that "The UN has achieved much . . .  It
preserved those elements of international cooperation --
the World Health Organization, the International Labour
Organization, and the International Court of Justice --
which already existed . . .  It eased the transformation of 
the world from a Eurocentric to a truly global system . . .
It . . . enables the smallest and least considerable of its
members to feel themselves part of a world community." 
Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role in 
International Security," pp. 79-80. Roberts and Kingsbury 
explain that the "UN's contribution came to be seen by many 
as being less in the field of peace between major powers 
than in other areas: defusing certain regional conflicts,
advocating self-determination, assisting decolonization, 
codifying international law, protecting human rights, and 
providing a possible framework for social and economic 
improvement, even for redistribution of wealth on a global 
scale." Roberts & Kingsbury, "Introduction: The UN's Roles 
in International Society since 1945," p. 19. Mangone 
explains, "In number and in function, international 
organizations have multiplied rapidly during the last 
century." Mangone, A Short History of International 
Organization, p. 10.
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the world."147 Peter Wilenski notes that "Through the worst 
years of the Cold War the UN was no more than a bit player 
in international peace and security issues: at its worst a 
propaganda forum, at its best playing a supporting role in 
the provision of peacekeeping forces once regional 
hostilities had ceased."148 He explains that the end result 
is that "it did not play the role that its founders had 
anticipated."149 Finally, writing in the mid-1980s, F.S. 
Northedge echoes the declining hope in 'international 
organization as peacemaker7 with his pronouncement that the 
failure of the United Nations "raises profound questions 
about the collective organization of peace through 
international organization.7/150 While international
organization continues to thrive, lack of faith in its 
potential and ability to maintain international peace and 
security has persisted from the mid-twentieth century to
147Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN7s Role 
in International Security," pp. 79-80.
148Peter Wilenski, "The Structure of the UN in the 
Post-Cold War Period" in Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, 
eds., United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in
International Relations, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1993), p. 437.
149Wilenski, "The Structure of the UN in the Post-Cold 
War Period," p. 43 7.
150F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and 
Times, 1920-1946 (Leicester: Leicester University Press,
1986), p. 282.
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today. The great hope of the Anglo-American world that a 
permanent international authority might bring perpetual 
peace no longer inspires as it once did.
The Nexus
The demonstrated phenomenon of ever-declining faith in 
peace proposals above the state level during the second 
half of the twentieth century was reflected in 
interpretations of Kant's Perpetual Peace completed during 
this period. This important treatise, for so long 
understood as favoring some form of peace proposal above 
the state, began to be viewed in an entirely different 
light from the mid-twentieth century onwards. Beginning in 
the 1950s and 1960s, then fully established by the 1980s 
and 1990s, a second pattern unambiguously replaced the 
first. Thorough interpretations of the text completed by 
Hinsley, Waltz and Gallie (among others) began to change 
the way Perpetual Peace was understood in academic 
International Relations by the 1960s and 1970s.
Coupling the disappointing record of the League with 
ever-increasing acknowledgment of the UN's incompetence in
the midst of intense bi-polar rivalry, there existed for
(
the first time in a long while little intellectual or
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political enthusiasm for world government, international 
federation or international organization as modes of a 
permanent authority above the state that might maintain 
peace and security. This coincided with the theoretical 
reorientation of the discipline of International Relations 
after 1945. Chris Brown notes, "in the years after 1945, 
realism became the dominant theory of IR.7/151 He further 
asserts, "Diplomats (and now academics) held views that 
were realist as the discipline of IR expanded on broadly 
realist lines."152 Idealism, and the conventional
identification of it with peace proposals above the state 
level, was replaced by realism's focus on state-centered
approaches to peace and security from the 1950s through the
1970s. Reflecting the historical and academic spirit of
this period and its alternative approaches to peace and 
security, Pattern Two, Phase One interpreters analyzed the 
same translated treatise as their Pattern One predecessors, 
yet saw the text as favoring the preservation of state 
sovereignty, rather than its limitation, as the path to 
peace.
151Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations 
(London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1997), p. 31.
152Brown, Understanding International Relations, p. 31.
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Interpretations stating that Kant's text favored peace 
proposals 'at the state level' as opposed to 'above the
state level' proliferated thereafter. With ever greater
focus on text outside the Second Definitive Article, these 
interpreters drew from the Preliminary Articles, the Third 
Definitive Article and the First Supplement and arrived at 
a state-centric reading of the full text. These Pattern
Two, Phase One interpreters understood Kant's text to 
suggest that, ultimately, peace between sovereign states 
would be guaranteed not by a centralized authority above 
them, but by the external forces of nature and history
working upon and through them.
By the early 1980s, with the state-centric reading
already predominant, new emphasis on the practical reason 
for adopting the First Definitive Article of Kant's text in 
Doyle's most influential interpretation lead to the 
development of a second phase of Pattern Two. Still
viewing the text as setting forth a peace proposal at the 
state level, Doyle's interpretation fueled a transformation 
in understanding exactly how Kant thought peace would be 
achieved between independent states. Simply stated, Doyle 
viewed Perpetual Peace as the textual foundation for the
idea of the 'liberal peace.' Since Doyle's well-known
empirical study on the 'liberal peace' was published,
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advanced studies on the idea have proliferated. Kant's 
Perpetual Peace has not been the same since.
Inspired primarily by Doyle's study in the mid-1980s, 
the 'liberal peace' phenomenon reached its peak in the 
triumphant years for liberal democracy immediately 
following the Cold War. The groundswell of interest, 
especially in America, in the notion that peace between 
states could be achieved at the state level through the 
adoption of representative government became extremely 
influential. Many fervently argued in favor of the 
proposition while others saw it as historically shallow 
propaganda. Whether for or against, interpreters looking 
at Perpetual Peace have been affected by the outpouring of 
'liberal peace' literature over the last two decades of the 
twentieth century. The 'liberal peace' phenomenon has 
clearly influenced the development of a new phase of 
interpretation. This new interpretive phase, which
gathered strength in substance and in numbers through the 
1990s, suggested that Kant's most important words were 
written in the First Definitive Article. These words read 
that peace between sovereign states would emerge so long as 
they adopted republican constitutions.
Therefore, the two phases of Pattern Two, with their 
outright rejection of earlier interpreters' positions that
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the text favored peace proposals above the state level, 
became a function of the historical decline in hopes for 
peace through international federation or world government. 
Importantly, there was little chance that Pattern One could 
be sustained with any real credibility or legitimacy 
considering the international situation post-1950. It is 
apparent that during the latter half of the twentieth 
century, with declining faith in international organization 
as the prescription for peace, hopes for peace shifted to a 
focus on more state-centered approaches. Whether adopting 
the general 'statist7 interpretation of Phase One or the 
more specific 'liberal peace7 interpretation of Phase Two, 
Pattern Two interpreters7 view that a state-centric 
approach to peace was all that Kant envisioned clearly 
reflected this shift. In essence, the shift in patterns 
became a function of the shift in hopes.
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CHAPTER NINE
FROM THE TURMOIL OF INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 
TO THE CALM OF THE LIBERAL PEACE
Introduction
Complementing the principal explanation for patterns 
developed in Chapter Eight is a subsidiary explanation 
which reflects on the steady increase in the number of 
liberal states in the western hemisphere over the past one 
hundred and fifty-five years and the affect of this 
evolving historico-political phenomenon on the minds of 
interpreters at work during this time period and in this 
geographical space.
In developing this explanation, I return first to 
Doyle's 1983 article and discuss his initial conclusions 
that the drift towards liberal, representative governments 
over the past two centuries is indeed an empirical fact. 
Second, while Doyle's belief in the 'liberal peace' that 
follows from this is admittedly controversial, I argue that 
it is difficult to disregard the relatively tranquil 
relationships that have existed between the majority of 
like-minded liberal states over the past two centuries. 
Finally, keeping Doyle's arguments in mind, I posit a 
relationship between the historical ascendancy of the
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liberal state and interpretation of Kant's Perpetual Peace. 
As part of this final argument, I demonstrate the interplay 
between this unfolding theme and the explanation offered in 
Chapter Eight.
Doyle and the Historical Drift Towards an Ever-Increasing 
Number of Liberal States
There has been no shortage of friendly colloquy or 
intense debate on the issue of the 'liberal peace' over the 
past two decades since it was first widely considered in 
Doyle's 1983 article "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign 
Affairs." Arguments for and against it are passionately 
held and offered with genuine credibility by either side.1 
Some scholars refer to the 'liberal peace' proposition as 
"one of the strongest nontrivial or non-tautological 
generalizations that can be made about international 
relations"2 or, even more boldly, as "the closest thing we 
have to an empirical law in international relations."3
1Footnote 4 in Chapter Five offers a lengthy list of 
articles that present arguments both for and against the 
'liberal peace' claim.
2Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic
Governance of National Security, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990), pp. 119-23 cited in ' Wade L. 
Huntley, "Kant's Third Image: Systemic Sources of
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There are also those who, as Chris Brown states, "deal 
harshly with arguments that are based on the proposition 
that foreign policy behaviour can be related to the 
domestic structure of states."4 Brown mentions both Kenneth 
Waltz's and J.D. Singer's works as representative of this 
critique. Waltz views the 'liberal peace' argument as 
narrowly 'second image' in Man, the State and War and 
'reductionist' in Theory of international Politics.5 
Singer's 'Correlates of War' Project is also critical of 
the 'liberal peace' idea in that it "suggests that 
involvement in war is a function of position within the
international system --  broadly, the more important the
state, the more wars it has been involved in."6
the Liberal Peace," International Studies Quarterly 40 
(1996), p. 45.
3J. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988) , pp. 661-62 and N.
Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace," Journal of Peace Research 
29 (1992), p. 372 cited in Huntley, "Kant's Third Image,"
p . 46.
4Chris Brown, International Relations Theory (Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1992), p. 40.
5Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 80-123. Kenneth 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 18-37.
6J.D. Singer and Associates, Explaining War: Selected
Papers from the Correlates of War Project (London: Sage
Publications, 1979) cited in Brown, International Relations 
Theory, p . 41.
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Finally, there are those whose views lie somewhere in 
between. For example, Williams and Booth are persuaded 
that there may be a "connection between peace and 
republican constitutions" but still remark that "the sample 
is small and the historical conditions advantageous."7 
While disagreements over this controversial proposition 
persist, one important particular on which most scholars 
agree, regardless of the position they take on the 'liberal 
peace7 idea, is the following: over the past two centuries, 
there has been a gradual increase in the number of liberal 
states across the world.
As stated above, the authoritative study on this topic 
is Doyle's 1983 article. Within it, Doyle devotes four 
pages to a detailed table, which demonstrates the growth in 
the number of what he calls "liberal regimes" over the past 
two centuries.8 According to Doyle, the "essential four 
institutions" that determine whether or not a country is a 
"liberal regime" are the following: "market and private
7Howard Williams & Ken Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond
Limits" in Ian Clark & Iver B. Neumann, eds., Classical 
Theories of International Relations (Houndmills, 
Basingstroke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 
pp. 89-90.
8Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign 
Affairs, Part 1," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983),
pp. 209-212.
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property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; 
citizens who possess juridical rights; and 'republican,' 
representative, government with the latter requiring that 
the legislative branch have an effective role in public 
policy and be formally and competitively, either 
potentially or actually, elected."9
9Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 212. Importantly, I use the terms 'liberal' or 
'illiberal' and Doyle's terms "liberal
regime(s)/state(s)/republic(s)" or "non-liberal regime(s)/ 
state(s)" throughout this chapter. The terms
"'republican,' representative government(s)" or "non­
republican, unrepresentative government(s)" are also used 
and are a sub-category of Doyle's terms "liberal regime(s)/ 
state(s)/republic(s)" or "non-liberal regime(s)/state(s)," 
respectively. According to Doyle's adopted terminology and 
definition here, a "liberal regime [or state]" necessarily 
has "republican, representative government." The key is to 
avoid use of the terms 'democratic' or 'democracy' (unless 
it is understood to be 'representative democracy' as in the 
Freedom House survey below) in discussion of Perpetual 
Peace. Kant was clearly against the establishment of pure 
'democracy' since it was not 'representative.' In
Perpetual Peace, he states, "Of the three forms of 
sovereignty [autocracy, aristocracy and democracy], 
democracy, in the truest sense of the word, is necessarily 
a despotism, because it establishes an executive power 
through which all the citizens may make decisions about 
(and indeed against) the single individual without his 
consent, so that decisions are made by all the people and 
yet not by all the people; and this means that the general 
will is in contradiction with itself, and thus also with 
freedom." Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, edited by Hans 
Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), p. 101 (emphasis in original). 
This is a further reason why I choose the phrase 'liberal 
peace' over the more widely used phrase 'democratic peace' 
throughout this chapter and the thesis as a whole. Many 
scholars do, however, use the latter phrase throughout 
their studies and articles on the subject.
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Based on this definition, the table he creates 
illustrates that by the end of the eighteenth century there 
were only three liberal regimes.10 From 1800 to 1850, the 
number increased to eight.11 From 1850 to 1900, the number 
increased to thirteen.12 From 1900 to 1945, the number 
increased to twenty-nine.13 And from 1945 to the
publication of the article in 1983 the number of liberal 
regimes increased to forty-nine.14
In a separate study, Freedom House, which has 
monitored the growth of political and civil liberties in 
countries throughout the world for the past several 
decades, published in the year 2000 its end-of-the-century 
Freedom in the World survey.15 On its "Map of Freedom," it 
counted the number of electoral democracies in 1989 at
10Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs 
Part 1," p. 209.
1:lDoyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 209.
12Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 210.
13Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," pp. 210-11.
14Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," pp. 211-12.
15Adrian Karatnycky, ed., Freedom House, Freedom in the 
World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil
Liberties 1999-2000 (New York: Freedom House, 2000) .
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sixty-nine, the number of electoral democracies in 1994 at 
one hundred and eight, and the number of electoral 
democracies in 2000.at one hundred and twenty.16 The Survey 
concludes, "In a very real sense, the twentieth century has 
become the 'Democratic Century. 17 Though the methodology 
in the form of a "Political Rights Checklist" used by 
Freedom House to determine whether or not a particular 
state is an electoral democracy is more extensive and 
detailed than that set out by Doyle above, there is general 
agreement between the two surveys that the essential 
requirement is representative government.18
16Karatnycky, ed. , Freedom House, The Map of Freedom 
2000, Http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey/2000/karat. html
(Accessed October 6, 2000).
17Karatnycky, ed., Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 
p. 590.
18Karatnycky, ed., Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 
pp. 583-84. Freedom House expands on Doyle's criteria to 
include the following more detailed version:
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government 
or other chief authority elected through free and fair 
elections? 2. Are the legislative representatives 
elected through free and fair elections? 3. Are their 
fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, 
fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots? 4. 
Are the voters able to endow their freely elected 
representatives with real power? 5. Do the people 
have the right to organize in different political 
parties or other political groupings of their choice, 
and is the system open to the rise and fall of these 
competing parties or groupings? 6. Is there a 
significant opposition vote, de facto opposition
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These two publications usefully demonstrate the 
increase in the number of liberal states over the time 
period of this interpretive history of Kant's Perpetual 
Peace. After a closer look at Doyle's survey, it also 
appears that the growth in the number of liberal states 
occurred, generally speaking, in a west to east direction. 
The three liberal states Doyle includes up to the end of
power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition 
to increase its support or gain power through
elections? 7. Are the people free from domination by 
military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, 
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any 
other powerful group? 8. Do cultural, ethnic, 
religious, and other minority groups have reasonable 
self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or 
participation through informal consensus in the
decision-making process? And finally, for what
Freedom House calls 'discretionary political rights' 
questions, they ask first for traditional monarchies 
that have no parties or electoral process, whether the 
system provides for consultation with the people, 
encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to 
petition the ruler, and second whether the government 
or occupying power is deliberately changing the ethnic 
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy 
a culture or tip the political balance in favor of
another group?
The Freedom House survey also includes an extensive 
"Civil Liberties Checklist" used in tandem with the 
"Political Liberties Checklist" to rate countries as
"free," "partly free," or "not free." Karatnycky, ed. ,
Freedom House, Freedom in the World, pp. 584-85. Within
that checklist, there is a section on "Personal Autonomy 
and Economic Rights" which basically embraces Doyle's 
criterion for inclusion in the 'liberal regime' category of 
a "market and private property economy."
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the eighteenth century are the Swiss Cantons, the French 
Republic from 1790-1795 and the United States from 1776 
onwards.19 These were the only three liberal regimes in 
place when Kant made his visionary proposition in 1795 that 
a gradual increase in states of this kind over a long 
period would ultimately bring peace between them. Kant's 
statement in the Second Definitive Article of Perpetual 
Peace is particularly telling. He remarks:
For if by good fortune one powerful and 
enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by 
its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this 
will provide a focal point for federal association 
among other states. These will join up with the first 
one, thus securing the freedom of each state in 
accordance with the idea of international right, and 
the whole will gradually spread further and further by 
a series of alliances of this kind.20
It is not certain whether Kant was referring to the United
States or the new French Republic when he made this remark.
He was more familiar and excited about the new ideas
19Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 2 09. In note "b" to his table of liberal 
regimes, Doyle explains, "There are domestic variations 
within these liberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was 
liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was 
liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when 
it became liberal throughout. These lists also exclude 
ancient 'republics,' since none appear to fit Kant's 
criteria." Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign 
Affairs, Part 1," p. 212.
20Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 104.
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boiling over in France. Still, he did know about the 
ideals of the revolutionary movement in the United States. 
Either way, he predicted a slow and gradual spread of 
liberal ideas and institutions from nascent and uniquely 
liberal regimes like the United States and France to the 
rest of Europe and beyond. Doyle's study appears to 
confirm Kant's prediction.
Kant also predicted (or at least hoped) that more and 
more states would, over time, form an "association" with 
the "one powerful and enlightened republican nation" to 
create a great and ever-expanding liberal alliance that 
would "secure the freedom of each state in accordance with 
international right."21 As Kant only expected liberal 
regimes to become part of this new association of states, 
an alliance possibly similar to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) comes to mind when one thinks of a 
twentieth century manifestation of Kant's original idea 
from this section of the text of Perpetual Peace.
Within this Kantian liberal alliance, peace not only 
exists within liberal states because of the establishment 
of civil society, representative government and the rule of 
law, but between liberal states as well. In his study,
21Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 104.
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Doyle boldly states his now rather famous thesis that "Even 
though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars 
with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal 
states have yet to engage in war with one another."22 He 
further asserts, "No one should argue that such wars are 
impossible; but preliminary evidence does appear to 
indicate that there exists a significant predisposition 
against warfare between liberal states."23 To prove this, 
he takes from Melvin Small and J. David Singer's 1982 book, 
Resort to Arms, an extensive table that lists the wars 
occurring between 1816 and 1980. Of the five hundred and 
seventy-five wars Small and Singer list, Doyle indicates he 
is only interested in international wars for the purposes 
of his argument. As such, in his table, Doyle uses a 
partial, chronological list of these wars, excluding civil 
wars and covert interventions.24 His simple point is that 
of the one hundred and eighteen international wars in his
22Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part lf" p. 213 (emphasis in original).
23Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part lt" p. 213.
24Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," pp. 214-15
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list that have been fought since 1816, not one has been 
between two liberal regimes.25
Importantly, he does not argue that these liberal 
regimes have always been peaceful. In fact, they have been 
as belligerent with non-liberal states as non-liberal 
states have been with each other. World War I and World 
War II come quickly to mind as fair examples of this. He 
only wishes to make the following two points: first, that
liberal regimes have generally been peaceful with other 
liberal regimes over the past two centuries and second, (by 
implication from the list of international wars between 
mostly non-liberal states he offers) that non-liberal 
states have been much more likely through the past two 
centuries to go to war with each other.
Finally, in what looks like anticipation on the part 
of Doyle of a possible attack by balance-of-power
25In Footnote 7 to his "well-known statement" already 
excerpted above, Doyle does make the admission that "There 
appear to be some exceptions to the tendency for liberal 
states not to engage in a war with each other." Doyle, 
"Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," 
Footnote 7, p. 213. His first example is Peru and Ecuador. 
His explanation is that "for each, the war came within one 
to three years after the establishment of a liberal regime 
[and] before the pacifying effects of liberalism could 
become deeply engrained." Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies 
and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," Footnote 7, p. 213. He also 
considers the clashes between Israelis and Palestinians 
along the border in Lebanon as a possible exception.
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theorists, he makes the important claim that "A liberal 
zone of peace, a pacific union, has been maintained and has 
expanded despite numerous particular conflicts of economic 
and strategic interest."26 He employs the example of the 
American Civil War. In it, as he explains, "the commercial 
linkages between the Lancashire cotton economy and the 
American South and the sentimental links between the 
British Aristocracy and the Southern plantocracy (together 
with numerous disputes over the rights of British shipping 
against the Northern blockade) brought Great Britain and 
the Northern states to the brink of war, but they never
passed that brink."27
Doyle also discusses relations between France and 
Britain during the twentieth century. He explains, 
"Despite their colonial rivalries, liberal France and 
Britain formed an entente before World War I against 
illiberal Germany (whose foreign relations were controlled 
by the Kaiser and the Army)."28 Also, he focuses on Italy's 
relationship to the Triple Alliance. He states, "During
26Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," pp. 213-15.
27Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," pp. 215-16.
28Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 216.
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1914-15 Italy, the liberal member of the Triple alliance 
with illiberal Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill 
its obligations under the Triple Alliance to either support 
its allies or remain neutral."29 According to Doyle, 
liberal Italy "joined the alliance with France and Britain 
that would prevent it from having to fight other liberal 
states, and declared war on Austria and Germany, its former 
allies."30 Finally, Doyle gives the example of the United 
States which, "despite generations of Anglo-American 
tension and British restrictions on American trade, leaned 
toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917. "31
The lessons Doyle takes from his study are several. 
First, "Statistically, war between any two states (in any 
single year or other short period of time) is a low 
probability event."32 Second, "War between any two adjacent 
states, considered over a long period of time, may be
29Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 216.
30Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 216.
31Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 216.
32Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 217.
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somewhat more probable."33 In relation to these two claims, 
Doyle's point is that "The apparent absence of war among 
the more clearly liberal states, whether adjacent or not, 
for almost two hundred years thus has some significance."34 
He seems even more impressed with the fact that liberal 
regimes, when confronted with world war, always have allied 
together. To this he says "when states are forced to 
decide, by the pressure of an impinging world war, on which 
side of a world contest they will fight, liberal states 
wind up all on the same side, despite the real complexity 
of the historical, economic and political factors that 
affect their foreign policies."35 I believe Doyle's final 
comment on this topic finds him at his most convincing. He 
states:
[H]istorically, we should recall that medieval 
and early modern Europe were the warring cockpits of 
states, wherein France and England and the Low 
Countries engaged in near constant strife. Then in 
the late eighteenth century there began to emerge 
liberal regimes. At first hesitant and confused, and 
later clear and confident as liberal regimes gained 
deeper domestic foundations and longer international
33Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 217.
34Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 217.
35Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,
Part 1," p. 217.
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experience, a pacific union of these liberal states
became established.36
Doyle's proposition (and the great number of articles 
it has spawned) has become an increasingly controversial 
topic over the past two decades in Political Science and 
International Relations. One noted twentieth century 
political philosopher certainly thinks there is merit to 
it. John Rawls writes in his most recent book The Law of
Peoples that "The historical record seems to suggest that
stability for the right reasons would be satisfied in a 
society of reasonably just constitutional democracies."37 
He then gives credit to Doyle for discovering this by his 
remark that "Though liberal democratic societies have often 
engaged in war against nondemocratic states, since 1800 
firmly established liberal societies have not fought one 
another."38
Rawls then goes through a long list of what he calls 
the "more famous wars of history" and notes that none of 
them were between "settled liberal democratic peoples."39
36Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 217.
3 7 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 51.
38Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 51.
39Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 52. Rawls' list
includes the Peloponnesian war, the Second Punic war, the
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Like Russett and Levy above, Rawls remarks, "The absence of 
war between major established democracies is as close as 
anything we know to a simple empirical regularity in 
relations among societies."40 Yet even with his
considerable support for Doyle's proposition, Rawls still 
notes historical incidents of liberal states engaging in 
"covert operations" against "weaker countries."41 In these 
instances, Rawls says such actions occurred "without the 
knowledge or criticism of the public."42
In this context and aware of these examples, Rawls 
supplements his remarks with the statement that 
"established constitutional democracy" is an "ideal" of 
which even liberal states sometimes fall short. Only when 
these states "approach that ideal" will "armed conflict 
between democratic peoples . . . tend to disappear .
and they will engage in war only as allies in self-defense 
against outlaw states."43 Rawls ends his section entitled
religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
and the great wars of the nineteenth century such as the 
Napoleonic wars, Bismarck's war, and the American Civil 
War. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 52.
40Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 52-53.
41Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 53.
42Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 53.
43Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 54.
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"Democratic Peace Seen in History" with the following 
comment: "I believe this hypothesis [the 'democratic peace'
as he calls it] is correct and think it underwrites the Law 
of Peoples as a realistic utopia."44
There are good arguments both for and against the 
existence of the 'liberal peace' and I do not intend to
come out strongly in favor of, or opposed to, Doyle's
original claim. As has been shown, a great political 
philosopher like Rawls certainly sees merit in it along
with noted political scientists whose numerous empirical 
studies have lent it further credibility. On the other 
hand, there are those who remain skeptical of it, e.g.,
Waltz, Singer, and Williams and Booth, or, even if they are 
persuaded by the apparent lack of war between liberal
states, offer alternative explanations that generally 
dismiss the theory that the 'liberal peace' is chiefly 
determined by the domestic political structure of sovereign 
states.
Above, I have attempted to explore the 'liberal peace' 
proposition and, based on the arguments and evidence
emphasized, it should be clear that I am reasonably
sympathetic to it. Concerning Doyle's original claim,
44Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 54.
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however, I make the following more modest assertion: well- 
established liberal states are less likely to be as 
belligerent with each other as non-liberal states are in 
their relations with each other. Another way of stating it 
is that authoritarian states are as aggressive with other 
authoritarian states as they are with liberal states. 
However, long-standing liberal states, though certainly 
aggressive with authoritarian states, are less likely to be 
aggressive with other liberal states. In sum, the pacific 
union of liberal states, gradually spreading from west to 
east, in fits and starts, and through many liberal gains 
and losses over the past two centuries, is a relatively 
recent though seemingly genuine historico-political 
phenomenon of continuing importance. Though debates on the 
'liberal peace' may have died down somewhat recently, 
discussion of the claim and its intellectual foundation 
should not become a fading scholarly memory of a few giddy 
liberals writing in the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War.
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The Historical Ascendancy of the Liberal State and the 
Establishment of a 'Liberal Peace': What Does It All Mean?
What does all this mean for writers who interpret a 
rather ambiguous, perhaps confusing, text like Perpetual 
Peace within a particular geographical, historical and 
political context? My argument is that the phenomenon of 
an ever-growing pacific alliance of sovereign liberal 
states, in development generally from the time of 
publication of Perpetual Peace, has conditioned the outlook 
of interpreters considering Kant's work.
Firstly, interpreters working from the middle to late 
nineteenth century through the early twentieth century 
(who, according to my research, were primarily British and 
American) were conscious of and realistically confronted 
with the historical fact that there existed a large number 
of non-liberal states. The phrase I used to describe the 
international situation during this period is the 'turmoil 
of international anarchy.' Essentially, the interpreters 
were aware of the historically belligerent tendencies of 
non-liberal states and the clear absence of any form of 
centralized authority above them to control the anarchical
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situation in international relations present between them.45 
Cognizant of these significant factors, they reasoned that 
a remedy for the aggressive tendencies of numerous non- 
liberal states was a permanent authority above them which 
would act as a restraint on their sovereignty, specifically 
their right to make war. With this in mind, they read 
Kant's text as favoring a solution to the problem of war 
above the state level. Reading the text of the Second 
Definitive Article, the interpreter took its rather complex 
language and viewed it in a way that reflected the general 
historical and political trend.
More to the point, Pattern One, Phase One 
interpretation, outlined in Chapter One, most certainly 
focuses on one particular passage. This passage states:
There is only one rational way in which states 
coexisting with other states can emerge from the 
lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like
individual men, they must renounce their savage and 
lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive 
laws, and thus form an international state (civitas 
gentium) .4S
45Doyle notes the following important point from Melvin 
Small and J. David Singer's influential work Resort to 
Arms: "Significantly, the most war-affected states have not 
been liberal republics." Melvin Small and J. David Singer, 
Resort to Anns (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications,
1982), pp. 176-79 cited in Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies 
and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," p. 228.
46Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant's Political 
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 105.
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Intellectually encountering this selection from the text 
when confronted with a large number of illiberal regimes 
which had proven themselves to. be violent towards each 
other for centuries, influenced the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century interpreter to conclude that the text 
offered a way out of this ancient predicament through the 
formation of a permanent and centralized authority above 
the collection of separate states.
As has been demonstrated in Chapter Three, this line 
of interpretation changed ever so slightly after World War
I. Commentators, many of them proponents of the League of
Nations, moved away from a focus on the Pattern One, Phase 
One selection quoted above and began to latch their 
interpretations to the alternative passage immediately 
following it. This primary passage (among several others 
they concentrate on) explains that there should be "a 
negative substitute [in place of the international state] 
of an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to 
prevent war."47 This "negative substitute" in the form of a
federation seemed to them the better option (or at least
the option they thought the text most likely embraced) .
47Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. 
Nisbet, p. 105.
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The interpretive thrust that developed was primarily 
couched in terms of, as one Pattern One, Phase Two 
interpreter stated, an authority above the state which 
required "'the surrender of a portion of power in return 
for participation in a wider, richer, and more secure 
life. ,//48
Historically speaking, the liberal alliance prevailed 
against illiberal Germany and Austria and it looked as if a 
new peace might reign with the founding of the League of 
Nations. Such an international institution offered, as 
Mowat says, "a reasonable compromise between the sacrifice 
of independence on the part of constituent States, on the 
one hand, and the wielding of universal despotic dominion 
on the other."49 Further, the pacific union of liberal 
states gradually expanded after 1919. From 1900 to 1945, 
sixteen countries were added to the list of liberal regimes 
as the total number went from thirteen at the end of the 
nineteenth century to twenty-nine by 1945.50 Most of these
48A.C.F . Beales, The History of Peace: A Short History 
of the Organized Movements for International Peace (New 
York: The Dial Press, 1931), p. 36.
49R.B. Mowat, The European States System: A Study of 
International Relations, Second Edition (London: Oxford
University Press, 1929; first published in 1923), p. 94.
50Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 210.
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new additions occurred after World War I. It is clear that 
the Anglo-American liberal alliance, which also included 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark as its liberal 
fringe on the continent, was gradually beginning to 
solidify itself.
Importantly, the collection of liberal regimes in
existence during the inter-war period was stronger and with
more members than anytime in history. Still, their
otherwise peaceful alliance remained relatively loose,
under threat, and was a much weaker bond than that which
formed after World War II. Germany and Austria, after a
brief period of liberalism, returned to illiberalism in
%
1932 and 1934, respectively, and did more than just 
threaten the liberal world thereafter.51 Accordingly, the 
interpretation of Perpetual Peace during the inter-war 
period continued to acknowledge that the text called for 
peace proposals above the state level, though proposals not 
as radical as those called for in times before World War I. 
The interpreter was just becoming aware of the potential of 
a pacific alliance of liberal states in the western world, 
though certainly not aware of it as a secure, well- 
entrenched idea for a lasting peace just yet.
51Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
Part 1," p. 210.
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Recognition of a pacific union of sovereign liberal 
states swept deeper into the consciousness of the 
interpreter when the liberal alliance further solidified 
itself during and after World War II. It was further 
entrenched by the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in 1949. This firm bloc of predominantly 
liberal states, fully conscious of itself, was aware of the 
peaceful tendencies between its member states, yet in the 
defensive position of 'cold' war with non-liberal states to 
its east. This, coupled with the emerging lack of faith in 
international organization as a path to peace, influenced 
the decision of the interpreter to introduce a more 'state- 
centric' view of the text from the 1950s onward.
The key point is that at this stage in history there 
was recognition by those within the liberal alliance that 
one certainty in an otherwise uncertain geopolitical world 
was the existence of peace between liberal states that 
willingly allied in defense of their liberal institutions 
and principles. As such, the focus of interpreters during 
this period shifted to an emphasis on Kantian phrases like 
the following: "This federation does not aim to acquire any 
power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and 
secure the freedom of each state in itself along with that 
of the other confederated states, although this does not
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mean that they need to submit to public laws and to a 
coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of 
nature." 52
Further, the following selection provided the 
interpreter with a wider array of support for his or her 
more 'statist' reading of the text of Perpetual Peace:
It can be shown that this idea of federalism, 
extending gradually to encompass all states and thus 
leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has 
objective reality. For if by good fortune one
powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic 
(which is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual 
peace), this will provide a focal point for federal 
association among other states. These will join up 
with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each 
state in accordance with the idea of international
right, and the whole will gradually spread further and
further by a series of alliances of this kind.53
Focusing on language from this excerpt like
"association among states," "alliance (of states)" and the
phrase "securing the freedom of each state," Pattern Two,
Phase One interpretation began to sense a genuine
commitment to the preservation of state sovereignty on the
part of the text in the Second Definitive Article.54 Such
52Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans.
Nisbet, p. 104 (emphasis in original).
53Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans.
Nisbet, p. 104 (emphasis in original).
54Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Hans Reiss, trans.
Nisbet, p. 104.
H.B
H.B.
H.B
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language conveyed the notion of an ultimate separateness of 
states so pivotal to this new pattern's identity. Language 
like "association of states" or an "alliance (of states)" 
directed interpretation away from the institutional 
character of the proposed international authority prevalent 
in both phases of Pattern One interpretation towards a 
loosely bound collection of independent liberal states. 
This is not even to mention Pattern Two, Phase One's new 
emphasis (discussed in detail in Chapters One and Four) on 
the Preliminary Articles, Third Definitive Article and 
First Supplement as further evidence of their belief that 
Perpetual Peace stood for the preservation of state 
sovereignty and the notion that the forces of history and 
nature acting upon and through independent states would 
guarantee peace between them in a distant future.
Finally, there was a shift in interpretation that 
occurred after Doyle's 1983 article, and was firmly 
established once into the 1990s. Discussed already in 
Chapters One, Five, Six, and Seven, it need only be 
repeated that the 'statist' view of the text originating in 
interpretations forming Pattern Two, Phase One, was further 
supplemented by a new emphasis on the practical reason for 
adopting the First Definitive Article during this period. 
These contemporary commentators began to view the most
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important part of the text to be Kant's suggestion that the 
representative nature of liberal states decreased the
likelihood that such regimes would choose to go to war with 
each other. They contrasted this unique idea with the
implicit claim that leaders of unrepresentative, 
authoritarian regimes would in fact be much more likely to 
engage in war with both non-liberal and liberal regimes 
alike. As such, the interpreters from the mid-1980s 
through the 1990s saw an ever-expanding liberal alliance of 
sovereign states as the text's key prescription for peace. 
During this period of unprecedented liberal optimism, this 
explanation for such an interpretation is very plausible.
In their remarks on the growing importance of Kant's 
thinking to International Relations, Williams and Booth 
acknowledged the following in 1996: "A further state [in
this direction of growing recognition for Kant] was reached 
with the liberal triumphalism at the end of the 1980s, with
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 'victory' of
Western democracy and capitalism."55 It was said, "World 
politics in important respects seemed to be moving in a
55Williams & Booth, "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits," p.
73 .
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'Kantian7 direction.7/56 But, as this thesis hopefully 
demonstrates, the 'Kantian7 direction for these and the 
majority of other interpreters during this period was far 
different than that espoused by interpreters writing on the 
same text and similar set of issues a century earlier.
With the alliance of liberal, independent states 
victorious (and victorious for the 'final7 time in one 
influential writer7s eyes), the former set of interpreters, 
witnessing this phenomenon, began to read Perpetual Peace 
as a text in favor of peace proposals at the state level.57 
'At the state level7 because they read the text in terms of 
the very evident 'calm of liberal peace7 firmly existing 
between sovereign, liberal states through the 1990s. In 
such a situation, the more radical 'above the state7 
remedies called for to effectively control the more 
aggressive tendencies of non-liberal states were no longer 
necessary in a world determined by an ever-expanding, 
peaceful alliance of liberal states. The turmoil of 
international anarchy was overcome by the calm of the
56Williams & Booth, ''Kant: Theorist beyond Limits,7 p.
73.
57Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992) .
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liberal peace and the interpretation of Kant's Perpetual 
Peace reflected this historical theme.
Conclusion: The Relationship between the Principal and
Subsidiary Explanations
There is a simple and clear connection between the 
principal explanation presented in Chapter Eight and the 
subsidiary explanation offered here. First, hopes for 
peace through international organization, so evident from 
the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, 
were also driven by the need to overcome the potentially 
aggressive ways of predominantly non-liberal states 
existing in an anarchic international system. Pattern One 
is a clear function of this.
As demonstrated however, the emergence of an intense 
and lengthy bi-polar rivalry that clearly prevented the 
United Nations from fulfilling its primary role of 
maintaining international peace and security meant that 
hopes for peace through international organization declined 
from the mid-twentieth century onwards. This corresponded, 
however, with a steady increase in the number of liberal 
states in the western world, especially over the course of 
the second half of the twentieth century, and manifested
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itself in establishment of a more formidable liberal 
alliance. This liberal alliance was the inspiration for 
the idea of the 'liberal peace' and empirical evidence 
followed which convincingly suggested that liberal states 
were far more peaceful in their relations with other 
liberal states than non-liberal states were with 
themselves.
International anarchy evident between non-liberal 
states, the only solution to which was establishment of a 
permanent, centralized authority above them, was overcome 
by the historical ascendancy of the liberal state in the 
West. Further acknowledgment of the 'liberal peace' 
phenomenon persuasively maintained that peace between 
liberal states could be achieved without the need of a 
strong federation or international state. As the second 
half of the twentieth century unfolded (and especially from 
the 1980s through the 'liberal triumphalism' of the 1990s), 
ever-decreasing faith in peace proposals above the state 
level was replaced by a newfound enthusiasm for peace 
proposals at the state level. Recognition of these 
significant factors led to the predominance of Pattern Two 
  a predominance that still exists today.
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EPILOGUE
Within the discipline of International Relations, 
Kant's Perpetual Peace has established itself as a
foundational text. The influential treatise is as complex 
and multi-faceted in its proposals as any he composed on
the subject. A substantial interpretive history of it
needed to be written and it is hoped that the thesis has
contributed to that effort. Yet the effort goes on. It 
will certainly be of interest to see how Perpetual Peace is 
understood through the next century. As it is translated 
into more and more languages, views of the text from 
interpretations written in different tongues will arise and 
gain influence. An even broader interpretive history may 
then be in order.
Further, it might also prove fruitful to complete 
interpretive histories of other influential works similar 
in content to Perpetual Peace and authored by noted 
classical theorists in the field of International 
Relations. Perhaps works by Grotius, Hobbes, Rousseau, or 
Bentham would be valuable to consider. My principal and 
subsidiary explanations could then be tested against 
interpretive histories of works written by such figures to
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see if they apply outside the context of Perpetual Peace. 
This could strengthen their validity as explanatory tools.
Most importantly, in the context of these historical 
explanations, it will be worthwhile to see whether Pattern 
Two, Phase Two endures in the interpretation of Perpetual 
Peace. As long as the liberal state continues its 
ascendancy and the idea of the 'liberal peace" maintains 
its legitimacy, my thesis suggests it will. One of the 
first notable interpretations of Perpetual Peace completed 
in the new century, by the UN Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan, certainly confirms this phase's continued 
predominance.
Given as the annual Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford on 
June 19, 2001, Annan points out that "Many would associate 
the idea of a connection between democracy and 
international peace with the work of Immanuel Kant, whose 
essay 'Perpetual Peace" was published in 1795.,fl Following 
exactly the same line as other Pattern Two, Phase Two 
interpreters, Annan views the First Definitive Article as 
the pivotal proposal of Kant's treatise. According to 
Annan, "Kant argued that 'republics' --  by which he meant
'Kofi Annan, "Why Democracy Is an International Issue," 
Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University, June 19, 2001
(University of Oxford: Press Office), p. 1.
Http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/po/annan.html (Accessed June 23, 
2001).
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essentially what today we call liberal or pluralistic
democracies were less likely than other forms of State
to go to war with one another."2 "Broadly speaking," Annan 
states, "the history of the last 200 years has proved him 
right."3 Annan continues with the following selection which 
mirrors the arguments in favor of the 'liberal peace7:
During [the past 2 00 years] there have been many 
horrible wars, which technology has made more 
destructive than those of earlier periods. And 
liberal democracies have played a big part in those 
wars. But almost always they have fought on the same 
side, not against each other. Dynastic states have
fought* each other throughout history --  and so have
religious states, totalitarian states, and military 
dictatorships. But liberal democracies have generally 
found other ways to settle their disputes.4
Annan is convinced that independent liberal states are
the foundation of international peace and that Kant's work
unambiguously endorses this idea. Nowhere in his lecture
does he state that Kant's treatise favors international
organization, federation, or a world state as the way to
peace. This is quite surprising considering his position
as UN Secretary General. Pattern Two, Phase Two appears to
be in good shape as the new century begins.
2Annan, "Why Democracy Is an International Issue," p.
1 .
3Annan, "Why Democracy Is an International Issue," p.
2 .
4Annan, "Why Democracy Is an International Issue," p.
2 .
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